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META MATH!
The Quest for Omega
by Gregory Chaitin
Gregory Chaitin has devoted his life to the attempt to understand what
mathematics can and cannot achieve, and is a member of the digital philos-
ophy/digital physics movement. Its members believe that the world is built
out of digital information, out of 0 and 1 bits, and they view the universe
as a giant information-processing machine, a giant digital computer. In this
book on the history of ideas, Chaitin traces digital philosophy back to the
nearly-forgotten 17th century genius Leibniz. He also tells us how he dis-
covered the celebrated Omega number, which marks the current boundary of
what mathematics can achieve. This book is an opportunity to get inside the
head of a creative mathematician and see what makes him tick, and opens
a window for its readers onto a glittering world of high-altitude thought that
few intellectual mountain climbers can ever glimpse.
ii Meta Math!
Cover
William Blake: The Ancient of Days, 1794.
Relief etching with watercolor, 9 1
8
× 6 7
8
inches.
British Museum, London.
iii
iv Meta Math!
Preface
Science is an open road: each question you answer raises ten new questions,
and much more difficult ones! Yes, I’ll tell you some things I discovered,
but the journey is endless, and mostly I’ll share with you, the reader, my
doubts and preoccupations and what I think are promising and challenging
new things to think about.
It would be easy to spend many lifetimes working on any of a number
of the questions that I’ll discuss. That is how the good questions are. You
can’t answer them in five minutes, and it would be no good if you could.
Science is an adventure. I don’t believe in spending years studying the
work of others, years learning a complicated field before I can contribute a
tiny little bit. I prefer to stride off in totally new directions, where imagina-
tion is, at least initially, much more important than technique, because the
techniques have yet to be developed. It takes all kinds of people to advance
knowledge, the pioneers, and those who come afterwards and patiently work
a farm. This book is for pioneers!
Most books emphasize what the author knows. I’ll try to emphasize what
I would like to know, what I’m hoping someone will discover, and just how
much there is that is fundamental and that we don’t know!
And yes, I’m a mathematician, but I’m really interested in everything:
what is life, what’s intelligence, what is consciousness, does the universe
contain randomness, are space and time continuous or discrete. To me math
is just the fundamental tool of philosophy, it’s a way to work out ideas, to flesh
them out, to build models, to understand! As Leibniz said, without math
you cannot really understand philosophy, without philosophy you cannot
v
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really understand mathematics, and with neither of them, you can’t really
understand a thing! Or at least that’s my credo, that’s how I operate.
On the other hand, as someone said a long time ago, “a mathematician
who is not something of a poet will never be a good mathematician.” And
“there is no permanent place in the world for ugly mathematics” (G. H.
Hardy). To survive, mathematical ideas must be beautiful, they must be
seductive, and they must be illuminating, they must help us to understand,
they must inspire us. So I hope this little book will also convey something
of this more personal aspect of mathematical creation, of mathematics as a
way of celebrating the universe, as a kind of love-making! I want you to fall
in love with mathematical ideas, to begin to feel seduced by them, to see
how easy it is to be entranced and to want to spend years in their company,
years working on mathematical projects.
And it is a mistake to think that a mathematical idea can survive merely
because it is useful, because it has practical applications. On the contrary,
what is useful varies as a function of time, while “a thing of beauty is a joy
forever” (Keats). Deep theory is what is really useful, not the ephemeral
usefulness of practical applications!
Part of that beauty, an essential part, is the clarity and sharpness that
the mathematical way of thinking about things promotes and achieves. Yes,
there are also mystic and poetic ways of relating to the world, and to create
a new math theory, or to discover new mathematics, you have to feel com-
fortable with vague, unformed, embryonic ideas, even as you try to sharpen
them. But one of the things about math that seduced me as a child was
the black/whiteness, the clarity and sharpness of the world of mathematical
ideas, that is so different from the messy (but wonderful!) world of human
emotions and interpersonal complications! No wonder that scientists express
their understanding in mathematical terms, when they can!
As has been often said, to understand something is to make it mathe-
matical, and I hope that this may eventually even happen to the fields of
psychology and sociology, someday. That is my bias, that the math point
of view can contribute to everything, that it can help to clarify anything.
Mathematics is a way of characterizing or expressing structure. And the
universe seems to be built, at some fundamental level, out of mathematical
structure. To speak metaphorically, it appears that God is a mathematician,
and that the structure of the world—God’s thoughts!—are mathematical,
that this is the cloth out of which the world is woven, the wood out of which
the world is built. . .
Preface vii
When I was a child the excitement of relativity theory (Einstein!) and
quantum mechanics was trailing off, and the excitement of DNA and molec-
ular biology had not begun. What was the new big thing then? The Com-
puter! Which some people referred to then as “Giant Electronic Brains.” I
was fascinated by computers as a child. First of all, because they were a great
toy, an infinitely malleable artistic medium of creation. I loved programming!
But most of all, because the computer was (and still is!) a wonderful new
philosophical and mathematical concept. The computer is even more revo-
lutionary as an idea, than it is as a practical device that alters society—and
we all know how much it has changed our lives. Why do I say this? Well, the
computer changes epistemology, it changes the meaning of “to understand.”
To me, you understand something only if you can program it. (You, not
someone else!) Otherwise you don’t really understand it, you only think
you understand it.
And, as we shall see, the computer changes the way you do mathematics,
it changes the kind of mathematical models of the world that you build. In
a nutshell, now God seems to be a programmer, not a mathematician! The
computer has provoked a paradigm shift: it suggests a digital philosophy, it
suggests a new way of looking at the world, in which everything is discrete
and nothing is continuous, in which everything is digital information, 0’s and
1’s. So I was naturally attracted to this revolutionary new idea.
And what about the so-called real world of money and taxes and disease
and death and war? What about this “best of all possible worlds, in which
everything is a necessary evil!?” Well, I prefer to ignore that insignificant
world and concentrate instead on the world of ideas, on the quest for under-
standing. Instead of looking down into the mud, how about looking up at
the stars! Why don’t you try it? Maybe you’ll like that kind of a life too!
Anyway, you don’t have to read these musings from cover to cover. Just
leap right in wherever you like, and on a first reading please skip anything
that seems too difficult. Maybe it’ll turn out afterwards that it’s actually
not so difficult. . . I think that basic ideas are simple. And I’m not really
interested in complicated ideas, I’m only interested in fundamental ideas. If
the answer is extremely complicated, I think that probably means that we’ve
asked the wrong question!
No man is an island, and practically every page of this book has benefited
from discussions with Franc¸oise Chaitin-Chatelin during the past decade;
she has wanted me to write this book for that long. Gradiva, a Portuguese
publishing house, arranged a stimulating visit for me to that country in
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January 2004. During that trip my lecture at the University of Lisbon on
Chapter V of this book was captured on digital video and is now available
on the web.
I am also grateful to Jorge Aguirre for inviting me to present this book as
a course at his summer school at the University of R´ıo Cuarto in Co´rdoba,
Argentina, in February 2004; the students’ comments there were extremely
helpful. And Cristian Calude has provided me with a delightful environment
in which to finish this book at his Center for Discrete Math and Theoretical
Computer Science at the University of Auckland. In particular, I thank
Simona Dragomir for all her help.
Finally, I am greatly indebted to Nabil Amer and to the Physics Depart-
ment at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights,
New York (my home base between trips) for their support of my work.
—Gregory Chaitin
Auckland, New Zealand, March 2004
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A` la femme de mes reˆves, the eternal muse,
and the search for inexpressible beauty. . .
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Quotes by Leibniz/Galileo
Leibniz —
Sans les mathe´matiques on ne pe´ne`tre point au fond de la philosophie.
Sans la philosophie on ne pe´ne`tre point au fond des mathe´matiques.
Sans les deux on ne pe´ne`tre au fond de rien.
Without mathematics we cannot penetrate deeply into philosophy.
Without philosophy we cannot penetrate deeply into mathematics.
Without both we cannot penetrate deeply into anything.
Galileo —
La filosofia e` scritta in questo grandissimo libro
che continuamente ci sta aperto innanzi a gli occhi (io dico l’universo)
ma non si puo` intender se prima non s’impara a intender
la lingua e conoscere i caratteri ne’ quali e` scritto.
Egli e` scritto in lingua matematica e
i caratteri sono triangoli, cerchi, ed altre figure geometriche
senza i quali mezi e` impossibile a intenderne umanamente parola;
senza questi e` un aggirarsi vanamente per un oscuro laberinto.
Philosophy is written in this very great book
which always lies open before our eyes (I mean the universe),
but one cannot understand it unless one first learns to understand
the language and recognize the characters in which it is written.
It is written in mathematical language and
the characters are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures;
without these means it is humanly impossible to understand a word of it;
without these there is only clueless scrabbling around in a dark labyrinth.
1
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Franz Kafka: Before the Law
Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the
country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that
he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and
then asks if he will be allowed to come in later on. “It is possible,” says the
gatekeeper, “but not now.” At the moment the gate to the law stands open,
as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in
order to see through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices
that, he laughs and says: “If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my
prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly
gatekeeper. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful
than the other. I can’t even endure even one glimpse of the third.” The man
from the country has not expected such difficulties: the law should always
be accessible for everyone, he thinks, but as he now looks more closely at
the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large pointed nose and his long, thin,
black Tartar’s beard, he decides that it would be better to wait until he
gets permission to go inside. The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows
him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There he sits for days and
years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he wears the gatekeeper out
with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him briefly, questioning
him about his homeland and many other things, but they are indifferent
questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always tells him once
more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has equipped himself
with many things for his journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable,
to win over the gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I
am taking this only so that you do not think you have failed to do anything.”
During the many years the man observes the gatekeeper almost continuously.
He forgets the other gatekeepers, and this one seems to him the only obstacle
for entry into the law. He curses the unlucky circumstance, in the first years
3
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thoughtlessly and out loud, later, as he grows old, he still mumbles to himself.
He becomes childish and, since in the long years studying the gatekeeper he
has come to know the fleas in his fur collar, he even asks the fleas to help him
persuade the gatekeeper. Finally his eyesight grows weak, and he does not
know whether things are really darker around him or whether his eyes are
merely deceiving him. But he recognizes now in the darkness an illumination
which breaks inextinguishably out of the gateway to the law. Now he no
longer has much time to live. Before his death he gathers in his head all
his experiences of the entire time up into one question which he has not yet
put to the gatekeeper. He waves to him, since he can no longer lift up his
stiffening body. The gatekeeper has to bend way down to him, for the great
difference has changed things to the disadvantage of the man. “What do
you still want to know, then?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.”
“Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is that in these many
years no one except me has requested entry?” The gatekeeper sees that the
man is already dying and, in order to reach his diminishing sense of hearing,
he shouts at him, “Here no one else can gain entry, since this entrance was
assigned only to you. I’m going now to close it.”
[This translation is by Ian Johnston of Malaspina College, Canada. Note that in Hebrew
“Law” is “Torah”, which also means “Truth”. Orson Wells delivers a beautiful reading of
this parable at the very beginning of his film version of Kafka’s The Trial.]
Chapter I—Introduction
In his book Everything and More: A Compact History of Infinity, David
Foster Wallace refers to Go¨del as “modern math’s absolute Prince of Dark-
ness” (p. 275) and states that because of him “pure math’s been in mid-air
for the last 70 years” (p. 284). In other words, according to Wallace, since
Go¨del published his famous paper in 1931, mathematics has been suspended
hanging in mid-air without anything like a proper foundation.
It is high time these dark thoughts were permanently laid to rest.
Hilbert’s century-old vision of a static completely mechanical absolutely rig-
orous formal mathematics, was a misguided attempt intended to demonstrate
the absolute certainty of mathematical reasoning. It is time for us to recover
from this disease!
Go¨del’s 1931 work on incompleteness, Turing’s 1936 work on uncom-
putability, and my own work on the role of information, randomness and
complexity have shown increasingly emphatically that the role that Hilbert
envisioned for formalism in mathematics is best served by computer pro-
gramming languages, which are in fact formalisms that can be mechanically
interpreted—but they are formalisms for computing and calculating, not for
reasoning, not for proving theorems, and most emphatically not for inventing
new mathematical concepts nor for making new mathematical discoveries.
In my opinion, the view that math provides absolute certainty and is
static and perfect while physics is tentative and constantly evolving is a
false dichotomy. Math is actually not that different from physics. Both are
attempts of the human mind to organize, to make sense, of human experience;
in the case of physics, experience in the laboratory, in the physical world, and
in the case of math, experience in the computer, in the mental mindscape of
pure mathematics.
And mathematics is far from static and perfect; it is constantly evolving,
constantly changing, constantly morphing itself into new forms. New con-
5
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cepts are constantly transforming math and creating new fields, new view-
points, new emphasis, and new questions to answer. And mathematicians
do in fact utilize unproved new principles suggested by computational expe-
rience, just as a physicist would.
And in discovering and creating new mathematics, mathematicians do
base themselves on intuition and inspiration, on unconscious motivations
and impulses, and on their aesthetic sense, just like any creative artist would.
And mathematicians do not lead logical mechanical “rational” lives. Like any
creative artist, they are passionate emotional people who deeply care about
their art, they are unconventional eccentrics motivated by mysterious forces,
not by money nor by a concern for the “practical applications” of their work.
I know, because I’m one of these crazy people myself! I’ve been obsessed
by these questions for my whole life, starting at an early age. And I’ll give
you an insider’s view of all of this, a first-hand report from the front, where
there is still a lot of fighting, a lot of pushing and shoving, between dif-
ferent viewpoints. In fact basic questions like this are never settled, never
definitively put aside, they have a way of resurfacing, of popping up again in
transformed form, every few generations. . .
So that’s what this book is about: It’s about reasoning questioning itself,
and its limits and the role of creativity and intuition, and the sources of new
ideas and of new knowledge. That’s a big subject, and I only understand a
little bit of it, the areas that I’ve worked in or experienced myself. Some of
this nobody understands very well, it’s a task for the future. How about
you?! Maybe you can do some work in this area. Maybe you can push
the darkness back a millimeter or two! Maybe you can come up with an
important new idea, maybe you can imagine a new kind of question to ask,
maybe you can transform the landscape by seeing it from a different point
of view! That’s all it takes, just one little new idea, and lots and lots of
hard work to develop it and to convince other people! Maybe you can put a
scratch on the rock of eternity!
Remember that math is a free creation of the human mind, and as
Cantor—the inventor of the modern theory of infinity described by Wallace—
said, the essence of math resides in its freedom, in the freedom to create. But
history judges these creations by their enduring beauty and by the extent
to which they illuminate other mathematical ideas or the physical universe,
in a word, by their “fertility”. Just as the beauty of a woman’s breasts or
the delicious curve of her hips is actually concerned with child-bearing, and
isn’t merely for the delight of painters and photographers, so a math idea’s
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beauty also has something to do with its “fertility”, with the extent to which
it enlightens us, illuminates us, and inspires us with other ideas and suggests
unsuspected connections and new viewpoints.
Anyone can define a new mathematical concept—many mathematical pa-
pers do—but only the beautiful and the fertile ones survive. It’s sort of sim-
ilar to what Darwin termed “sexual selection”, which is the way in which
animals (including us) choose their mates for their beauty. This is a part of
Darwin’s original theory of evolution that nowadays one usually doesn’t hear
much about, but in my opinion it is much to be preferred to the “survival
of the fittest” and the “nature red in tooth and claw” view of biological evo-
lution. As an example of this unfortunate neglect, in a beautiful edition of
Darwin’s The Descent of Man that I happen to possess, several chapters on
sexual selection have been completely eliminated!
So this gives some idea of the themes that I’ll be exploring with you. Now
let me outline the contents of the book.
Overview of the Book
Here’s our road to Ω:
• In the second chapter I’ll tell you how the idea of the computer entered
mathematics and quickly established its usefulness.
• In the third chapter, we’ll add the idea of algorithmic information, of
measuring the size of computer programs.
• The intermezzo briefly discusses physical arguments against infinite-
precision real numbers.
• The fifth chapter analyzes such numbers from a mathematical point of
view.
• Finally the sixth chapter presents my information-based analysis of
what mathematical reasoning can or cannot achieve. Here’s Ω in all its
glory.
• A brief concluding chapter discusses creativity. . .
• And there’s a short list of suggested books, plays, and even musicals!
Now let’s get to work. . .
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Chapter II—Three Strange
Loves: Primes/Go¨del/LISP
I am a mathematician, and this is a book about mathematics. So I’d like
to start by sharing with you my vision of mathematics: why is it beautiful,
how it advances, what fascinates me about it. And in order to do this I will
give some case histories. I think that it is useless to make general remarks
about mathematics without exhibiting some specific examples. So you and
I are going to do some real mathematics together: important mathematics,
significant mathematics. I will try to make it as easy as possible, but I’m
going to show you the real thing! If you can’t understand something, my
advice is to just skim it to get the flavor of what is going on. Then, if you
are interested, come back later and try to work your way through it slowly
with a pencil and paper, looking at examples and special cases. Or you can
just skip all the math and read the general observations about the nature of
mathematics and the mathematical enterprise that my examples are intended
to illustrate!
In particular, this chapter will try to make the case the computer isn’t
just a billion (or is it trillion?) dollar industry, it is also—which is more
important to me—an extremely significant and fundamental new concept
that changes the way you think about mathematical problems. Of course,
you can use a computer to check examples or to do massive calculations, but
I’m not talking about that. I’m interested in the computer as a new idea, a
new and fundamental philosophical concept that changes mathematics, that
solves old problems better and suggests new problems, that changes our way
of thinking and helps us to understand things better, that gives us radically
new insights. . .
And I should say right away that I completely disagree with those who
say that the field of mathematics embodies static eternal perfection, and that
9
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mathematical ideas are inhuman and unchanging. On the contrary, these
case studies, these intellectual histories, illustrate the fact that mathematics
is constantly evolving and changing, and that our perspective, even on basic
and deep mathematical questions, often shifts in amazing and unexpected
fashion.1 All it takes is a new idea! You just have to be inspired, and then
work like mad to develop your new viewpoint. People will fight you at first,
but if you are right, then everyone will eventually say that it was obviously
a better way to think about the problem, and that you contributed little or
nothing! In a way, that is the greatest compliment. And that’s exactly what
happened to Galileo: he is a good example of this phenomenon in the history
of ideas. The paradigm shift that he fought so hard to achieve is now taken
so absolutely, totally and thoroughly for granted, that we can no longer even
understand how much he actually contributed! We can no longer conceive of
any other way of thinking about the problem.
And although mathematical ideas and thought are constantly evolving,
you will also see that the most basic fundamental problems never go away.
Many of these problems go back to the ancient Greeks, and maybe even
to ancient Sumer, although we may never know for sure. The fundamental
philosophical questions like the continuous versus the discrete or the limits
of knowledge are never definitively solved. Each generation formulates its
own answer, strong personalities briefly impose their views, but the feeling of
satisfaction is always temporary, and then the process continues, it continues
forever. Because in order to be able to fool yourself into thinking that you
have solved a really fundamental problem, you have to shut your eyes and
focus on only one tiny little aspect of the problem. Okay, for a while you
can do that, you can and should make progress that way. But after the brief
elation of “victory”, you, or other people who come after you, begin to realize
that the problem that you solved was only a toy version of the real problem,
one that leaves out significant aspects of the problem, aspects of the problem
that in fact you had to ignore in order to be able to get anywhere. And
those forgotten aspects of the problem never go away entirely: Instead they
just wait patiently outside your cozy little mental construct, biding their
time, knowing that at some point someone else is going to have to take them
seriously, even if it takes hundreds of years for that to happen!
And finally, let me also say that I think that the history of ideas is the best
way to learn mathematics. I always hated textbooks. I always hated books
1See also the history of proofs that there are transcendental numbers in Chapter V.
Chapter II—Three Strange Loves: Primes/Go¨del/LISP 11
full of formulas, dry books with no colorful opinions, with no personality!
The books I loved were books where the author’s personality shows through,
books with lots of words, explanations and ideas, not just formulas and
equations! I still think that the best way to learn a new idea is to see
its history, to see why someone was forced to go through the painful and
wonderful process of giving birth to a new idea! To the person who discovered
it, a new idea seems inevitable, unavoidable. The first paper may be clumsy,
the first proof may not be polished, but that is raw creation for you, just as
messy as making love, just as messy as giving birth! But you will be able
to see where the new idea comes from. If a proof is “elegant”, if it’s the
result of two-hundred years of finicky polishing, it will be as inscrutable as a
direct divine revelation, and it’s impossible to guess how anyone could have
discovered or invented it. It will give you no insight, no, probably none at
all.
Enough talk! Let’s begin! I’ll have much more to say after we see a few
examples.
An Example of the Beauty of Mathematics:
The Study of the Prime Numbers
The primes
2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37 . . .
are the unsigned whole numbers with no exact divisors except themselves
and 1. It is usually better not to consider 1 a prime, for technical reasons (so
that you get unique factorization into primes, see below). So 2 is the only
even prime and
9 = 3× 3, 15 = 3× 5, 21 = 3× 7, 25 = 5× 5,
27 = 3× 9, 33 = 3× 11, 35 = 5× 7 . . .
are not primes. If you keep factorizing a number, eventually you have to
reach primes, which can’t be broken down any more. For example:
100 = 10× 10 = (2× 5)× (2× 5) = 22 × 52.
Alternatively,
100 = 4× 25 = (2× 2)× (5× 5) = 22 × 52.
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Note that the final results are the same. That this is always the case was al-
ready demonstrated by Euclid two thousand years ago, but amazingly enough
a much simpler proof was discovered recently (in the last century). To make
things easier in this chapter, though, I’m not going to use the fact that this
is always the case, that factorization into primes is unique. So we can go
ahead without delay; we don’t need to prove that.
The ancient Greeks came up with all these ideas two millennia ago, and
they have fascinated mathematicians ever since. What is fascinating is that
as simple as the whole numbers and the primes are, it is easy to state clear,
straight-forward questions about them that nobody knows how to answer,
not even in two-thousand years, not even the best mathematicians on earth!
Now I’d like to mention two ideas that we’ll discuss a lot later: irre-
ducibility and randomness.
Primes are irreducible numbers, irreducible via multiplication, via factor-
ing. . .
And what’s mysterious about the primes is that they seem to be scattered
about in a haphazard manner. In other words, the primes exhibit some kind
of randomness, since the local details of the distribution of primes shows no
apparent order, even though we can calculate them one by one.
By the way, Chapters 3 and 4 of Stephen Wolfram’s A New Kind of
Science give many other examples of simple rules that yield extremely com-
plicated behavior. But the primes were the first example of this phenomenon
that people noticed.
For example, it is easy to find an arbitrarily long gap in the primes.
To find N − 1 non-prime numbers in a row—these are called composite
numbers—just multiply all the whole numbers from 1 to N together (that’s
called N !, N factorial), and add in turn 2, 3, 4 up through N to this product
N !:
N ! + 2, N ! + 3, . . . N ! + (N − 1), N ! +N.
None of these numbers are prime. In fact, the first one is divisible by 2, the
second one is divisible by 3, and the last one is divisible by N . But you don’t
really need to go that far out.
In fact the size of the gaps in the primes seem to jump around in a fairly
haphazard manner too. For example, it looks like there are infinitely many
twin primes, consecutive odd primes separated by just one even number. The
computational evidence is very persuasive. But no one has managed to prove
this yet!
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And it is easy to show that there are infinitely many primes—we’ll do this
three different ways below—but in whatever direction you go you quickly get
to results which are conjectured, but which no one knows how to prove. So
the frontiers of knowledge are nearby, in fact, extremely close.
For example, consider “perfect” numbers like 6, which is equal to the
sum of all its proper divisors—divisors less than the number itself—since
6 = 3+2+1. Nobody knows if there are infinitely many perfect numbers. It
is known that each Mersenne prime, each prime of the form 2n−1, gives you
a perfect number, namely 2n−1× (2n−1), and that there are many Mersenne
primes and that every even perfect number is generated from a Mersenne
prime in this way. But no one knows if there are infinitely many Mersenne
primes. And nobody knows if there are any odd perfect numbers. Nobody
has ever seen one, and they would have to be very large, but no one is sure
what’s going on here. . . 2
So right away you get to the frontier, to questions that nobody knows how
to answer. Nevertheless many young math students, children and teenagers
who have been bitten by the math bug, work away on these problems, hoping
that they may succeed where everyone else has failed. Which indeed they
may! Or at least they may find something interesting along the way, even
if they don’t get all the way to their goal. Sometimes a fresh look is better,
sometimes it’s better not to know what everyone else has done, especially if
they were all going in the wrong direction anyway!
For example, there is the recent discovery of a fast algorithm to check
if a number is prime by two students and their professor in India, a simple
algorithm that had been missed by all the experts. My friend Professor Jacob
Schwartz at the Courant Institute of New York University even had the idea
of including a few famous unsolved math problems on his final exams, in
the hope that a brilliant student who was not aware that they were famous
problems might in fact manage to solve one of them!
Yes, miracles can happen. But they don’t happen that often. And the
question of whether we are burdened by our current knowledge is in fact a
serious one.
Are the primes the right concept? How about perfect numbers? A concept
is only as good as the theorems that it leads to! Perhaps we have been
following the wrong clues. How much of our current mathematics is habit,
2For more on this subject, see Tobias Dantzig’s beautiful history of ideas Number, The
Language of Science.
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and how much is essential? For example, instead of primes, perhaps we
should be concerned with the opposite, with “maximally divisible numbers”!
In fact the brilliantly intuitive mathematician Ramanujan, who was self-
taught, and Doug Lenat’s artificial intelligence program AM (for Automated
Mathematician) both came up with just such a concept. Would mathematics
done on another planet by intelligent aliens be similar or very different from
ours?
As the great French mathematician Henri Poincare´ said, “Il y a les
proble`mes que l’on se pose, et les proble`mes qui se posent.” There are
questions that one asks, and questions that ask themselves! So just how
inevitable are our current concepts? If evolution were rerun, would humans
reappear? If the history of math were rerun, would the primes reappear?
Not sure! Wolfram has examined this question in Chapter 12 of his book,
and he comes up with interesting examples that suggest that our current
mathematics is much more arbitrary than most people think.
In fact the aliens are right here on this very planet! Those amazing
Australian animals, and the mathematicians of previous centuries, they are
the aliens, and they are very different from us. Mathematical style and
fashion varies substantially as a function of time, even in the comparatively
recent past. . .
Anyway, here comes our first case study of the history of ideas in math-
ematics. Why are there infinitely many primes?
Euclid’s Proof That There Are Infinitely Many
Primes
We’ll prove that there are infinitely many primes by assuming that there are
only finitely many and deriving a contradiction. This is a common strategy in
mathematical proofs, and it’s called a proof by reductio ad absurdum, which
is Latin for “reduction to an absurdity”.
So let’s suppose the opposite of what we wish to prove, namely that
there are only finitely many primes, and in fact that K is the very last prime
number. Now consider
1 +K! = 1 + (1× 2× 3× · · · ×K).
This is the product of all the positive integers up to what we’ve assumed is
the very last prime, plus one. But when this number is divided by any prime,
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it leaves the remainder 1! So it must itself be a prime! Contradiction! So
our initial assumption that K was the largest prime has got to be false.
Here’s another way to put it. Suppose that all the primes that we know
are less than or equal to N . How can we show that there has to be a bigger
prime? Well, consider N ! + 1. Factorize it completely, until you get only
primes. Each of these primes has to be greater than N , because no number
≤ N divides N ! + 1 exactly. So the next prime greater than N has to be
≤ N ! + 1.
This masterpiece of a proof has never been equalled, even though it is 2000
years old! The balance between the ends and the means is quite remarkable.
And it shows that people were just as intelligent 2000 years ago as they are
now. Other, longer proofs, however, illuminate other aspects of the problem,
and lead in other directions. . . In fact, there are many interesting proofs that
there are infinitely many primes. Let me tell you two more that I like. You
can skim over these two proofs if you wish, or skip them altogether. The
important thing is to understand Euclid’s original proof!
Euler’s Proof That There Are Infinitely Many
Primes
Warning: this is the most difficult proof in this book. Don’t get stuck here.
In the future I won’t give any long proofs, I’ll just explain the general idea.
But this is a really beautiful piece of mathematics by a wonderful mathemati-
cian. It may not be your favorite way to prove that there are infinitely many
primes—it may be overkill—but it shows how very far you can get in a few
steps with what is essentially just high-school mathematics. But I really want
to encourage you to make the effort to understand Euler’s proof. I am not
a believer in instant gratification. It is well worth it to make a sustained ef-
fort to understand this one piece of mathematics; it’s like long, slow foreplay
rewarded by a final orgasm of understanding!
First let’s sum what’s called an infinite geometric series:
1 + r + r2 + r3 + · · · = 1/(1− r)
This works as long as the absolute value (the unsigned value) of r is less than
1. Proof:
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Let Sn stand for 1 + r + r
2 + r3 + · · ·+ rn.
Sn − (r × Sn) = 1− rn+1
Therefore (1− r)× Sn = 1− rn+1
and Sn = (1− rn+1)/(1− r).
So Sn tends to 1/(1− r) as n goes to infinity,
because if −1 < r < 1, then rn+1 goes to zero
as n goes to infinity (gets bigger and bigger).
So we’ve just summed an infinite series! Let’s check if the result makes
any sense. Well, let’s look at the special case r = 1/2. Then our result says
that
1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + 1/32 + 1/64 + . . . 1/2n + . . .
= 1/(1− r) = 1/(1/2) = 2,
which is correct. What happens if r is exactly zero? Then the infinite series
becomes 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 . . . = 1, which is 1/(1 − r) with r = 0. And if r is
just a tiny bit greater than 0, then the sum will be just a tiny bit greater
than 1. And what if r is just a tiny little bit less than 1? Then the infinite
series starts off looking like 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 . . . and the sum will be very big,
which also agrees with our formula: 1/(1− r) is also very large if r is just a
tiny bit less than 1. And for r = 1 everything falls apart, and coincidentally
both the infinite series and our expression 1/(1− 1) = 1/0 for the sum give
infinity. So that should give us some confidence in the result.
Now we’ll sum the so-called “harmonic series” of all reciprocals of the
positive integers.
1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 + 1/5 . . . =∞
In other words, it diverges to infinity, it becomes arbitrarily
large if you sum enough terms of the harmonic series.
Proof: compare the harmonic series with 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/4 + 1/8 +
1/8 + 1/8 + 1/8 + . . . Each term of the harmonic series is greater than or
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equal to the corresponding term in this new series, which is obviously equal
to 1 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + . . . and therefore diverges to infinity.
But the harmonic series is less than or equal to the product of
1/(1− 1/p) = 1 + 1/p+ 1/p2 + 1/p3 + . . .
taken over all the primes p. (This is the sum of a geometric series with ratio
r = 1/p.) Why? Because the reciprocal of every number can be expressed
as a product
1/(pα × qβ × rγ × . . .)
of the reciprocal of prime powers pα, qβ, rγ . . .
In other words,
1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 + 1/5 + 1/6 + 1/7 + 1/8 + 1/9 + 1/10 + . . .
≤ (1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + . . .)× (1 + 1/3 + 1/9 + 1/27 + 1/81 + . . .)
×(1 + 1/5 + 1/25 + 1/125 + 1/625 + . . .)× . . .
Since the left-hand side of this inequality diverges to infinity, the
right-hand side must too, so there must be infinitely many primes!
This leads to Euler’s product formula for the Riemann zeta function, as
I’ll now explain.
Actually, prime factorization is unique. (Exercise for budding mathemati-
cians: Can you prove this by the method of infinite descent? Assume that
N is the smallest positive integer that has two different prime factorizations,
and show that a smaller positive integer must also have this property. But
in fact 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 all have unique factorization, and if we keep going down,
we must eventually get down to there! Contradiction!)3
So, a special case of what is known as Euler’s product formula, 1+1/2+
1/3+ 1/4+ 1/5 . . . = (not ≤) product of 1/(1− 1/p) over all primes p. This
is a special case of the following more general formula:
ζ(s) = 1 + 1/2s + 1/3s + 1/4s + 1/5s . . . =
product over all primes p of 1/(1− 1/ps),
which gives us two different expressions for ζ(s), which is Riemann’s famous
zeta function. Above we have been considering ζ(1), which diverges to infin-
ity. The modern study of the statistical distribution of the primes depends
3For a solution see Courant and Robbins, What is Mathematics?
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on delicate properties of Riemann’s zeta function ζ(s) for complex arguments
s = a+ b
√−1, which is a complicated business that I’m not going to discuss,
and is where the famous Riemann hypothesis arises.
Let me just tell you how far I got playing with this myself when I was a
teenager. You can do a fair amount using comparatively elementary methods
and the fact that the sum of the reciprocals of the primes diverges:
1/2 + 1/3 + 1/5 + 1/7 + 1/11 + 1/13 + 1/17 + 1/23 + . . . =∞
This was established by Euler, and it shows that the primes cannot be too
sparse, or this infinite series would converge to a finite sum instead of diverg-
ing to infinity.
My Complexity-Based Proof That There Are
Infinitely Many Primes
Because if there were only finitely many different primes, expressing a number
N via a prime factorization
N = 2e × 3f × 5g × . . .
would be too concise! This is too compressed a form to give each number
N . There are too many N , and not enough expressions that concise to name
them all!
In other words, most N cannot be defined that simply, they are too com-
plex for that. Of course, some numbers can be expressed extremely concisely:
For example, 299999 is a very small expression for a very large number. And
22
99999
is an even more dramatic example. But these are exceptions, these
are atypical.
In general, N requires order of logN characters, but a prime factorization
N = 2e × 3f × 5g × . . .
with a fixed number of primes would only require order of log logN charac-
ters, and this isn’t enough characters to give that many, the required number,
of different N !
If you think of 2e × 3f × 5g × . . . as a computer program for generating
N , and if there were only finitely many primes, these programs would be
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too small, they would enable you to compress all N enormously, which is
impossible, because in general the best way to specify N via a computer
program is to just give it explicitly as a constant in a program with no
calculation at all!
For those of you who do not know what the “log” function is, you can
think of it as “the number of digits needed to write the number N”; that
makes it sound less technical. It grows by 1 each time that N is multiplied
by ten. log logN grows even more slowly. It increases by 1 each time that
logN is multiplied by ten.
Needless to say, I’ll explain these ideas much better later. The size of
computer programs is one of the major themes of this book. This is just our
first taste of this new spice!
Discussion of These Three Proofs
Okay, I’ve just sketched three different—very different—proofs that there are
infinitely many prime numbers. One that’s 2000 years old, one that’s about
200 years old, and one that’s about 20 years old! Notice how very, very
different these proofs are!
So right away, I believe that this completely explodes the myth, dear to
both Bourbaki and Paul Erdo¨s, that there is only one perfect proof for each
mathematical fact, just one, the most elegant one. Erdo¨s used to refer to “the
book”, God’s book with the perfect proof of each theorem. His highest praise
was, “that’s a proof from the book!” As for Bourbaki, that enterprising group
of French mathematicians that liked to attribute the output of their collective
efforts to the fictitious “Nicolas Bourbaki”, they would have endless fights
and revisions of their monographs until everything was absolutely perfect.
Only perfection was acceptable, nothing less than that!
In my opinion this is a totalitarian doctrine. Mathematical truth is not
totally objective. If a mathematical statement is false, there will be no proofs,
but if it is true, there will be an endless variety of proofs, not just one! Proofs
are not impersonal, they express the personality of their creator/discoverer
just as much as literary efforts do. If something important is true, there will
be many reasons that it is true, many proofs of that fact. Math is the music
of reason, and some proofs sound like jazz, others sound like a fugue. Which
is better, the jazz or the fugues? Neither: it’s all a matter of taste; some
people prefer jazz, some prefer fugues, and there’s no arguing over individual
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tastes. In fact this diversity is a good thing: if we all loved the same woman
it would be a disaster!
And each proof will emphasize different aspects of the problem, each proof
will lead in different directions. Each one will have different corollaries, dif-
ferent generalizations. . . Mathematical facts are not isolated, they are woven
into a vast spider’s web of interconnections.
As I said, each proof will illuminate a different aspect of the problem.
Nothing is ever absolutely black or white; things are always very complicated.
Trivial questions may have a simple answer: 2 + 2 is definitely not 5. But if
you are asking a real question, the answers are more likely to be: “on the
one hand this and that, on the other hand so and so”, even in the world
of pure mathematics, not to mention the real world, which is much, much
messier than the imaginary mental mindscape of pure mathematics.
Another thing about the primes and elementary number theory, is how
close you always are to the frontiers of knowledge. Yes, sometimes you are
able to prove something nice, like our three proofs that the list of primes is
endless. But those are the good questions, and they are in a minority! Most
questions that you ask are extremely difficult or impossible to answer, and
even if you can answer them, the answers are extremely complicated and lead
you nowhere. In a way, math isn’t the art of answering mathematical ques-
tions, it is the art of asking the right questions, the questions that give you
insight, the ones that lead you in interesting directions, the ones that connect
with lots of other interesting questions—the ones with beautiful answers!
And the map of our mathematical knowledge resembles a highway running
through the desert or a dangerous jungle; if you stray off the road, you’ll be
hopelessly lost and die! In other words, the current map of mathematics
reflects what our tools are currently able to handle, not what is really out
there. Mathematicians don’t like to talk about what they don’t know, they
like to talk about the questions that current technique, current mathematical
technology, is capable of handling. Ph.D. students who are too ambitious
never finish their thesis and disappear from the profession, unfortunately.
And you may think that mathematical reality is objective, that it’s not a
matter of opinion. Supposedly it is clear whether a proof is correct or not.
Up to a point! But whether a piece of math is correct isn’t enough, the
real question is whether it’s “interesting”, and that is absolutely and totally
a matter of opinion, and one that depends on the current mathematical
fashions. So fields become popular, and then they become unpopular, and
then they disappear and are forgotten! Not always, but sometimes. Only
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really important mathematical ideas survive.
Changing direction a bit, let me say why it’s good to have many different
proofs of an important mathematical result. Each, as I said before, illumi-
nates a different aspect of the problem and reveals different connections and
leads you in different directions. But it is also a fact, as was said by the
mathematician George Po´lya in his lovely little book How to Solve It (which
I read as a child), that it’s better to stand on two legs than on one. If a
result is important, you badly want to find different ways to see that fact;
that’s much safer. If you have only one proof, and it contains an error, then
you’re left with nothing. Having several proofs is not only safer, it also gives
you more insight, and it gives you more understanding. After all, the real
goal of mathematics is to obtain insight, not just proofs. A long, complicated
proof that gives you no insight is not only psychologically unsatisfying, it’s
fragile, it may easily turn out to be flawed. And I prefer proofs with ideas,
not proofs with lots of computation.
My Love/Hate Relationship with Go¨del’s
Proof
“The theory of numbers, more than any other branch of mathe-
matics, began by being an experimental science. Its most famous
theorems have all been conjectured, sometimes a hundred years or
more before they were proved; and they have been suggested by
the evidence of a mass of computations.”—G. H. Hardy, quoted
in Dantzig op. cit.
So number theory is an experimental science as well as a mathematical
theory. But theory lags far, far behind experiment! And one wonders, will
it ever catch up? Will the primes refuse to be tamed? Will the mystery
remain? I was fascinated reading about all of this as a child.
And then one day I discovered that a little book had just been published.
It was by Nagel and Newman, and it was called Go¨del’s Proof. This was
in 1958, and the book was an expanded version of an article that I’d also
seen, and that was published by the two of them in Scientific American in
1956. It was love at first sight! Mad love, crazy love, obsessive love, what the
French call “amour a` la folie.” Here in fact was a possible explanation for the
difficulties that mathematicians were experiencing with the primes: Go¨del’s
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incompleteness theorem, which asserts that any finite system of mathematical
axioms, any mathematical theory, is incomplete. More precisely, he showed
that there will always be arithmetic assertions, assertions about the positive
integers and addition and multiplication, what are called number-theoretic
assertions, that are true but unprovable!
I carried this book around with me constantly, absolutely and totally fas-
cinated, mesmerized by the whole idea. There was only one small, tiny little
problem, fortunately, which was that for the life of me I couldn’t understand
Go¨del’s proof of this wonderful meta-mathematical result. It’s called that be-
cause it’s not a mathematical result, it’s a theorem about mathematics itself,
about the limitations of mathematical methods. It’s not a result within any
field of mathematics, it stands outside looking down at mathematics, which
is itself a field called metamathematics!
I wasn’t an idiot, so why couldn’t I understand Go¨del’s proof? Well, I
could follow it step by step, but it was like trying to mix oil and water. My
mind kept resisting. In other words, I didn’t lack the necessary intelligence,
I just plain didn’t like Go¨del’s proof of his fabulous result. His original proof
seemed too complicated, too fragile! It didn’t seem to get to the heart of the
matter, because it was far from clear how prevalent incompleteness might in
fact be.
And this is where my own career as a mathematician takes off. I loved
reading about number theory, I loved computer programming (for example,
programs for calculating primes), I disliked Go¨del’s proof, but I loved Tur-
ing’s alternative approach to incompleteness using the idea of the computer.
I felt very comfortable with computers. I thought they were a great toy, and I
loved writing, debugging and running computer programs—FORTRAN pro-
grams, machine language programs—I thought that this was great mental
entertainment! And at 15 I had the idea—anticipated by Leibniz in 1686—
of looking at the size of computer programs and of defining a random string
of bits to be one for which there is no program for calculating it that is
substantially smaller than it is.
The idea was define a kind of logical, mathematical or structural random-
ness, as opposed to the kind of physical randomness that Einstein and Infeld’s
delightful book The Evolution of Physics emphasized to be an essential char-
acteristic of quantum physics, the physics of the microcosm. That’s another
book suitable for children and teenagers that I can highly recommend, and
that I also worshiped at that stage of my life.
Let me explain what happened better; I’ll now reveal to you one of the
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secrets of mathematical creation! I loved incompleteness, but not Go¨del’s
proof. Why? Because of the lack of balance between the ends and the
means, between the theorem and its proof. Such a deep and important—
philosophically important—mathematical result deserved a deep proof that
would give deep insight into the “why” of incompleteness, instead of a clever
proof that only permitted you to have a superficial understanding of what was
going on. That was my feeling, totally on intuitive grounds, pure instinct,
pure intuition, my subconscious, gut-level, emotional reaction to Go¨del’s
proof.
And so I set to work to make it happen! This was a totally subjective act
of creation, because I forced it to happen. How? Well, by changing the rules
of the game, by reformulating the problem, by redefining the context in which
incompleteness was discussed in such a way that there would be a deep reason
for incompleteness, in such a way that a deeper reason for incompleteness
could emerge! You see, within the context that Go¨del worked, he had done
the best that was possible. If you were to keep the setup exactly the same as
the one he had dealt with, there was no deeper reason for incompleteness.
And so I proceeded to change the question until I could get out a deep reason
for incompleteness. My instinct was that the original context in which the
problem of incompleteness was formulated had to be changed to one that
permitted such deeper understanding—that it was the wrong context if this
wasn’t possible!
Now you see why I say that the mathematician is a creator as much as
a discoverer, and why I say that mathematical creation is a totally personal
act.
On the other hand, I couldn’t have succeeded if my intuitions that there
was a deeper reason were incorrect. Mathematical truth is malleable, but
only up to a point!
Another way to put it, is that I wanted to eliminate the superficial details
that I thought obscured these deeper truths, and I proceeded to change the
formulation of the problem in order to make this happen. So you might
say that this is an act of pure invention, that I created a deeper reason for
incompleteness because I so badly wanted there to be one. That’s true up
to a point. Another way to put it is that my intuition whispered to me
because the idea wanted to be found, because it was a more natural, a
less forced way to perceive the question of incompleteness. So, from that
point of view, I wasn’t making anything happen, on the contrary! I simply
was acutely sensitive to the vague half-formulated but more natural view of
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incompleteness that was partially obscured by Go¨del’s original formulation.
I think that both views of this particular act of creation are correct:
On the one hand, there was a masculine component, in making something
happen by ignoring the community consensus of how to think about the
problem. On the other hand, there was a feminine component, in allowing
my hypersensitive intuition to sense a delicate new truth that no one else
was receptive to, that no one else was listening for.
The purpose of this book is to explain what I created/discovered to you.
It took many years of work, culminating with the halting probability Ω—
sometimes called Chaitin’s number—that’s the discovery that I’m most proud
of. It will take several chapters for me to explain all of this well, because
I’ll have to build the appropriate intellectual framework for thinking about
incompleteness and my Ω number.
The first step is for me to explain to you the starting point for my own
work, which most definitely was not Go¨del’s proof of 1931, but was instead
Turing’s alternative 1936 approach to incompleteness, in which the idea of
computation plays a fundamental role. And it’s thanks to Turing that the
idea of computation, that the idea of the computer, became a new force in
mathematical thinking. So let me tell you how this happened, and then
I’ll illustrate the power of this new idea by showing you the way in which
it solved an outstanding open question called Hilbert’s 10th problem, that
was formulated by Hilbert as one of a list of 23 challenge problems in 1900.
That’ll keep us busy for the rest of this chapter.
In the next chapter I’ll get back to my fundamental new idea, to what
I added to Turing, which is my definition of randomness and complexity
that Leibniz—who happens to be the inventor of the infinitesimal calculus—
clearly and definitely anticipated in 1686.
Hilbert, Turing & Post on Formal Axiomatic
Systems & Incompleteness
The first step in the direction of being able to use math to study the power
of math was taken by David Hilbert about a century ago. So I view him
as the creator of metamathematics. It was his idea that in order to be able
to study what mathematics can achieve, we first have to specify completely
the rules of the game. It was his idea to create a formal axiomatic system
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or FAS for all of mathematics, one that would eliminate all the vagueness in
mathematical argumentation, one that would eliminate any doubt whether
a mathematical proof is correct or not.
How is this done? What’s in a formal axiomatic system? Well, the
general idea is that it’s like Euclid’s Elements, except that you have to be
much, much more fussy about all the details!
The first step is to create a completely formal artificial language for doing
mathematics. You specify the alphabet of symbols that you’re using, the
grammar, the axioms, the rules of inference, and a proof-checking algorithm:
Hilbert Formal Axiomatic System
Alphabet
Grammar
Axioms
Rules of Inference
Proof-Checking Algorithm
Mathematical proofs must be formulated in this language with nothing
missing, with every tiny step of the reasoning in place. You start with the
axioms, and then you apply the rules of inference one by one, and you deduce
all the theorems! This was supposed to be like a computer programming
language: So precise that a machine can interpret it, so precise that a machine
can understand it, so precise that a machine can check it. No ambiguity, none
at all! No pronouns. No spelling mistakes! Perfect grammar!
And part of this package is that a finite set of mathematical axioms or
postulates are explicitly given, plus you use symbolic logic to deduce all the
possible consequences of the axioms. The axioms are the starting point for
any mathematical theory; they are taken as self-evident, without need for
proof. The consequences of these axioms, and the consequences of the conse-
quences, and the consequences of that, and so forth and so on ad infinitum,
are called the “theorems” of the FAS.4
4These ingredients are already in Euclid, except that some of his axioms are tacit, some
steps in his proofs are skipped, and he uses Greek instead of symbolic logic, in other words,
a human language, not a machine language.
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And a key element of a FAS is that there is a proof-checking algorithm,
a mechanical procedure for checking if a proof is correct or not. In other
words, there is a computer program that can decide whether or not a proof
follows all the rules. So if you are using a FAS to do mathematics, then you
do not need to have human referees check whether a mathematics paper is
correct before you publish it. You just run the computer program, and it
tells you whether or not there’s a mistake!
Up to a point this doesn’t seem too much to demand: It’s just the idea
that math can achieve perfect rigor, that mathematical truth is black or
white, that math provides absolute certainty. We will see!
Math = Absolute Certainty???
The first step in this drama, in the decline and fall of mathematical cer-
tainty, was an idea that I learned from Alan Turing’s famous 1936 paper
introducing the computer—as a mathematical idea, not with actual hard-
ware! And the most interesting thing about this paper, is Turing’s famous
halting problem, which shows that there are things that no computer can
ever calculate, no matter how cleverly you program it, no matter how pa-
tient you are in waiting for an answer. In fact Turing finds two such things:
the halting problem; and uncomputable real numbers, which we’ll discuss in
Chapter V.
Turing, 1936: Halting Problem
Here I’ll just talk about the halting problem. What’s the halting problem?
It’s the question of whether or not a computer program, one that’s entirely
self-contained, one that does no input/output, will ever stop. If the program
needs any numbers, they have to be given in the program itself, not read in
from the outside world.
So the program grinds away step by step, and either goes on forever, or
else it eventually stops, and the problem is to decide which is the case in a
finite amount of time, without waiting forever for it to stop.
And Turing was able to show the extremely fundamental result that there
is no way to decide in advance whether or not a computer program will ever
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halt, not in a finite amount of time. If it does halt, you can eventually
discover that. The problem is to decide when to give up and decide that it
will never halt. But there is no way to do that.
Just like I’m not polluting your mind with Go¨del’s proof, I won’t say a
word about how Turing showed that the halting problem cannot be solved,
that there is no algorithm for deciding if a computer program will never halt.
I’ll give you my own proof later, in the Chapter VI. I’ll show that you
can’t prove that a program is “elegant”, by which I mean that it’s the smallest
possible program for producing the output that it does. From the fact that
you can’t establish elegance, I’ll deduce the immediate consequence that the
halting problem must be unsolvable. Not to worry, it’ll all be explained in
due course.
But what I will explain right now is how Turing derived incompleteness
from the halting problem.
Turing: Halting Problem implies Incompleteness!
The idea is very simple. Let’s assume that we have a FAS that can always
prove whether or not individual programs halt. Then you just run through
all possible proofs in size order until you find a proof that the particular
program that you’re interested in never halts, or you find a proof that it
does in fact halt. You work your way systematically through the tree of all
possible proofs, starting from the axioms. Or you can write down one by
one all the possible strings of characters in your alphabet, in size order, and
apply the proof-checking algorithm to them to filter out the invalid proofs
and determine all the valid theorems. In either case it’s slow work, very
slow, but what do I care, I’m a theoretician! This isn’t supposed to be a
practical approach; it’s more like what physicists call a thought experiment,
“gedanken” experiment in the original German. I’m trying to prove a theo-
rem, I’m trying to show that a FAS must have certain limitations, I’m not
trying to do anything practical.
So, Turing points out, if we have a FAS that can always prove whether or
not individual programs halt, and if the FAS is “sound” which means that all
the theorems are true, then we can generate the theorems of the FAS one by
one and use this to decide if any particular program that we are interested
in will ever halt! But that’s impossible, it cannot be, as Turing proved in his
1936 paper and I’ll prove in a totally different manner in Chapter VI.
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So the FAS must be incomplete. In other words, there must be programs
for which there is no proof that the program halts and there is also no proof
that it will never halt. There is no way to put all the truth and only the
truth about the halting problem into a FAS!
Turing’s marvelous idea was to introduce the notion of computability, of
distinguishing things that cannot be calculated from those that can, and then
deduce incompleteness from uncomputability.
Turing: Uncomputability implies Incompleteness!
Uncomputability is a deeper reason for incompleteness. This immediately
makes incompleteness seem much more natural, because, as we shall see in
Chapter V, a lot of things are uncomputable, they’re everywhere, they’re
very easy to find.
(Actually, what Turing has shown is more general than that, it’s that
Soundness + Completeness implies
you can systematically settle anything you can ask your FAS!
In fact, in some limited domains you can do that: Tarski did it for a big
chunk of Euclidean geometry.)
My own approach to incompleteness is similar to Turing’s in that I deduce
incompleteness from something deeper, but in my case it’ll be from random-
ness, not from uncomputability, as we shall see. And random things are also
everywhere, they’re the rule, not the exception, as I’ll explain in Chapter V.
My Approach: Randomness implies Incompleteness!
Anyway, the next major step on this path was taken in 1944 by Emil
Post, who happens to have been a professor at the City College of the City
University of New York, which is where I was a student when I wrote my
first major paper on randomness. They were very impressed by this paper
at City College, and they were nice enough to give me a gold medal, the
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Belden Mathematical Prize, and later the Nehemiah Gitelson award for “the
search for truth”. It says that on the Gitelson medal in English and Hebrew,
which is how I happen to know that Truth and Law are both Torah in
Hebrew; that’s crucial in order to be able to understand the Kafka parable
at the beginning of this book. And as the extremely kind head of the math
department, Professor Abraham Schwartz, was handing me the Belden Prize
gold medal, he pointed to the photos of former professors hanging on the
wall of his office, one of whom was Emil Post.
Post had the insight and depth to see the key idea in Turing’s proof that
uncomputability implies incompleteness. He extracted that idea from Tur-
ing’s proof. It was a jewel that Turing himself did not sufficiently appreciate.
Post sensed that the essence of a FAS is that there is an algorithm for gen-
erating all the theorems, one that’s very slow and that never stops, but that
eventually gets to each and every one of them. This amazing algorithm gen-
erates the theorems in size order, but not in order of the size of the statement
of each theorem, in order of the size of each proof.
Hilbert/Turing/Post Formal Axiomatic System
Machine for generating all the theorems
one by one, in some arbitrary order.
Of course, as I believe E´mile Borel pointed out, it would be better to
generate just the interesting theorems, not all the theorems; most of them
are totally uninteresting! But no one knows how to do that. In fact, it’s not
even clear what an “interesting” theorem is.5
Anyway, it was Post who put his finger on the essential idea, which is the
notion of a set of objects that can be generated one by one by a machine,
in some order, any order. In other words, there is an algorithm, a computer
program, for doing this. And that’s the essential content of the notion of
a FAS, that’s the toy model that I’ll use to study the limits of the formal
axiomatic method. I don’t care about the details, all that matters to me
5Wolfram has some thoughts about what makes theorems interesting in his book. As
usual, he studies a large number of examples and extracts the interesting features. That’s
his general modus operandi.
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is that there’s an algorithm for generating all the theorems, that’s the key
thing.
And since this is such an important notion, it would be nice to give it
a name! It used to be called an r.e. or “recursively enumerable” set. The
experts seem to have switched to calling it a “computably enumerable” or c.e.
set. I’m tempted to call it something that Post said in one of his papers, which
is that it’s a “generated set”, one that can be generated by an algorithm,
item by item, one by one, in some order or other, slowly but surely. But I’ll
resist the temptation!
FAS = c.e. set of mathematical assertions
So what’s the bottom line? Well, it’s this: Hilbert’s goal of one FAS for
all of math was an impossible goal, because you can’t put all of mathematical
truth into just one FAS. Math can’t be static, it’s got to be dynamic, it’s got
to evolve. You’ve got to keep extending your FAS, adding new principles,
new ideas, new axioms, just as if you were a physicist, without proving them,
because they work! Well, not exactly the way things are done in physics, but
more in that spirit. And this means that the idea of absolute certainty in
mathematics becomes untenable. Math and physics may be different, but
they’re not that different, not as different as people might think. Neither of
them gives you absolute certainty!
We’ll discuss all of this at greater length in the concluding chapter, Chap-
ter VII. Here just let me add that I personally view metamathematics as a
reductio ad absurdum of Hilbert’s idea of a formal axiomatic system. It’s an
important idea precisely because it can be shot down! And in the con-
flict between Hilbert and Poincare´ over formalism versus intuition, I am now
definitely on the side of intuition.
And as you have no doubt noticed, here we’ve been doing “philosophical”
math. There are no long proofs. All that counts are the ideas. You just take
care of the ideas, and the proofs will take care of themselves! That’s the
kind of math I like to do! It’s also beautiful mathematics, just as beautiful
as proving that there are infinitely many primes. But it’s a different kind of
beauty!
Armed with these powerful new ideas, let’s go back to number theory.
Let’s see if we can figure out why number theory is so hard.
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We’ll use this notion of a computably enumerable set. We’ll use it to
analyze Hilbert’s 10th problem, an important problem in number theory.
More precisely, I’ll explain what Hilbert’s 10th problem is, and then I’ll
tell you how Yuri Matiyasevich, Martin Davis, Hilary Putnam and Julia
Robinson managed to show that it can’t be solved.
Davis, Putnam and Robinson did much of the preparatory work, and
then the final steps were taken by Matiyasevich. Some important additional
results were then obtained much more simply by Matiyasevich together with
James Jones. Matiyasevich and Jones built on a curious and unappreciated
piece of work by E´douard Lucas, a remarkable and extremely talented and
unconventional French mathematician of the late 1800’s who never let fashion
stand in his way. Lucas also invented an extremely fast algorithm for deciding
if a Mersenne number 2n−1 is a prime or not, which is how the largest primes
that we currently know were all discovered.
By the way, Martin Davis studied with Emil Post at City College. It’s a
small world!
Hilbert’s 10th Problem & Diophantine Equa-
tions as Computers
What is a diophantine equation? Well, it’s an algebraic equation in which
everything, the constants as well as the unknowns, has got to be an integer.
And what is Hilbert’s 10th problem? It’s Hilbert’s challenge to the world to
discover an algorithm for determining whether a diophantine equation can
be solved. In other words, an algorithm to decide if there is a bunch of whole
numbers that you can plug into the unknowns and satisfy the equation.
Note that if there is a solution, it can eventually be found by system-
atically plugging into the unknowns all the possible whole-number values,
starting with small numbers and gradually working your way up. The prob-
lem is to decide when to give up. Doesn’t that sound familiar? Yes, that’s
exactly the same as what happens with Turing’s halting problem!
Diophantus was, like Euclid, a Greek scholar in Alexandria, where the
famous library was. And he wrote a book about diophantine equations that
inspired Fermat, who read a Latin translation of the Greek original. Fermat’s
famous “last theorem”, recently proved by Andrew Wiles, was a marginal
annotation in Fermat’s copy of Diophantus.
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More precisely, we’ll work only with unsigned integers, namely the posi-
tive integers and zero: 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
For example, 3× x × y = 12 has the solution x = y = 2, and x2 = 7 has
no whole-number solution.
And we’ll allow an equation to be assembled from constants and un-
knowns using only additions and multiplications, which is called an (ordi-
nary) diophantine equation, or using additions, multiplications and expo-
nentiations, which is called an exponential diophantine equation. The idea
is to avoid negative integers and minus signs and subtraction by actually
using both sides of the equation. So you cannot collect everything on the
left-hand side and reduce the right-hand side to zero.
In an ordinary diophantine equation the exponents will always be con-
stants. In an exponential diophantine equation, exponents may also contain
unknowns. Fermat-Wiles states that the exponential diophantine equation
xn + yn = zn
has no solutions with x, y and z greater than 0 and n greater than 2. It
only took a few hundred years to find a proof! Too bad that Fermat only
had enough room in the margin of Diophantus to state his result, but not
enough room to say how he did it. And all of Fermat’s personal papers have
disappeared, so there is nowhere left to search for clues.
So that’s just how very bad an exponential diophantine problem can be!
Hilbert wasn’t that ambitious, he was only asking for a way to decide if
ordinary diophantine equations have solutions. That’s bad enough!
To illustrate these ideas, let’s suppose we have two equations, u = v and
x = y, and we want to combine them into a single equation that has precisely
the same solutions. Well, if we could use subtraction, the trick would be to
combine them into
(u− v)2 + (x− y)2 = 0.
The minus signs can be avoided by converting this into
u2 − (2× u× v) + v2 + x2 − (2× x× y) + y2 = 0
and then to
u2 + v2 + x2 + y2 = (2× u× v) + (2× x× y).
That does the trick!
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Okay, now we’re ready to state the amazing Matiyasevich/Davis/Put-
nam/Robinson solution of Hilbert’s 10th problem. Diophantine equations
come, as we’ve seen, from classical Alexandria. But the solution to Hilbert’s
problem is amazingly modern, and could not even have been imagined by
Hilbert, since the relevant concepts did not yet exist.
Here is how you show that there is no solution, that there is no algorithm
for determining whether or not a diophantine equation can be solved, that
there will never be one.
It turns out that there is a diophantine equation that is a computer. It’s
actually called a universal diophantine equation, because it’s like a universal
Turing machine, math-speak for a general-purpose computer, one that can
be programmed to run any algorithm, not just perform special-purpose cal-
culations like some pocket calculators do. What do I mean? Well, here’s the
equation:
Diophantine Equation Computer:
L(k, n, x, y, z, . . .) = R(k, n, x, y, z, . . .)
Program k
Output n
Time x, y, z, . . .
(The real thing is too big to write down!) There’s a left-hand side L, a right-
hand side R, a lot of unknowns x, y, z, . . . and two special symbols, k, called
the parameter of the equation, and n, which is the unknown that we really
care about. k is the program for the computer, n is the output that
it produces, and x, y, z, . . . are a multi-dimensional time variable!
In other words, you put into the equation L(k, n) = R(k, n) a specific value
for k which is the computer program that you are going to run. Then you
focus on the values of n for which there are solutions to the equation, that
is, for which you can find a time x, y, z, . . . at which the program k outputs
n. That’s it! That’s all there is to it!
So, amazingly enough, this one diophantine equation can perform any
calculation. In particular, you can put in a k that’s a program for calculat-
ing all the primes, or you can put in a k that’s a program for computably
enumerating all the theorems of a particular FAS. The theorems will come
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out as numbers, not character strings, but you can just convert the number
to binary, omit the leftmost 1 bit, divide it up into groups of 8 bits, look up
each ASCII character code, and presto chango, you have the theorem!
And this diophantine equation means we’re in trouble. It means that
there cannot be a way to decide if a diophantine equation has any solutions.
Because if we could do that, we could decide if a computer program gives any
output, and if we could do that, we could solve Turing’s halting problem.
Halting Problem unsolvable implies
Hilbert’s 10th Problem is unsolvable!
Why does being able to decide if a computer program has any output
enable us to decide whether or not a program halts? Well, any program
that either halts or doesn’t and produces no output, can be converted into
one that produces a message “I’m about to halt!” (in binary, as an integer)
just before it does. If it’s written in a high-level language, that should be
easy to do. If it’s written in a machine language, you just run the program
interpretively, not directly, and catch it just before it halts. So if you can
decide whether the converted program produces any output, you can decide
whether the original program halts.
That’s all there is to it: diophantine equations are actually computers!
Amazing, isn’t it! What wouldn’t I give to be able to explain this to Dio-
phantus and to Hilbert! I’ll bet they would understand right away! (This
book is how I’d do it.)
And this proves that number theory is hard! This proves that
uncomputability and incompleteness are lurking right at the core,
in two thousand-year old diophantine problems! Later I’ll show
that randomness is also hiding there. . .
And how do you actually construct this monster diophantine equation
computer? Well, it’s a big job, rather like designing actual computer hard-
ware. In fact, I once was involved in helping out on the design of an IBM
computer. (I also worked on the operating system and on a compiler, which
was a lot of fun.) And the job of constructing this diophantine equation re-
minds me of what’s called the logical design of a CPU. It’s sort of an algebraic
version of the design of a CPU.
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The original proof by Matiyasevich/Davis/Putnam/Robinson is compli-
cated, and designs an ordinary diophantine equation computer. The sub-
sequent Matiyasevich/Jones design for an exponential diophantine equation
computer is much, much simpler—fortunately!—so I was able to actually pro-
gram it out and exhibit the equation, which nobody else had ever bothered
to do. I’ll tell you about that in the next section, the section on LISP.
And in designing this computer, you don’t work with individual bits, you
work with strings of bits represented in the form of integers, so you can
process a lot of bits at a time. And the key step was provided by Lucas a
century ago and is a way to compare two bit strings that are the same size and
ensure that every time that a bit is on in the first string, the corresponding
bit is also on in the second string. Matiyasevich and Jones show that that’s
enough, that it can be expressed via diophantine equations, and that it’s
much more useful to be able to do it than you might think. In fact, that’s all
the number theory that Matiyasevich and Jones need to build their computer;
the rest of the job is, so to speak, computer engineering, not number theory.
From that point on, it’s basically just a lot of high-school math!
So what’s this great idea contributed posthumously by Lucas? Well, it
involves “binomial coefficients”. Here are some. They’re what you get when
you expand powers of (1 + x):
Binomial Coefficients:
(1 + x)0 = 1
(1 + x)1 = 1 + x
(1 + x)2 = 1 + 2x+ x2
(1 + x)3 = 1 + 3x+ 3x2 + x3
(1 + x)4 = 1 + 4x+ 6x2 + 4x3 + x4
(1 + x)5 = 1 + 5x+ 10x2 + 10x3 + 5x4 + x5
Let’s consider the coefficient of xk in the expansion of (1 + x)n. Lucas’s
amazing result is that this binomial coefficient is odd if and only if each time
that a bit is on in the number k, the corresponding bit is also on in the
number n!
Let’s check some examples. Well, if k = 0, then every binomial coefficient
is 1 which is odd, no matter what n is, which is fine, because every bit in
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k is off. And if k = n, then the binomial coefficient is also 1, which is fine.
How about n = 5 = “101” in binary, and k = 1 = “001”. Then the binomial
coefficient is 5 which is odd, which is correct. What if we change k to 2 =
“010”. Aha! Then each bit that’s on in k is not on in n, and the binomial
coefficient is 10, which is even! Perfect!
Please note that if the two bit strings aren’t the same size, then you have
to add 0’s on the left to the smaller one in order to make them the same
size. Then you can look at the corresponding bits.
[Exercise for budding mathematicians: Can you check more values? By hand? On a
computer? Can you prove that Lucas was right?! It shouldn’t be too difficult to convince
yourself. As usual, it’s much more difficult to discover a new result, to imagine the
happy possibility, than to verify that it’s correct. Imagination, inspiration and hope are
the key! Verification is routine. Anyone can do that, any competent professional. I prefer
tormented, passionate searchers for Truth! People who have been seized by a demon!—
hopefully a good demon, but a demon nevertheless!]
And how do Matiyasevich and Jones express (if a bit is on in k it also
has to be on in n) as a diophantine equation?
Well, I’ll just show you how they did it, and you can see why it works
with the help of the hints that I’ll give.
The coefficient of xK in the expansion
of (1 + x)N is odd if and only if there is
a unique set of seven unsigned whole
numbers b, x, y, z, u, v, w such that
b = 2N
(b+ 1)N = xbK+1 + ybK + z
z + u+ 1 = bK
y + v + 1 = b
y = 2w + 1
Can you figure out how this works? Hint: y is the binomial coefficient
that we’re interested in, w is used to ensure that y is odd, u guarantees
that z is smaller than bk, v guarantees that y is smaller than b, and when
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(b+ 1)n is written as a base b numeral its successive digits are precisely the
binomial coefficients that you get by expanding (1+x)n. The basic idea here
is that the powers of the number eleven give you the binomial coefficients:
112 = 121, 113 = 1331, 114 = 14641. Then things fall apart because the
binomial coefficients get too large to be individual digits. So you have to
work in a large base b. The particular b that Matiyasevich and Jones pick
happens to be the sum of all the binomial coefficients that we are trying to
pack together into the digits of a single number. So the base b is larger than
all of them, and there are no carries from one digit to the next to mess things
up, so everything works!
And then you combine these five individual equations into a single equa-
tion the way I showed you before. There will be ten squares on one side, and
five cross-products on the other side. . .
Now that we’ve done this, we have the fundamental tool that we need
in order to be able to build our computer. The CPU of that computer is
going to have a bunch of hardware registers, just like real computers do. But
unlike real computers, each register will hold an unsigned integer, which can
be an arbitrarily large number of bits. And the unknowns in our master
equation will give the contents of these registers. Each digit of one of these
unknowns will be the number that that register happened to have at a par-
ticular moment, step by step, as the CPU clock ticks away and it executes
one instruction per clock cycle. In other words, you have to use the same
trick of packing a list of numbers into a single number that we used before
with binomial coefficients. Here it’s done with the time history of CPU reg-
ister contents, a register contents history that ranges from the start of the
computation to the moment that you output an integer.
I’m afraid that we’re going to have to stop at this point. After all, con-
structing a computer is a big job! And I’m personally much more interested
in general ideas than in details. You just take care of the general ideas, and
the details will take care of themselves! Well, not always: You wouldn’t
want to buy a computer that was designed that way! But carrying out this
construction in detail is a big job. . . Not much fun! Hard work!
Actually, it is a lot of fun if you do it yourself. Like making love, it’s
not much fun to hear how somebody else did it. You have to do it yourself!
And you don’t learn much by reading someone else’s software. It’s excruci-
ating to have to do that, you’re lost in the maze of someone else’s train of
thought! But if you yourself write the program and debug it on interesting
examples, then it’s your train of thought and you learn a lot. Software is
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frozen thought. . .
So we won’t finish working out the design in detail. But the basic ideas
are simple, and you can find them in the short paper by Matiyasevich and
Jones, or in a book I wrote that was published by Cambridge University
Press in 1987. It’s called Algorithmic Information Theory, and that’s where
I actually exhibit one of these computer equations. It’s an equation that runs
LISP programs.
What kind of a programming language is LISP? Well, it’s a very beautiful
language that’s highly mathematical in spirit.
LISP, an Elegant Programming Language
Utopian social theorists and philosophers have often dreamt of a perfect,
ideal universal human language that would be unambiguous and would pro-
mote human understanding and international cooperation: for example, Es-
peranto, Leibniz’s characteristica universalis, Hilbert’s formal axiomatic sys-
tem for all of mathematics. These utopian fantasies have never worked. But
they have worked for computers—very, very well indeed!
Unfortunately, as programming languages become increasingly sophisti-
cated, they reflect more and more the complexity of human society and of
the immense world of software applications. So they become more and more
like giant tool boxes, like garages and attics stuffed with 30 years of belong-
ings! On the contrary, LISP is a programming language with considerable
mathematical beauty; it is more like a surgeon’s scalpel or a sharp-edged di-
amond cutting tool than a two-car garage overflowing with possessions and
absolutely no room for a car.
LISP has a few powerful simple basic concepts, and everything else is built
up from that, which is how mathematicians like to work; it’s what mathe-
matical theories look like. Mathematical theories, the good ones, consist in
defining a few new key concepts, and then the fireworks begin: they reveal
new vistas, they open the door to entirely new worlds. LISP is like that too;
it’s more like pure math than most programming languages are. At least it is
if you strip away the “useful” parts that have been added on, the accretions
that have made LISP into a “practical tool”. What’s left if you do that is
the original LISP, the conceptual heart of LISP, a core which is a jewel of
considerable mathematical beauty, austere intellectual beauty.
So you see, for me this is a real love affair. And how did I fall in love with
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LISP? In 1970 I was living in Buenos Aires, and I bought a LISP manual in
Rio de Janeiro. On page 14 there was a LISP interpreter written in LISP. I
didn’t understand a word! It looked extremely strange. I programmed the
interpreter in FORTRAN and suddenly saw the light. It was devastatingly
beautiful! I was hooked! (I still am. I’ve used LISP in six of my books.) I ran
lots of LISP programs on my interpreter. I wrote dozens of LISP interpreters,
probably hundreds of LISP interpreters! I kept inventing new LISP dialects,
one after another. . .
You see, learning a radically new programming language is a lot of work.
It’s like learning a foreign language: you need to pick up the vocabulary,
you need to acquire the culture, the foreign world-view, that inevitably
comes with a language. Each culture has a different way of looking at the
world! In the case of a programming language, that’s called its “program-
ming paradigm”, and to acquire a new programming paradigm you need to
read the manual, you need to see a lot of examples, and you need to try
writing and running programs yourself. We can’t do all that here, no way!
So the idea is just to whet your appetite and try to suggest how very different
LISP is from normal programming languages.
How does LISP work?
First of all, LISP is a non-numerical programming language. Instead of
computing only with numbers, you deal with symbolic expressions, which
are called “S-expressions”.
Programs and data in LISP are both S-expressions. What’s an S-
expression? Well, it’s like an algebraic expression with full parenthesization.
For example, instead of
a× b+ c× d
you write
((a× b) + (c× d))
And then you move operators forward, in front of their arguments rather
than between their arguments.
(+ (× a b) (× c d))
That’s called prefix as opposed to infix notation. Actually in LISP it’s written
this way
(+ (* a b) (* c d))
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because, as in many other programming languages, * is used for multiplica-
tion. You also have minus - and exponentiation ^ in LISP.
Let’s get back to S-expressions. In general, an S-expression consists of a
nest of parentheses that balance, like this
( ( ) (( )) ((( ))) )
What can you put inside the parentheses? Words, and unsigned integers,
which can both be arbitrarily big. And for doing math with integers, which
are exact, not approximate numbers, it’s very important to be able to handle
very large integers.
Also, a word or unsigned integer can appear all by itself as an S-
expression, with no parentheses. Then it’s referred to as an atom (which
means indivisible in Greek). If an S-expression isn’t an atom, then it’s called
a list, and it’s considered to be a list of elements, with a first element, a
second, a third, etc.
(1 2 3) and ((x 1) (y 2) (z 3))
are both lists with three elements.
And LISP is a functional or expression-based language, not an imperative
or statement-based language.
Everything in LISP (that’s instructions rather than data) is built up by
applying functions to arguments like this:
(f x y)
This indicates that the function f is applied to the arguments x and y. In
pure math that’s normally written
f(x, y)
And everything is put into this function applied to arguments form.
For example,
(if condition true-value false-value)
is how you choose between two values depending on whether a condition is
true or not. So “if” is treated as a three-argument function with the strange
property that only two of its arguments are evaluated. For instance
(if true (+ 1 2) (+ 3 4))
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gives 3, and
(if false (+ 1 2) (+ 3 4))
gives 7. Another pseudo-function is the quote function, which doesn’t eval-
uate its only argument. For instance
(’ (a b c))
gives (a b c) “as is”. In other words, this does not mean that the function
a should be applied to the arguments b and c. The argument of quote is
literal data, not an expression to be evaluated.
Here are two conditions that may be used in an “if”.
(= x y)
gives true if x is equal to y.
(atom x)
gives true if x is an atom, not a list.
Next let me tell you about “let”, which is very important because it
enables you to associate values with variables and to define functions.
(let x y expression)
yields the value of “expression” in which x is defined to be y. You can use
“let” either to define a function, or like an assignment statement in an ordi-
nary programming language. However, the function definition or assignment
are only temporarily in effect, inside “expression”. In other words, the effect
of “let” is invariably local.
Here are two examples of how to use “let”. Let n be 1 + 2 in 3× n:
(let n (+ 1 2)
(* 3 n)
)
This gives 9. And let f of n be n× n in f of 10:
(let (f n) (* n n)
(f 10)
)
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This gives 100.
And in LISP we can take lists apart and then reassemble them. To get
the first element of a list, “car” it:
(car (’ (a b c)))
gives a. To get the rest of a list, “cdr” it:
(cdr (’ (a b c)))
gives (b c). And to reassemble the pieces, “cons” it:
(cons (’ a) (’ (b c)))
gives (a b c).
And that’s it, that gives you the general idea! LISP is a simple, but
powerful formalism.
Before showing you two real LISP programs, let me point out that in LISP
you don’t speak of programs, they’re called expressions. And you don’t run
them or execute them, you evaluate them. And the result of evaluating an
expression is merely a value; there is no side-effect. The state of the universe
is unchanged.
Of course, mathematical expressions have always behaved like this. But
normal programming languages are not at all mathematical. LISP is math-
ematical.
In this chapter we’ve used the factorial function “!” several times. So
let’s program that in a normal language, and then in LISP. Then we’ll write
a program to take the factorials of an entire list of numbers, not just one.
Factorial in a normal language
Recall that N ! = 1× 2× 3× · · · × (N − 1)×N . So 3! = 3× 2× 1 = 6, and
4! = 24, 5! = 120. This program calculates 5 factorial:
Set N equal to 5.
Set K equal to 1.
LOOP: Is N equal to 0? If so, stop. The result is in K.
If not, set K equal to K ×N .
Then set N equal to N − 1.
Go to LOOP.
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When the program stops, K will contain 120, and N will have been reduced
to 0.
Factorial in LISP
The LISP code for calculating factorial of 5 looks rather different:
(let (factorial N)
(if (= N 0)
1
(* N (factorial (- N 1)))
)
(factorial 5)
)
This gives
120
Here’s the definition of the function factorial of N in English: If N is 0,
then factorial of N is 1, otherwise factorial of N is N times factorial of N
minus 1.
A more sophisticated example: list of factori-
als
Here’s a second example. Given a list of numbers, it produces the corre-
sponding list of factorials:
(let (factorial N)
(if (= N 0)
1
(* N (factorial (- N 1)))
)
(let (map f x)
(if (atom x)
x
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(cons (f (car x))
(map f (cdr x))
)
)
(map factorial (’ (4 1 3 2 5)))
))
This gives
(24 1 6 2 120)
The “map” function changes (x y z . . .) into (f(x) f(y) f(z) . . .). Here’s
the definition of “map” f of x in English: The function “map” has two
arguments, a function f and a list x. If the list x is empty, then the result is
the empty list. Otherwise it’s the list beginning with (f of the first element
of x) followed by “map” f of the rest of x.
[For more on my conception of LISP, see my books The Unknowable and Exploring
Randomness, in which I explain LISP, and my book The Limits of Mathematics, in which
I use it. These are technical books.]
My Diophantine Equation for LISP
So you can see how simple LISP is. But actually, it’s still not simple enough.
In order to make a LISP equation, I had to simplify LISP even more. It’s
still a powerful language, you can still calculate anything you could before,
but the fact that some things are missing and you have to program them
yourself starts to become really annoying. It starts to feel more like a ma-
chine language and less like a higher-level language. But I can actually put
together the entire equation for running LISP, more precisely, the equation
for evaluating LISP expressions. Here it is!
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Exponential Diophantine Equation Computer:
L(k, n, x, y, z, . . .) = R(k, n, x, y, z, . . .)
LISP expression k
Value of LISP expression n
Time x, y, z, . . .
Two hundred page equation, 20,000 unknowns!
If the LISP expression k has no value, then this equation
will have no solution. If the LISP expression k has a value,
then this equation will have exactly one solution.
In this unique solution, n = the value of the expression k.
(Chaitin, Algorithmic Information Theory, 1987.)
Guess what, I’m not going to actually show it to you here! Anyway, this
is a diophantine equation that’s a LISP interpreter. So that’s a fairly serious
amount of computational ability packed into one diophantine equation.
We’re going to put this computer equation to work for us later, in Chapter
VI, in order to show that Ω’s randomness also infects number theory.
Concluding Remarks
Some concluding remarks. I’ve tried to share a lot of beautiful mathematics
with you in this chapter. It’s math that I’m very passionate about, math
that I’ve spent my life on!
Euclid’s proof is classical, Euler’s proof is modern, and my proof is post-
modern! Euclid’s proof is perfect, but doesn’t seem to particularly lead
anywhere. Euler’s proof leads to Riemann and analytic number theory and
much extremely technical and difficult modern work. My proof leads to the
study of program-size complexity (which actually preceded this proof). The
work on Hilbert’s 10th shows a marvelously unexpected application of the
notion of a computably enumerable set.
46 Meta Math!
I’m not really that interested in the primes. The fact that they now have
applications in cryptography makes me even less interested in the primes.
What is really interesting about the primes is that there are still lots of
things that we don’t know about them, it’s the philosophical significance of
this bizarre situation. What’s really interesting is that even in an area of
math as simple as this, you immediately get to questions that nobody knows
how to answer and things begin to look random and haphazard!
Is there always some structure or pattern there waiting to be
discovered? Or is it possible that some things really are lawless,
random, patternless—even in pure math, even in number theory?
Later I’ll give arguments involving information, complexity and the ex-
tremely fundamental notion of irreducibility that strongly suggest that the
latter is in fact the case. In fact, that’s the raison d’eˆtre for this book.
Based on his own rather individualistic viewpoint—which happens to be
entirely different from mine—Wolfram gives many interesting examples that
also strongly suggest that there are lots of unsolvable problems in math-
ematics. I think that his book on A New Kind of Science is extremely
interesting and provides further evidence that lots of things are unknowable,
that the problem is really serious. Right away in mathematics, in 2000 year-
old math, you get into trouble, and there seem to be limits to what can be
known. Epistemology, which deals with what we can know and why, is the
branch of philosophy that worries about these questions. So this is really a
book about epistemology, and so is Wolfram’s book. We’re actually working
on philosophy as well as math and physics!
To summarize, in this chapter we’ve seen that the computer is a powerful
new mathematical concept illuminating many questions in mathematics and
metamathematics. And we’ve seen that while formal axiomatic systems are
a failure, formalisms for computing are a brilliant success.
To make further progress on the road to Ω, we need to add more to
the stew. We need the idea of digital information—that’s measured by the
size of computer programs—and we also need the idea of irreducible digital
information, which is a kind of randomness. In the next chapter we’ll discuss
the sources of these ideas. We’ll see that the idea of complexity comes from
biology, the idea of digital information comes from computer software, and
the idea of irreducibility—that’s my particular contribution—can be traced
back to Leibniz in 1686.
Chapter III—
Digital Information:
DNA/Software/Leibniz
“Nothing is more important than to see the sources of invention
which are, in my opinion, more interesting than the inventions
themselves.”—Leibniz, as quoted in Po´lya, How to Solve It.
In this chapter I’m going to show you the “sources of invention” of the
ideas of digital information, program-size complexity, and algorithmic irre-
ducibility or randomness. In fact, the genesis of these ideas can be traced to
DNA, to software, and to Leibniz himself.
Basically the idea is just to measure the size of software in bits, that’s it!
But in this chapter I want to explain to you just why this is so important,
why this is such a universally applicable idea. We’ll see that it plays a key
role in biology, where DNA is that software, and in computer technology as
well of course, and even in Leibniz’s metaphysics where he analyzes what’s
a law of nature, and how can we decide if something is lawless or not. And
later, in Chapter VI, we’ll see that it plays a key role in metamathematics,
in discussing what a FAS can or cannot achieve.
Let’s start with Leibniz.
Who was Leibniz?
Let me tell you about Leibniz.
Leibniz invented the calculus, invented binary arithmetic, a superb me-
chanical calculator, clearly envisioned symbolic logic, gave the name to topol-
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ogy (analysis situs) and combinatorics, discovered Wilson’s theorem (a pri-
mality test; see Dantzig, Number, The Language of Science), etc. etc. etc.
Newton was a great physicist, but he was definitely inferior to Leibniz
both as a mathematician and as a philosopher. And Newton was a rotten
human being—so much so that Djerassi and Pinner call their recent book
Newton’s Darkness.
Leibniz invented the calculus, published it, wrote letter after letter to
continental mathematicians to explain it to them, initially received all the
credit for this from his contemporaries, and then was astonished to learn that
Newton, who had never published a word on the subject, claimed that Leibniz
had stolen it all from him. Leibniz could hardly take Newton seriously!
But it was Newton who won, not Leibniz.
Newton bragged that he had destroyed Leibniz and rejoiced in Leibniz’s
death after Leibniz was abandoned by his royal patron, whom Leibniz had
helped to become the king of England. It’s extremely ironic that Newton’s
incomprehensible Principia—written in the style of Euclid’s Elements—was
only appreciated by continental mathematicians after they succeeded in
translating it into that effective tool, the infinitesimal calculus that Leib-
niz had taught them!
Morally, what a contrast! Leibniz was such an elevated soul that he found
good in all philosophies: Catholic, Protestant, Cabala, medieval scholastics,
the ancients, the Chinese. . . It pains me to say that Newton enjoyed witness-
ing the executions of counterfeiters he pursued as Master of the Mint.
[The science-fiction writer Neal Stephenson has recently published the first volume,
Quicksilver, of a trilogy about Newton versus Leibniz, and comes out strongly on Leibniz’s
side. See also Isabelle Stengers, La Guerre des sciences aura-t-elle lieu?, a play about
Newton vs. Leibniz, and the above mentioned book, consisting of two plays and a long
essay, called Newton’s Darkness.]
Leibniz was also a fine physicist. In fact, Leibniz was good at everything.
For example, there’s his remark that “music is the unconscious joy that the
soul experiences on counting without realising that it is counting.” Or his
effort to discern pre-historic human migration patterns through similarities
between languages—something that is now done with DNA!
So you begin to see the problem: Leibniz is at too high an intellectual
level. He’s too difficult to understand and appreciate. In fact, you can only
really appreciate Leibniz if you are at his level. You can only realize that
Leibniz has anticipated you after you’ve invented a new field by yourself—
which as C. MacDonald Ross says in his little Oxford University Press book
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Leibniz, has happened to many people.
In fact, that’s what happened to me. I invented and developed my theory
of algorithmic information, and one day not so long ago, when asked to write
a paper for a philosophy congress in Bonn, I went back to a little 1932 book
by Hermann Weyl, The Open World, Yale University Press. I had put it
aside after being surprised to read in it that Leibniz in 1686 in his Discours
de Me´taphysique—that’s the original French, in English, Discourse on Meta-
physics—had made a key observation about complexity and randomness, the
key observation that started me on all this at age 15!
[Actually, Weyl himself was a very unusual mathematician, Hilbert’s mathematical
heir and philosophical opponent, who wrote a beautiful book on philosophy that I had
read as a teenager: Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, Princeton University
Press, 1949. In that book Weyl also recounts Leibniz’s idea, but the wording is not
as sharp, it’s not formulated as clearly and as dramatically as in Weyl’s 1932 Yale book.
Among his other works: an important book on relativity, Raum-Zeit-Materie (space, time,
matter).]
“Could Leibniz have done it?!”, I asked myself. I put the matter aside
until such time as I could check what he had actually said. Years passed. . .
Well, for my Bonn paper I finally took the trouble to obtain an English
translation of the Discours, and then the original French. And I tried to find
out more about Leibniz.
It turns out that Newton wasn’t the only important opponent that Leibniz
had had. You didn’t realize that math and philosophy were such dangerous
professions, did you?!
The satirical novel Candide by Voltaire, which was made into a musical
comedy when I was a child, is actually a caricature of Leibniz. Voltaire was
Leibniz’s implacable opponent, and a terrific Newton booster—his mistress
la Marquise du Chaˆtelet translated Newton’s Principia into French. Voltaire
was against one and in favor of the other, not based on an understanding
of their work, but simply because Leibniz constantly mentions God, whereas
Newton’s work seems to fit in perfectly with an atheist, mechanistic world
view. This was leading up to the French revolution, which was against the
Church just as much as it was against the Monarchy.
Poor Voltaire—if he had read Newton’s private papers, he would have
realised that he had backed the wrong man! Newton’s beliefs were primi-
tive and literal—Newton computed the age of the world based on the Bible.
Whereas Leibniz was never seen to enter a church, and his notion of God was
sophisticated and subtle. Leibniz’s God was a logical necessity to provide
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the initial complexity to create the world, and is required because nothing is
necessarily simpler than something. That’s Leibniz’s answer to the question,
“Why is there something rather than nothing? For nothing is simpler and
easier than something.” (Principles of Nature and Grace, 1714, Section 7)
In modern language, this is like saying that the initial complexity of the
universe comes from the choice of laws of physics and the initial conditions to
which these laws apply. And if the initial conditions are simple, for example
an empty universe or an exploding singularity, then all the initial complexity
comes from the laws of physics.
The question of where all the complexity in the world comes from contin-
ues to fascinate scientists to this day. For example, it’s the focus of Wolfram’s
book A New Kind of Science. Wolfram solves the problem of complexity
by claiming that it’s only an illusion, that the world is actually very sim-
ple. For example, according to Wolfram all the randomness in the world is
only pseudo-randomness generated by simple algorithms! That’s certainly
a philosophical possibility, but does it apply to this world? Here it seems
that quantum-mechanical randomness provides an inexhaustible source of
potential complexity, for example via “frozen accidents”, such as biological
mutations that change the course of evolutionary history.
Before explaining to what extent and how Leibniz anticipated the start-
ing point for my theory, let me recommend some good sources of informa-
tion about Leibniz, which are not easy to find. On Leibniz’s mathematical
work, see the chapter on him in E. T. Bell’s Men of Mathematics and Tobias
Dantzig’s Number, The Language of Science. On Leibniz the philosopher,
see C. MacDonald Ross, Leibniz, and The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz,
edited by Nicholas Jolley. For works by Leibniz, including his Discourse on
Metaphysics and Principles of Nature and Grace, see G. W. Leibniz, Philo-
sophical Essays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber.
Actually, let me start by telling you about Leibniz’s discovery of binary
arithmetic, which in a sense marks the very beginning of information theory,
and then I’ll tell you what I discovered in the Discours de Me´taphysique.
Leibniz on Binary Arithmetic and Information
As I said, Leibniz discovered base-two arithmetic, and he was extremely
enthusiastic about it. About the fact that
10110 = 1× 24 + 0× 23 + 1× 22 + 1× 21 + 0× 20
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= 16 + 4 + 2 = 22 ???
Yes indeed, he sensed in the 0 and 1 bits the combinatorial power to create the
entire universe, which is exactly what happens in modern digital electronic
computers and the rest of our digital information technology: CD’s, DVD’s,
digital cameras, PC’s, . . . It’s all 0’s and 1’s, that’s our entire image of the
world! You just combine 0’s and 1’s, and you get everything.
And Leibniz was very proud to note how easy it is to perform calculations
with binary numbers, in line with what you might expect if you have reached
the logical bedrock of reality. Of course, that observation was also made by
computer engineers three centuries later; the idea is the same, even though
the language and the cultural context in which it is formulated is rather
different.
Here is what Dantzig has to say about this in his Number, The Language
of Science:
“It is the mystic elegance of the binary system that made
Leibniz exclaim: Omnibus ex nihil ducendis sufficit unum. (One
suffices to derive all out of nothing.) [In German: “Einer hat alles
aus nichts gemacht.” Word for word: “One has all from nothing
made.”] Says Laplace:
‘Leibniz saw in his binary arithmetic the image of
Creation. . . He imagined that Unity represented God,
and Zero the void; that the Supreme Being drew all
beings from the void, just as unity and zero express all
numbers in his system of numeration. . . I mention this
merely to show how the prejudices of childhood may
cloud the vision even of the greatest men!. . . ’
Alas! What was once hailed as a monument to monotheism ended
in the bowels of a robot. For most of the high-speed calculating
machines [computers] operate on the binary principle.”
In spite of the criticism by Laplace, Leibniz’s vision of creating the world
from 0’s and 1’s refuses to go away. In fact, it has begun to inspire some
contemporary physicists, who probably have never even heard of Leibniz.
Opening the 1 January 2004 issue of the prestigious journal Nature, I dis-
covered a book review entitled “The bits that make up the Universe.” This
turned out to be a review of von Baeyer, Information: The New Language
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of Science by Michael Nielsen, himself coauthor of the large and authorita-
tive Nielsen and Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information.
Here’s what Nielsen had to say:
“What is the Universe made of? A growing number of sci-
entists suspect that information plays a fundamental role in an-
swering this question. Some even go as far as to suggest that
information-based concepts may eventually fuse with or replace
traditional notions such as particles, fields and forces. The Uni-
verse may literally be made of information, they say, an idea
neatly encapsulated in physicist John Wheeler’s slogan: ‘It from
bit’ [Matter from information!]. . . These are speculative ideas,
still in the early days of development. . . Von Baeyer has pro-
vided an accessible and engaging overview of the emerging role
of information as a fundamental building block in science.”
So perhaps Leibniz was right after all! At any rate, it certainly is a grand
vision!
Leibniz on Complexity and Randomness
Okay, it’s time to look at Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics! Modern sci-
ence was really just beginning then. And the question that Leibniz raises
is, how can we tell the difference between a world that is governed by law,
one in which science can apply, and a lawless world? How can we decide if
science actually works?! In other words how can we distinguish between a
set of observations that obeys a mathematical law, and one that doesn’t?
And to make the question sharper, Leibniz asks us to think about scat-
tering points at random on a sheet of paper, by closing our eyes and stabbing
at it with a pen many times. Even then, observes Leibniz, there will always
be a mathematical law that passes through those very points!
Yes, this is certainly the case. For example, if the three points are (x, y) =
(a, A), (b, B), (c, C), then the following curve will pass through those very
points:
y = A(x− b)(x− c)/(a− b)(a− c) + B(x− a)(x− c)/(b− a)(b− c)
+ C(x− a)(x− b)/(c− a)(c− b).
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Just plug in a every time you see an x, and you’ll see that the entire right-
hand side reduces to A. And this also works if you set x = b or x = c. Can
you figure out how this works and write the corresponding equation for four
points? This is called Lagrangian interpolation, by the way.
So there will always be a mathematical law, no matter what the points
are, no matter how they were placed at random!
That seems very discouraging. How can we decide if the universe is
capricious or if science actually works?
And here is Leibniz’s answer: If the law has to be extremely complicated
(“fort compose´e”) then the points are placed at random, they’re “irre´gulier”,
not in accordance with a scientific law. But if the law is simple, then it’s a
genuine law of nature, we’re not fooling ourselves!
See for yourself, look at Sections V and VI of the Discours.
The way that Leibniz summarizes his view of what precisely it is that
makes the scientific enterprise possible is this: “God has chosen that which
is the most perfect, that is to say, in which at the same time the hypotheses
are as simple as possible, and the phenomena are as rich as possible.” The
job of the scientist, of course, is then to figure out these simplest possible
hypotheses.
(Please note that these ideas of Leibniz are much stronger than Occam’s
razor, because they tell us why Occam’s razor works, why it is necessary.
Occam’s razor merely asserts that the simplest theory is best.)
But how can we measure the complexity of a law and compare it with
the complexity of the data that it attempts to explain? Because it’s only a
valid law if it’s simpler than the data, hopefully much simpler. Leibniz does
not answer that question, which bothered Weyl immensely. But Leibniz had
all the pieces, he only had to put them together. For he worshiped 0 and 1,
and appreciated the importance of calculating machines.
The way I would put it is like this: I think of a scientific theory
as a binary computer program for calculating the observations,
which are also written in binary. And you have a law of nature if
there is compression, if the experimental data is compressed into
a computer program that has a smaller number of bits than are in
the data that it explains. The greater the degree of compression,
the better the law, the more you understand the data.
But if the experimental data cannot be compressed, if the small-
est program for calculating it is just as large as it is (and such a
theory can always be found, that can always be done, that’s so to
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speak our “Lagrangian interpolation”), then the data is lawless,
unstructured, patternless, not amenable to scientific study, incom-
prehensible. In a word, random, irreducible!
And that was the idea that burned in my brain like a red-hot ember
when I was 15 years old! Leibniz would have understood it instantaneously!
But working out the details, and showing that mathematics contains such
randomness—that’s where my Ω number comes in—that’s the hard part, that
took me the rest of my life. As they say, genius is 1% inspiration and 99%
perspiration. And the devil is in the details. And the detail that cost me the
most effort was the idea of self-delimiting information, that I’ll explain later
in this chapter, and without which, as we’ll see in Chapter VI, there would
in fact be no Ω number.
The ideas that I’ve been discussing are summarized in the following dia-
grams:
Leibniz’s Metaphysics:
ideas −→Mind of God −→ universe
The ideas are simple, but the
universe is very complicated!
(If science applies!)
God minimizes the left-hand side,
and maximizes the right-hand side.
Scientific Method:
theory −→ Computer −→ data
The theory is concise, the data isn’t.
The data is compressed into the theory!
Understanding is compression!
To comprehend is to compress!
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Algorithmic Information Theory:
binary program −→ Computer −→ binary output
What’s the smallest program that produces a given output?
If the program is concise and the output isn’t, we have a theory.
If the output is random, then no compression is possible,
and the input has to be the same size as the output.
And here’s a diagram from Chapter II, which I think of in exactly the
same way:
Mathematics (FAS):
axioms −→ Computer −→ theorems
The theorems are compressed into the axioms!
I think of the axioms as a computer program for generating all theorems.
I measure the amount of information in the axioms by the size of this pro-
gram. Again, you want the smallest program, the most concise set of axioms,
the minimum number of assumptions (hypotheses) that give you that set of
theorems. One difference with the previous diagrams: This program never
halts, it keeps generating theorems forever; it produces an infinite amount of
output, not a finite amount of output.
And the same ideas sort of apply to biology:
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Biology:
DNA −→ Pregnancy −→ organism
The organism is determined by its DNA!
The less DNA, the simpler the organism.
Pregnancy is decompression
of a compressed message.
So I think of the DNA as a computer program for calculating the organ-
ism. Viruses have a very small program, single-celled organisms have a larger
program, and multi-celled organisms need an even larger program.
The Software of Life: Love, Sex and Biological
Information
A passionate young couple can make love several times a night, every night.
Nature does not care about recreational sex; the reason that men and women
romanticize about each other and are attracted and fall in love, is so that
they will be fooled into having children, even if they think they are trying to
avoid conception! They’re actually trying very hard to transmit information
from the male to the female. Every time a man ejaculates inside a woman he
loves, an enormous number of sperm cells, each with half the DNA software
for a complete individual, try to fertilize an egg.
Jacob Schwartz once surprised a computer science class by calculating the
bandwidth of human sexual intercourse, the rate of information transmission
achieved in human love-making. I’m too much of a theoretician to care about
the exact answer, which anyway depends on details like how you measure
the amount of time that’s involved, but his class was impressed that the
bandwidth that’s achieved is quite respectable!
What is this software like? It isn’t written in 0/1 binary like computer
software. Instead DNA is written in a 4-letter alphabet, the 4 bases that
can be each rung of the twisted double-helix ladder that is a DNA molecule.
Adenine, A, thymine, T, guanine, G, and cytosine, C, are those four letters.
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Individual genes, which code for a single protein, are kilobases of information.
And an entire human genome is measured in gigabases, so that’s sort of like
gigabytes of computer software.
Each cell in the body has the same DNA software, the complete
genome, but depending on the kind of tissue or the organ that
it’s in, it runs different portions of this software, while using many
basic subroutines that are common to all cells.
Program (10011. . . ) −→ Computer −→ Output
DNA (GCTATAGC. . . ) −→ Development −→ Organism
And this software is highly conservative, much of it is quite ancient: Many
common subroutines are shared among fruitflies, invertebrates, mice and
humans, so they have to have originated in an ancient common ancestor. In
fact, there is surprisingly little difference between a chimp and a human, or
even between a mouse and human.
We are not that unique; Nature likes to re-use good ideas. Instead of
starting afresh each time, Nature “solves” new problems by patching—that
is, slightly modifying or mutating—the solutions to old problems, as the
need arises. Nature is a cobbler, a tinkerer. It’s much too much work,
it’s much too expensive, to start over again each time. Our DNA software
accumulates by accretion, it’s a beautiful patch-work quilt! And our DNA
software also includes all those frozen accidents, those mutations due to DNA
copying errors or ionizing radiation, which is a possible pathway for quantum
uncertainty to be incorporated in the evolutionary record. In a sense this is
an amplification mechanism, one that magnifies quantum uncertainty into
an effect that is macroscopically visible.
Another example of this constant re-use of biological ideas is the fact
that the human embryo is briefly a fish, or, more generally, the fact that the
development of the embryo tends to recapitulate the evolutionary history
leading to that particular organism. The same thing happens in human
software, where old code is hard to get rid of, since much is built on it, and
it quickly becomes full of add-ons and patches.
When a couple falls madly in love, what is happening in information-
theoretic terms is that they are saying, what nice subroutines the other person
58 Meta Math!
has, let’s try combining some of her subroutines with some of his subroutines,
let’s do that right away! That’s what it’s really all about! Just like a child
cannot have a first name followed by the entire father’s and mother’s names,
because then names would double in size each generation and soon become
too long to remember (although the Spanish nobility attempted to achieve
this!), a child cannot have all the software, all the DNA, from both parents.
So a child’s DNA consists of a random selection of subroutines, half from one
parent, half from the other. You only pass half of your software to each child,
just as you can’t include your whole name as part of your child’s name.
And in my great-grandmother’s generation in the old country, women
would have a dozen children, most of whom would die before puberty. So
you were trying a dozen mixes of DNA subroutines from both parents. (In
the middle ages, babies weren’t even named til they were a year old, since so
many of them would die the first year.) Now instead of trying to keep women
pregnant all the time, we depend on massive amounts of expensive medical
care to keep alive one or two children, no matter how unhealthy they are.
While such medical care is wonderful for the individual, the quality of the
human gene pool inevitably deteriorates to match the amount of medical care
that is available. The more medical care there is, the sicker people become!
The massive amounts of medical care become part of the ecology, and people
come to depend on it to survive til child-bearing and for their children to
survive in turn. . .
Actually, many times a woman will not even realize that she was briefly
pregnant, because the embryo was not at all viable and the pregnancy quickly
aborted itself. So parents still actually do try lots of different combinations
of their subroutines, even if they only have a few children.
We are just beginning to discover just how powerful biological software is.
For example, take human life expectancy. Ageing isn’t just a finally fatal ac-
cumulation of wear and tear. No, death is programming, the life-expectancy
of an individual is determined by an internal alarm clock. Just like the way
that “apoptosis”, the process by which individual cells are ordered to self-
destruct, is an intrinsic part of new cell growth and the plasticity in the
organism (it must continually tear itself down in order to continually rebuild
itself), a human organism systematically starts to self-destruct according to a
pre-programmed schedule, no doubt designed to get him or her out of the way
and no longer competing for food with children and younger child-bearing
individuals. (Although grandparents seem to serve a role to help caring for
children.) So this is just software! Well, then it should be easy to modify,
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you just change a few key parameters in your code! And, in fact, people
are beginning to think this can be done. For one invertebrate, the nema-
tode worm C. elegans, it has already been done. (This is work of Cynthia
Kenyon.) For humans, maybe in 50 or a hundred years such modification will
be common practice, or permanently incorporated into the human genome.
By the way, bacteria may not have different sexes like we do, but they
certainly do pass around useful DNA subroutines, which is how antibiotics
quickly create superbugs in hospitals. This is called horizontal gene transfer,
because the genes go to contemporaries, not to descendents (that’s vertical).
And this process results in a kind of “bacterial intelligence”, in their ability
to quickly adapt to a new environment.
What are bits and what are they good for?
The Hindus were fascinated by large numbers. There is a parable of a moun-
tain of diamond, the hardest substance in the world, one-mile high and one-
mile wide. Every thousand years a beautiful golden bird flies over this dia-
mond mountain and sheds a single tear, which wears away a tiny, tiny bit
of the diamond. And the time that it will take for these tears to completely
wear away the diamond mountain, that immense time, it is but the blink of
an eye to one of the Gods!
And when I was a small child, like many future mathematicians, I was
also fascinated by large numbers. I would sit in a stair-well of the apartment
building where we lived with a piece of paper and a pencil, and I would write
down the number 1 and then double it, and then double it again, and again,
until I ran out of paper or of patience:
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20 = 1
21 = 2
22 = 4
23 = 8
24 = 16
25 = 32
26 = 64
27 = 128
28 = 256
29 = 512
210 = 1024
211 = 2048
212 = 4096
213 = 8192
214 = 16384
215 = 32768
. . .
A similar attempt to reach infinity is to take a piece of paper and fold it
in half, and then fold that in half, and then do it again and again, until the
paper is too thick to fold, which happens rather quickly. . .
What does all this have to do with information? Well, the doubling has
a lot to do with bits of information, with messages in binary, and with the
bits or binary digits 0 and 1, out of which we can build the entire universe!
One bit of information, a string 1-bit long, can distinguish two different
possibilities. Two bits of information, a string 2-bits long, can distinguish
four different possibilities. Each time you add another bit to the message, you
double the number of possible messages. There are 256 possible different 8-bit
messages, and there are 1024 possible different 10-bit messages. So ten bits
of information is roughly equivalent to three digits of information, because
ten bits can represent 1024 possibilities, while three digits can represent 1000
possibilities.
Two possibilities:
0, 1.
Four possibilities:
00, 01, 10, 11.
Eight possibilities:
000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111.
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Sixteen possibilities:
0000, 0001, 0010, 0011, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111,
1000, 1001, 1010, 1011, 1100, 1101, 1110, 1111.
So that’s what raw information is, that’s what raw binary information
looks like inside a computer. Everything is in binary, everything is built up
out of 0’s and 1’s. And computers have clocks to synchronize everything,
and in a given clock cycle an electrical signal represents a 1, and no signal
represents a 0. These two-state systems can be built very reliably, and then
everything in a computer is built up out of them.
What do these binary strings, these strings of bits, these binary messages,
what do they represent? Well, the bit strings can represent many things. For
instance, numbers:
0: 0
1: 1
2: 10
3: 11
4: 100
5: 101
6: 110
7: 111
8: 1000
9: 1001
10: 1010
Or you can use an 8-bit “byte” to represent a single character, using the
ASCII character-code, which is used by most computers. For example:
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A: 0100 0001
B: 0100 0010
C: 0100 0011
a: 0110 0001
b: 0110 0010
c: 0110 0011
0: 0011 0000
1: 0011 0001
2: 0011 0010
(: 0010 1000
): 0010 1001
blank: 0010 0000
And you can use a string of 8-bit bytes to represent character strings. For
example, in the LISP programming language how do you write the arithmetic
expression for 12 plus 24? This is written in LISP as
(+ 12 24)
This 9-character LISP expression indicates the result of adding the numbers
12 and 24, and its value is therefore the number 36. This LISP expression
has 9 characters because there are seven visible characters plus two blanks,
and inside a computer it becomes a 9 × 8 = 72-bit bit string. And you can
easily build up more complicated objects like this. For example, the LISP
expression for adding the product of 3 and 4 to the product of 5 and 6 is
this:
(+ (* 3 4) (* 5 6))
This has 19 characters and is therefore represented as a 19× 8 = 152-bit bit
string. But this 152-bit bit string could also be interpreted as an extremely
large number, one that is 152 bits or, recalling that 10 bits is about 3 digits
worth of information, about (152/10 = 15)× 3 = 45 digits long.
So bit strings are neutral, they are pure syntax, but it is a convention
regarding semantics that gives them meaning. In other words, bit strings
can be used to represent many things: numbers, character strings, LISP
expressions, and even, as we all know, color pictures, since these are also
in our computers. In each case it is the bit string plus a convention for
interpreting them that enables us to determine its meaning, be it a number,
a character string, a LISP expression, or a color picture. For pictures one
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must in fact give the height and width of the picture in pixels, or picture
elements (points on a display) and then the red/green/blue intensity at each
point, each with 8-bit precision, which is a total of 24 bits per pixel.
What is biological information?
Here is a specific example that is of great interest to us as human beings.
Our genetic information (DNA) is written using an alphabet of 4 symbols:
A, C, G, T
These are the symbols for each of the possible bases at each rung of a DNA
double-helix. So each of these bases is exactly 2 bits of information, since
two bits enables us to specify exactly 2× 2 = 4 possibilities.
In turn, a triple (codon) of 3 bases “codes for” (specifies) a specific amino
acid. So each DNA codon is 3 × 2 = 6 bits of information. An individ-
ual protein is determined by giving the linear sequence of its amino acids
in a portion of the DNA that is called a gene. The gene determines the
amino-acid “spinal cord” of each protein. Once synthesized in a ribosome,
the protein immediately folds into a complicated three-dimensional shape.
This folding process isn’t well understood and in the current state of the art
requires massive amounts of computation to simulate. It is the complicated
geometrical form of the protein that determines its biological activity. For
example, enzymes are proteins that catalyze (greatly facilitate and speed-up
specific chemical reactions) by holding the reagents close to each other in
exactly the right way for them to react with each other.
That’s the story, roughly speaking, but DNA is actually much more so-
phisticated than that. For example, some proteins turn other genes on and
off; in other words, they control gene “expression”. We are dealing here with
a programming language that can perform complicated calculations and run
through sophisticated sequences of gene expression in response to changes in
environmental conditions!
And as I said before, the DNA software of some of our cousin apes and
near-relative mammals is surprisingly similar to our own. DNA subroutines
are strongly “conserved”, they are reused constantly across many different
species. Many of our basic subroutines are present in much more primitive
living beings. They haven’t changed much; Nature likes to re-use good ideas.
By the way, a human being has 3 giga-bases, that’s 3Gb, of DNA:
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Human = 3 giga-bases = 6 giga-bits !!!
The conventional units of biological information are kilo-bases (genes),
mega-bases (chromosomes) and giga-bases (entire genomes for organisms).
That’s thousands, millions and billions of bases, respectively.
Compressing digital pictures and video
It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words. Indeed, a thousand-by-
thousand-point picture has a million pixels, and each pixel requires 3 bytes
= 24 bits to specify the admixture of primary colors. So a thousand by a
thousand picture is 3 megabytes or 24 megabits of information. We have all
experienced the frustration of having to wait for a large picture to take shape
in a web browser.
Digital video requires transmitting many pictures per second to create
the illusion of smooth, continuous motion, and this requires extremely high
internet bandwidth to work well, say, thirty frames per second. This kind
of high-bandwidth connection is now usually only available in-house within
organizations, but not across the internet between organizations. It would
be nice to be able to distribute HDTV, high-resolution digital video, across
the web, but this is unfortunately not practical at this time.
But there isn’t really that much information there—you don’t really have
to transmit all those bits. Compression techniques are widely used to speed-
up the transmission of digital pictures and video. The idea is to take advan-
tage of the fact that large regions of a photo may be more or less the same,
and that successive frames of a video may not differ that much from each
other. So instead of transmitting the pictures directly, you just send compact
descriptions of the pictures, and then at the receiving end you de-compress
them and re-create the original pictures. It’s sort of like the freeze-dried
desiccated foods that you can take with you up a mountain. Just add water
and heat, and you recreate the original foods, which are mostly water and
much heavier than their freeze-dried “compressions”.
Why does this compression and decompression work so well? It works so
well because pictures are far from random. If each pixel had absolutely no
connection with any of its neighboring pixels, and if successive frames of a
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digital video were totally unconnected, then no compression technique would
work. Compression techniques are useless if they are applied to noise, to
the mad jumble that you get if an antenna is disconnected, because there is
absolutely no pattern there to compress away.
Another way to put it is that the most informative picture is one in
which each pixel is a complete surprise. Fortunately real pictures are almost
never like that. But we shall re-encounter this important theme later on,
in Chapter V, when we’ll take incompressibility and use it as the basis for
a mathematical definition of a random real number. And then, in Chapter
VI, we’ll discover such a random number in pure mathematics: the halting
probability Ω. Ω is an infinite sequence of bits in which there is no pattern,
and there are no correlations. Its bits are mathematical facts that cannot be
compressed into axioms that are more concise than they are. So, surprisingly
enough, digital TV and DVD compression/decompression technology may
actually have something to do with more important questions, namely with
philosophy and the limits of knowledge!
Indeed, the philosophical, mathematical ideas anti-dated these practical
applications of compression and decompression. There were no DVD’s when
I started working on these ideas in the early 1960’s. At that time audio and
video recording was analog, not digital. And the cheap computing power
necessary to compress and decompress audio and video was simply not avail-
able back then. Vinyl records used to use the depth of a groove to record
a sound, not 0’s and 1’s like a CD does. I even remember my grandpar-
ents’ totally mechanical record player, absolutely without electricity, that
still worked perfectly when I was a child on their old, heavy 78 rpm records.
What astonishing progress!
Too bad that human society hasn’t progressed at the same pace that
this technology has! Indeed, in some ways we’ve retrogressed, we haven’t
progressed at all. Technology can be improved easily enough, but the human
soul, that’s immensely hard to improve!
But according to John Maynard Smith and Eo¨rs Szathma´ry (see their
books The Major Transitions in Evolution and The Origins of Life), this
kind of technological progress isn’t just important in consumer electronics,
it’s also responsible for the major steps forward in the evolution of life on
this planet. It played an extremely important role in the creation of vastly
new and improved life-forms, which are in a sense multiple origins of life,
moments when the life on this planet successfully re-invented itself. To be
more specific, they see the major steps forward in evolution as occurring at
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each point in time when biological organisms were able to invent and take
advantage of radically new and improved techniques for representing and
storing biological information.
And this even extends to human society and to human history! In his
books The New Renaissance and Phase Change, Douglas Robertson makes
a convincing case that the major steps forward in human social evolution
were because of the invention of language, which separates us from the apes,
because of written language, which makes civilization possible, because of
the printing press and cheap paper and cheap books, which provoked the
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and because of the PC and the web,
which are the current motor for drastic social change. Each major transition
occurred because it became possible for human society to record and transmit
a vastly increased amount of information. That may not be the whole story,
but the amount of information that could be recorded and remembered, the
availability of information, certainly played a major role.
What is self-delimiting information?
Okay, so far we’ve discussed what information is, and the important role
that it plays in biology—and even in determining our form of human social
organization!—and the idea of compression and decompression. But there’s
another important idea that I’d like to tell you about right away, which is
how to make information be “self-delimiting”. What the heck is that?!
The problem is very simple: How can we tell where one binary message
ends and another begins, so that we can have several messages in a row
and not get confused? (This is also, it will turn out, an essential step in the
direction of the number Ω!) Well, if we know exactly how long each message
is, then there is no problem. But how can we get messages to indicate how
long they are?
Well, there are many ways to do this, with increasing degrees of sophis-
tication.
For example, one way to do it is to double each bit of the original message,
and then tack on a pair of unequal bits at the end. For example, the plain
ordinary binary string
Original string: 011100
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becomes the self-delimiting binary string
With bits doubled: 00 11 11 11 00 00 01.
The only problem with this technique, is that we’ve just doubled the length
of every string! True, if we see two such strings in a row, if we are given two
such strings in a row, we know just where to separate them. For example,
Two self-delimiting strings: 00 11 11 11 00 00 01 11 00 11 00 10
gives us the two separate strings
011100, 1010.
But we had to double the size of everything! That’s too big a price to pay! Is
there a better way to make information self-delimiting? Yes, there certainly
is!
Let’s start with
011100
again. But this time, let’s put a prefix in front of this string, a header, that
tells us precisely how many bits there are in this message (6). To do this,
let’s write 6 in binary, which gives us 110 (4 + 2), and then let’s use the
bit-doubling trick on the prefix so that we know where the header ends and
the actual information begins:
With a header: 11 11 00 01 011100
In this particular case, using a bit-doubled header like this is no better than
doubling the entire original message. But if our original message were very
long, doubling the header would be a lot more economical than doubling
everything.
Can we do even better?! Yes, we can, there’s no need to double the entire
header. We can just put a prefix in front of the header that tells us how
long the header is, and just double that. So now we have two headers, and
only the first one is doubled, nothing else is. How many bits are there in our
original header? Well, the header is 6 = 110, which is only 3 = 11 bits long,
which doubled gives us 11 11 01. So now we’ve got this:
With two headers: 11 11 01 110 011100
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In this case using two headers is actually longer than just using one header.
But if our original message were very, very long, then this would save us a
lot of bits.
And you can keep going on and on in this way, by adding more and more
headers, each of which tells us the size of the next header, and only the very
first header is doubled!
So I think you get the idea. There are lots and lots of ways to make
information self-delimiting! And the number of bits that you have to add in
order to do this isn’t very large. If you start with an N -bit message, you
can make it self-delimiting by only adding the number of bits you need to
specify N in a self-delimiting manner. That way you know where all the
header information, the part that tells us N , ends, and where the actual
information, all N bits of it, begins. Okay? Is that clear?
This is more important than it seems. First of all, self-delimiting informa-
tion is additive, which means that the number of bits it takes to convey two
messages in a row is just the sum of the number of bits it takes to convey each
message separately. In other words, if you think of individual messages as
subroutines, you can combine many subroutines into a larger program with-
out having to add any bits—as long as you know just how many subroutines
there are, which you usually do.
And that’s not all. We’ll come back to self-delimiting information later
when we discuss how the halting probability Ω is defined, and why the defi-
nition works and actually defines a probability. In a word, it works because
we stipulate that these programs, the ones that the halting probability Ω
counts, have to be self-delimiting binary information. Otherwise Ω turns out
to be nonsense, because you can’t use a single number to count the programs
of any size that halt, you can only do it for programs of a particular size,
which isn’t very interesting.
We’ll discuss this again later. It’s probably the most difficult thing to
understand about Ω. But even if I can’t explain it to you well enough for
you to understand it, just remember that we’re always dealing with self-
delimiting information, and that all the computer programs that we’ve been
and will be considering are self-delimiting binary, that’ll give you the general
idea of how things work. Okay?
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Algorithmic Information Theory:
self-delimiting information −→ Computer −→ output
What’s the smallest self-delimiting program that produces a given output?
The size of that program in bits is the complexity H(output) of the output.
After all, you don’t want to become an expert in this field, (at least not
yet!), you just want to get a general idea of what’s going on, and of what the
important ideas are.
More on Information Theory & Biology
On the one hand, different kinds of organisms need different amounts of
DNA. And the DNA specifies how to construct the organism, and how it
works.
DNA −→ Development/Embryogenesis/Pregnancy −→ Organism
Complexity/Size Measure:
kilo/mega/gigabases of DNA.
And one can more or less classify organisms into a complexity hierarchy
based on the amount of DNA they need: viruses, cells without nuclei,
cells with nuclei, multi-celled organisms, humans. . .
That’s the biological reality. Now let’s abstract a highly-simplified math-
ematical model of this:
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Program −→ Computer −→ Output
Complexity/Size Measure:
bits/bytes kilo/mega/gigabytes of software.
H(Output) = size of smallest program for computing it.
Actually, a byte = 8 bits, and kilo/mega/gigabytes are the conventional
units of software size, leading to confusion with bases (= 2 bits), which also
starts with the letter “b”! One way to avoid the confusion is to use capital
“B” for “bytes”, and lowercase “b” for “bases”. So KB, MB, GB, TB =
kilo/mega/giga/terabytes, and Kb, Mb, Gb, Tb = kilo/mega/giga/terabases.
And kilo = one thousand (103), mega = one million (106), giga = one billion
(109), tera = a million millions (1012). However as a theoretician, I’ll think
in just plain bits, usually, I won’t use any of these practical information size
measures.
Now let me be provocative: Science is searching for the DNA for the
Universe!
A Mixed-Up Model:
DNA −→ Computer −→ Universe!
What is the complexity of the entire universe?
What’s the smallest amount of DNA/software to construct the world?
So, in a way, AIT is inspired by biology! Certainly biology is the domain
of the complex, it’s the most obvious example of complexity in the world, not
physics, where there are simple unifying principles, where there are simple
equations that explain everything! But can AIT contribute to biology?! Can
ideas flow from AIT to biology, rather than from biology to AIT? One has
to be very careful!
First of all, the
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Algorithmic Information Theory:
program −→ Computer −→ output
What’s the smallest program for a given output?
model of AIT imposes no time limit on the computation. But in the world of
biology, 9 months is already a long time to produce a new organism, that’s
a long pregnancy. And some genes are repeated because one needs large
quantities of the protein that they code for. So AIT is much too simple-
minded a model to apply to biology. DNA is not the minimum-size for the
organism that it produces.
In my theory a program should have no redundancy. But in DNA and
the real world, redundancy is good. If there were none, any change in a
message yields another valid message. But redundancy makes it possible
to do error correction and error detection, which is very important for DNA
(indeed DNA actually contains complementary base pairs, not individual
bases, so that is already a form of redundancy).
But unfortunately, in order for us to be able to prove theorems, we need
to use a less complicated model, a toy model, one that applies well to meta-
mathematics, but that does not apply well to biology. Remember: Pure
mathematics is much easier to understand, much simpler, than the messy
real world!
Complexity!
It’s an idea from Biology imported into Mathematics.
It’s not an idea from Mathematics imported into Biology.
AIT also fails in biology in another crucial respect. Look at a crystal and
at a gas. One has high program-size complexity, the other has low program-
size complexity, but neither is organized, neither is of any biological interest!
72 Meta Math!
Gas, Crystal
H(Crystal) is very low because
it’s a regular array of motionless atoms.
H(Gas) is very high because you have to specify
where each atom is and where it is going and how fast.
Here, however, is a (very theoretical) biological application of AIT, using
mutual information, the extent to which two things considered together are
simpler than considered apart. In other words, this is the extent to which
the smallest program that computes both simultaneously is smaller than the
sum of the size of the individual smallest programs for each separately.
Mutual Information Between X and Y
The mutual information is equal to H(X) +H(Y )−H(X, Y ).
It’s small if H(X, Y ) is approximately equal to H(X) +H(Y ).
It’s large if H(X, Y ) is much smaller than H(X) +H(Y ).
Note that H(X, Y ) cannot be larger than H(X) +H(Y )
because programs are self-delimiting binary information.
If two things have very little in common, it makes no difference if we
consider them together or separately. But if they have a lot in common, then
we can eliminate common subroutines when we calculate them at the same
time, and so the mutual information will be large. How about biology? Well,
there is the problem of the whole versus the parts. By what right can we
partition the world of our experience into parts, instead of considering it as
a unified whole? I’ll discuss this in a moment. Mutual information also has
a very theoretical application in music theory, not just in theoretical biology.
How?
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In music, we can use this measure of mutual information to see how close
two compositions are, to see how much they have in common. Presumably,
two works by Bach will have higher mutual information than a work by
Bach and one by Shostakovich. Or compare the entire body of work of two
composers. Two Baroque composers should have more in common than a
Baroque and a Romantic composer.
Bach, Shostakovich
H(Bach, Shostakovich) is approximately equal to
H(Bach) + H(Shostakovich).
Bach1 = Brandenburg Concertos
Bach2 = Art of the Fugue
H(Bach1, Bach2) is much less than H(Bach1) + H (Bach2).
How about biology? As I said, there is the problem of the whole versus the
parts. By what right can we partition the universe into parts, rather than
consider it as an interacting whole? Well, the parts of an organism have
high mutual information. (Because they all contain the full genome for that
organism, they all have the same DNA, even though different cells in different
tissues turn on different parts of that DNA.) Also, it is natural to divide a
whole into pieces if the program-size complexity decomposes additively, that
is, if the complexity of the whole is approximately equal to the sum of the
complexity of those parts, which means that their mutual interactions are not
as important as their internal interactions. This certainly applies to living
beings!
Fred, Alice
H (Fred, Alice) is approximately equal to H(Fred) + H(Alice).
Fred’s left arm, Fred’s right arm
H(left arm, right arm) is much less than H(left arm) + H(right arm).
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But do we really have the right to talk about the complexity of a physical
object like H(Alice), H(Fred)?! Complexity of digital objects, yes, they’re
all just finite strings of 0’s and 1’s. But physicists usually use real numbers
to describe the physical world, and they assume that space and time and
many measurable quantities can change continuously. And a real number
isn’t a digital object, it’s an analog object. And since it varies continuously,
not in discrete jumps, if you convert such a number into bits you get an
infinite number of bits. But computers can’t perform computations with
numbers that have an infinite number of bits! And my theory of algorithmic
information is based on what computers can do.
Does this pull the rug out from under everything? Fortunately it doesn’t.
In Chapter IV we’ll discuss whether the physical world is really continu-
ous or whether it might actually be discrete, like some rebels are beginning
to suspect. We’ll see that there are in fact plenty of physical reasons to reject
real numbers. And in Chapter V we’ll discuss mathematical and philosophi-
cal reasons to reject real numbers. There are lots of arguments against real
numbers, it’s just that people usually aren’t willing to listen to any of them!
So our digital approach may in fact have a truly broad range of appli-
cability. After this reassuring vindication of our digital viewpoint, the road
will finally be clear for us to get to Ω, which will happen in Chapter VI.
Chapter IV—Intermezzo
The Parable of the Rose
Let’s take a break. Please take a look at this magnificent rose:
In his wonderfully philosophical short story The Rose of Paracelsus
(1983), Borges depicts the medieval alchemist Paracelsus, who had the fame
of being able to recreate a rose from its ashes:
The young man raised the rose into the air.
“You are famed,” he said, “for being able to burn a rose to
ashes and make it emerge again, by the magic of your art. Let
me witness that prodigy. I ask that of you, and in return I will
offer up my entire life.” . . .
“There is still some fire there,” said Paracelsus, pointing to-
ward the hearth. “If you cast this rose into the embers, you would
believe that it has been consumed, and that its ashes are real. I
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tell you that the rose is eternal, and that only its appearances
may change. At a word from me, you would see it again.”
“A word?” the disciple asked, puzzled. “The furnace is cold,
and the retorts are covered with dust. What is it you would do
to bring it back again?”6
Now let’s translate this into the language of our theory.
The algorithmic information content (program-size complexity) H(rose)
of a rose is defined to be the size in bits of the smallest computer program
(algorithm) prose that produces the digital image of this rose.
This minimum-size algorithmic description prose captures the irreducible
essence of the rose, and is the number of bits that you need to preserve in
order to be able to recover the rose:
ashes −→ Alchemy/Paracelsus −→ rose
minimum-size program prose −→ Computer −→ rose
size in bits of prose =
algorithmic information content H(rose) of the rose
H(rose) measures the conceptual complexity of the rose, that is, the
difficulty (in bits) of conceiving of the rose, the number of independent
yes/no choices that must be made in order to do this. The larger H(rose)
is, the less inevitable it is for God to create this particular rose, as an
independent act of creation.
In fact, the work of Edward Fredkin, Tommaso Toffoli and Norman Mar-
golus on reversible cellular automata, has shown that there are discrete toy
universes in which no information is ever lost, that is, speaking in me-
dieval terms, the soul is immortal. Of course, this is not a terribly personal
kind of immortality; it only means that enough information is always present
to be able to reverse time and recover any previous state of the universe.
Furthermore the rose that we have been considering is only a jpeg image,
it’s only a digital rose. What about a real rose? Is that analog or digital?
6Source: Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, translated by Andrew Hurley, Pen-
guin Books, 1999, pp. 504–507. For the original La rosa de Paracelso, see Borges, Obras
Completas, Tomo III, Emece´, 1996, pp. 387–390.
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Is physical reality analog or digital? In other words, in this universe are
there infinite precision real numbers, or is everything built up out of a finite
number of 0’s and 1’s?
Well, let’s hear what Richard Feynman has to say about this.
“It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we un-
derstand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite
number of logical operations to figure out what goes on in no
matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how tiny a re-
gion of time. How can all that be going on in that tiny space?
Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to figure out what
one tiny piece of space/time is going to do? So I have often
made the hypothesis that ultimately physics will not require a
mathematical statement, that in the end the machinery will be
revealed, and the laws will turn out to be simple like the chequer
board. . . ”—Feynman, The Character of Physical Law.
Fredkin told me that he spent years trying to make Feynman take digital
physics seriously, and was very pleased to see his ideas reproduced in this
passage in Feynman’s book! For an idea to be successful, you have to give
it away, you have to be willing to let other people think that it was theirs!
You can’t be possessive, you can’t be jealous!. . .
I used to be fascinated by physics, and I wanted very badly to be able to
know if physical reality is discrete or continuous.
But what I really want to know now is: “What is life?”, “What is mind?”,
“What is intelligence?”, “What is consciousness?”, “What is creativity?”.
By working in a toy world and using digital physics, we can hopefully avoid
getting bogged down in the physics and we can concentrate on the biology
instead.
I call this theoretical theoretical physics, because even if these models do
not apply to this particular world, they are interesting possible worlds!
And my ultimate ambition, which hopefully somebody will someday
achieve, would be to prove that life, intelligence and consciousness must
with high probability evolve in one of these toy worlds. In playing God like
this, it’s important to get out more than you put in, because otherwise the
whole thing can just be a cheat. So what would really be nice is to be able
to obtain more intelligence, or a higher degree of consciousness, than you
yourself possess! You, who set up the rules of the toy universe in the first
place.
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This is certainly not an easy task to achieve, but I think that this kind
of higher-level understanding is probably more fundamental than just disen-
tangling the microstructure of the physical laws of this one world.
Theoretical Physics & Digital Philosophy
Nevertheless, there are some intriguing hints that this particular universe
may in fact be a discrete digital universe, not a continuous analog universe
the way that most people would expect.
In fact these ideas actually go back to Democritus, who argued that
matter must be discrete, and to Zeno, who even had the audacity to suggest
that continuous space and time were self-contradictory impossibilities.
Through the years I’ve noticed many times, as an armchair physicist,
places where physical calculations diverge to infinity at extremely small dis-
tances. Physicists are adept at not asking the wrong question, one that gives
an infinite answer. But I’m a mathematician, and each time I would wonder
if Nature wasn’t really trying to tell something, namely that real numbers
and continuity are a sham, and that infinitesimally small distances do not
exist!
Two Examples: the infinite amount of energy stored in the field around
a point electron according to Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, and the
infinite energy content of the vacuum according to quantum field theory.
In fact, according to quantum mechanics, infinitely precise measurements
require infinite energies (infinitely big and expensive atom smashers), but
long before that you get gravitational collapse into a black hole, if you believe
in general relativity theory.
For more on ideas like this, see the discussion of the Bekenstein bound and
the holographic principle in Lee Smolin, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity.
And although it’s not usually presented that way, string theory was in-
vented to eliminate these divergences as distances become arbitrarily small.
String theory does this by eliminating point field sources like the electron,
which as I pointed out causes difficulties for Maxwell’s theory of electromag-
netism. In string theory elementary particles are changed from points into
loops of string. And string theory provides a crucial minimum distance
scale, which is the length of these loops of string. (They’re in a tightly
curled-up extra dimension.) So you can no longer make distances go below
that minimum length scale.
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That’s one of the reasons that string theory had to be invented, in order
to get rid of arbitrarily small distances!
Last but not least, I should share with you the following experience:
For many years, whenever I would bump into my esteemed late colleague
Rolf Landauer in the halls of the IBM Watson Research Center in Yorktown
Heights, he would often gently assure me that no physical quantity has ever
been measured with more than, say, 20 digits of precision. And the exper-
iments that achieve that degree of precision are masterpieces of laboratory
art and the sympathetic search for physical quantities stable enough and
sharply defined enough to allow themselves to be measured with that de-
gree of precision, not to mention eliminating all possible perturbing sources
of noise! So why, Rolf would ask, should anyone believe in arbitrarily pre-
cise measurements or in the real numbers used to record the results of such
measurements?!
So, you see, there are lots of reasons to suspect that we might live in a
digital universe, that God prefers to be able to copy things exactly when he
has to, rather than to get the inevitable increase in noise that accompanies
analog copying!
And in the next chapter I’d like to continue in Zeno’s footsteps as well
as Rolf’s and argue that a number with infinite precision, a so-called
real number, is actually rather unreal!
80 Meta Math!
Chapter V—The Labyrinth of
the Continuum
The “labyrinth of the continuum” is how Leibniz referred to the philosophical
problems associated with real numbers, which we shall discuss in this chapter.
So the emphasis here will be on philosophy and mathematics, rather than on
physics as in the last chapter.
What is a real number? Well, in geometry it’s the length of a line,
measured exactly, with infinite precision, for example 1.2749591. . . , which
doesn’t sound too problematical, at least at first. And in analytic geometry
you need two real numbers to locate a point (in two dimensions), its distance
from the x axis, and its distance from the y axis. One real will locate a
point on a line, and the line that we will normally consider will be the so-
called “unit interval” consisting of all the real numbers from zero to one.
Mathematicians write this interval as [0, 1), to indicate that 0 is included
but 1 is not, so that all the real numbers corresponding to these points have
no integer part, only a decimal fraction. Actually, [0, 1] works too, as long as
you write one as 0.99999. . . instead of as 1.00000. . . But not to worry, we’re
going to ignore all these subtle details. You get the general idea, and that’s
enough for reading this chapter.
[By the way, why is it called “real”? To distinguish it from so-called “imaginary”
numbers like
√−1. Imaginary numbers are neither more nor less imaginary than real
numbers, but there was initially, several centuries ago, including at the time of Leibniz,
much resistance to placing them on an equal footing with real numbers. In a letter to
Huygens, Leibniz points out that calculations that temporarily traverse this imaginary
world can in fact start and end with real numbers. The usefulness of such a procedure
was, he argued, an argument in favor of such numbers. By the time of Euler, imaginaries
were extremely useful. For example, Euler’s famous result that
eix = cosx+ i sinx
totally tamed trigonometry. And the statement (Gauss) that an algebraic equation of
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degree n has exactly n roots only works with the aid of imaginaries. Furthermore, the
theory of functions of a complex variable (Cauchy) shows that the calculus and in particular
so-called power series
a0 + a1x + a2x
2 + a3x
3 + . . .
make much more sense with imaginaries than without. The final argument in their favor, if
any was needed, was provided by Schro¨dinger’s equation in quantum mechanics, in which
imaginaries are absolutely essential, since quantum probabilities (so-called “probability
amplitudes”) have to have direction as well as magnitude.]
As is discussed in Burbage and Chouchan, Leibniz et l’infini, PUF, 1993,
Leibniz referred to what we call the infinitesimal calculus as “the calculus
of transcendentals”. And he called curves “transcendental” if they cannot
be obtained via an algebraic equation, the way that the circles, ellipses,
parabolas and hyperbolas of analytic geometry most certainly can.
Leibniz was extremely proud of his quadrature of the circle, a problem
that had eluded the ancient Greeks, but that he could solve with transcen-
dental methods:
π/4 = 1− 1/3 + 1/5− 1/7 + 1/9− 1/11 + 1/13 + . . .
What is the quadrature of the circle? The problem is to geometrically con-
struct a square having the same area as a given circle, that is, to determine
the area of the circle. Well, that’s πr2, r being the radius of the circle,
which converts the problem into determining π, precisely what Leibniz ac-
complished so elegantly with the infinite series displayed above.
Leibniz could not have failed to be aware that in using this
term he was evoking the notion of God’s transcendence of all things
human, of human limitations, of human finiteness.
As often happens, history has thrown away the philosophical ideas that
inspired the creators and kept only a dry technical husk of what they thought
that they had achieved. What remains of Leibniz’s idea of transcendental
methods is merely the distinction between algebraic numbers and transcen-
dental numbers. A real number x is algebraic if it is the solution of an
equation of the form
axn + bxn−1 + · · ·+ px+ q = 0
where the constants a, b, . . . are all integers. Otherwise x is said to be tran-
scendental. The history of proofs of the existence of transcendental numbers
is rich in intellectual drama, and is one of the themes of this chapter.
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Similarly, it was Cantor’s obsession with God’s infiniteness and transcen-
dence that led him to create his spectacularly successful but extremely con-
troversial theory of infinite sets and infinite numbers. What began, at least
in Cantor’s mind, as a kind of madness, as a kind of mathematical theology
full—necessarily full—of paradoxes, such as the one discovered by Bertrand
Russell, since any attempt by a finite mind to apprehend God is inherently
paradoxical, has now been condensed and desiccated into an extremely tech-
nical and untheological field of math, modern axiomatic set theory.
Nevertheless, the intellectual history of the proofs of the existence of
transcendental numbers is quite fascinating. New ideas totally transformed
our way of viewing the problem, not once, but in fact four times! Here is an
outline of these developments:
• Liouville, Hermite and Lindemann, with great effort, were the first to
exhibit individual real numbers that could be proved to be transcen-
dental. Summary: individual transcendentals.
• Then Cantor’s theory of infinite sets revealed that the transcendental
reals had the same cardinality as the set of all reals, while the alge-
braic reals were merely as numerous as the integers, a smaller infinity.
Summary: most reals are transcendental.
• Next Turing pointed out that all algebraic reals are computable, but
again, the uncomputable reals are as numerous as the set of all re-
als, while the computable reals are only as numerous as the integers.
The existence of transcendentals is an immediate corollary. Summary:
most reals are uncomputable and therefore transcendental.
• The next great leap forward involves probabilistic ideas: the set
of random reals was defined, and it turns out that with probabil-
ity one, a real number is random and therefore necessarily uncom-
putable and transcendental. Non-random, computable and algebraic
reals all have probability zero. So now you can get a transcenden-
tal real merely by picking a real number at random with an infinitely
sharp pin, or, alternatively, by using independent tosses of a fair coin
to get its binary expansion. Summary: reals are transcenden-
tal/uncomputable/random with probability one. And in the
next chapter we’ll exhibit a natural construction that picks out an in-
dividual random real, namely the halting probability Ω, without the
need for an infinitely sharp pin.
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• Finally, and perhaps even more devastatingly, it turns out that the set
of all reals that can be individually named or specified or even defined or
referred to—constructively or not—within a formal language or within
an individual FAS, has probability zero. Summary: reals are un-
nameable with probability one.
So the set of real numbers, while natural—indeed, immediately given—
geometrically, nevertheless remains quite elusive:
Why should I believe in a real number if I can’t calculate it,
if I can’t prove what its bits are, and if I can’t even refer to it?
And each of these things happens with probability one! The real
line from 0 to 1 looks more and more like a Swiss cheese, more
and more like a stunningly black high-mountain sky studded with
pin-pricks of light.
Let’s now set to work to explore these ideas in more detail.
The “Unutterable” and the Pythagorean
School
This intellectual journey actually begins, as is often the case, with the an-
cient Greeks. Pythagoras is credited with naming both mathematics and
philosophy. And the Pythagoreans believed that number—whole numbers—
rule the universe, and that God is a mathematician, a point of view largely
vindicated by modern science, especially quantum mechanics, in which the
hydrogen atom is modeled as a musical instrument that produces a discrete
scale of notes. Although, as we saw in Chapter III, perhaps God is actually
a computer programmer!
Be that as it may, these early efforts to understand the universe suffered a
serious setback when the Pythagoreans discovered geometrical lengths that
cannot be expressed as the ratio of two whole numbers. Such lengths are
called irrational or incommensurable. In other words, they discovered real
numbers that cannot be expressed as a ratio of two whole numbers.
How did this happen?
The Pythagoreans considered the unit square, a square one unit in length
on each side, and they discovered that the size of both of the two diagonals,√
2, isn’t a rational number n/m. That is to say, it cannot be expressed as
the ratio of two integers. In other words, there are no integers n and m such
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that
(n/m)2 = 2 or n2 = 2m2
An elementary proof of this from first principles is given in Hardy’s well-
known A Mathematician’s Apology. He presents it there because he believes
that it’s a mathematical argument whose beauty anyone should be able to
appreciate. However, the proof that Hardy gives, which is actually from
Euclid’s Elements, does not give as much insight as a more advanced proof
using unique factorization into primes. I did not prove unique factorization
in Chapter II. Nevertheless, I’ll use it here. It is relevant because the two
sides of the equation
n2 = 2m2
would give us two different factorizations of the same number. How?
Well, factor n into primes, and factor m into primes. By doubling the
exponent of each prime in the factorizations of n and m,
2α 3β 5γ . . . −→ 22α 32β 52γ . . . ,
we get factorizations of n2 and m2. This gives us a factorization of n2 in
which the exponent of 2 is even, and a factorization of 2m2 in which the
exponent of 2 is odd. So we have two different factorizations of the same
number into primes, which is impossible.
According to Dantzig, Number, The Language of Science, the discovery
of irrational or incommensurable numbers like
√
2
“caused great consternation in the ranks of the Pythagoreans.
The very name given to these entities testifies to that. Algon,
the unutterable, these incommensurables were called. . . How can
number dominate the universe when it fails to account even for
the most immediate aspect of the universe, namely geometry? So
ended the first attempt to exhaust nature by number.”
This intellectual history also left its traces in the English language: In English
such irrationals are referred to as “surds”, which comes from the French
“sourd-muet”, meaning deaf-mute, one who cannot hear or speak. So the
English word “surd” comes from the French word for “deaf-mute”, and algon
= mute. In Spanish it’s “sordomudo”, deaf-mute.
In this chapter we’ll retrace this history, and we’ll see that real num-
bers not only confound the philosophy of Pythagoras, they confound as well
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Hilbert’s belief in the notion of a FAS, and they provide us with many addi-
tional reasons for doubting their existence, and for remaining quite skeptical.
To put it bluntly, our purpose here is to review and discuss the mathematical
arguments against real numbers.
The 1800’s: Individual transcendentals (Liou-
ville, Hermite, Lindemann)
Although Leibniz was extremely proud of the fact that he been able to square
the circle using transcendental methods, the 1800’s wanted to be sure that
they were really required. In other words, they demanded proofs that π and
other individual numbers defined via the sums of infinite series were not
the solution of any algebraic equation.
Finding a natural specific example of a transcendental real turned out
to be much harder than expected. It took great ingenuity and cleverness to
exhibit provably transcendental numbers!
The first such number was found by Liouville:
Liouville number = 1/101! + 1/102! + · · ·+ 1/10n! + . . .
He showed that algebraic numbers cannot be approximated that well by
rational numbers. In other words, he showed that his number cannot be
algebraic, because there are rational approximations that work too well for
it: they can get too close, too fast. But Liouville’s number isn’t a natural
example, because no one had ever been interested in this particular number
before Liouville. It was constructed precisely so that Liouville could prove
its transcendence. What about π and Euler’s number e?
Euler’s number
e = 1/1! + 1/2! + 1/3! + · · ·+ 1/n! + . . .
was finally proved transcendental by Hermite. Here at last was a natural
example! This was an important number that people really cared about!
But what about the number that Leibniz was so proud of conquering?
He had squared the circle by transcendental methods:
π/4 = 1/1− 1/3 + 1/5− 1/7 + 1/9− 1/11 + . . .
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But can you prove that transcendental methods are really necessary? This
question attracted a great deal of attention after Hermite’s result, since π
seemed to be the obvious next candidate for a transcendence proof. This
feat was finally accomplished by Lindemann, provoking the famous remark
by Kronecker that “Of what use is your beautiful proof, since π does not
exist!” Kronecker was a follower of Pythagoras; Kronecker’s best known
statement is, “God created the integers; all the rest is the work of man!”
These were the first steps on the long road to understanding transcen-
dence, but they were difficult complicated proofs that were specially tailored
for each of these specific numbers, and gave no general insight into what was
going on.
Cantor: The number of transcendentals is a
higher order infinity than the number of alge-
braic reals
As I’ve said, a real number is one that can be determined with arbitrary
precision, such as π = 3.1415926 . . . Nevertheless, in the late 1800’s two
mathematicians, Cantor and Dedekind, were moved to come up with much
more careful definitions of a real number. Dedekind did it via “cuts”, thinking
of an irrational real r as a way to partition all the rational numbers n/m into
those less than r and those greater than r. In Cantor’s case a real was defined
as an infinite sequence of rational numbers n/m that approach r more and
more closely.7
History did not take any more kindly to their work than it has to any
other attempt at a “final solution”.
But first, let me tell you about Cantor’s theory of infinite sets and his
invention of new, infinite numbers for the purpose of measuring the sizes of
all infinite sets. A very bold theory, indeed!
Cantor’s starting point is his notion of comparing two sets, finite or infi-
nite, by asking whether or not there is a one-to-one correspondence, a pairing
between the elements of the two sets that exhausts both sets and leaves no
element of either set unpaired, and no element of one of the sets paired with
7Earlier versions of the work of Dedekind and of Cantor on the reals are due to Eudoxus
and to Cauchy, respectively. History repeats itself, even in mathematics.
88 Meta Math!
more than one partner in the other set. If this can be done, then Cantor
declares that the two sets are equally big.
Actually, Galileo had mentioned this idea in one of his dialogues, the one
published at the end of his life when he was under house arrest. Galileo
points out that there are precisely as many positive integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . .
as there are square numbers 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, . . . Up to that point, history has
decided that Galileo was right on target.
However, he then declares that the fact that the squares are just a tiny
fraction of all the positive integers contradicts his previous observation that
they are equally numerous, and that this paradox precludes making any sense
of the notion of the size of an infinite set.
The paradox of the whole being equivalent to one of its parts, may have
deterred Galileo, but Cantor and Dedekind took it entirely in stride. It did
not deter them at all. In fact, Dedekind even put it to work for him, he used
it. Dedekind defined an infinite set to be one having the property that a
proper subset of it is just as numerous as it is! In other words, according
to Dedekind, a set is infinite if and only if it can be put in a one-to-one
correspondence with a part of itself, one that excludes some of the elements
of the original set!
Meanwhile, Dedekind’s friend Cantor was starting to apply this new way
of comparing the size of two infinite sets to common everyday mathematical
objects: integers, rational numbers, algebraic numbers, reals, points on a
line, points in the plane, etc.
Most of the well-known mathematical objects broke into two classes: 1)
sets like the algebraic real numbers and the rational numbers, which were
exactly as numerous as the positive integers, and are therefore called “count-
able” or “denumerable” infinities, and 2) sets like the points in a finite or
infinite line or in the plane or in space, which turned out all to be exactly as
numerous as each other, and which are said to “have the power of the con-
tinuum”. And this gave rise to two new infinite numbers, ℵ0 (aleph-nought)
and c, both invented by Cantor, that are, respectively, the size (or as Cantor
called it, the “power” or the “cardinality”) of the positive integers and of the
continuum of real numbers.
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Comparing Infinities!
#{reals} = #{points in line} = #{points in plane} = c
#{positive integers} = #{rational numbers} =
#{algebraic real numbers} = ℵ0
Regarding his proof that there were precisely as many points in a plane
as there are in a solid or in a line, Cantor remarked in a letter to Dedekind,
“Je le vois, mais je ne le crois pas!”, which means “I see it, but I don’t believe
it!”, and which happens to have a pleasant melody in French.
And then Cantor was able to prove the extremely important and basic
theorem that c is larger than ℵ0, that is to say, that the continuum is a
nondenumerable infinity, an uncountable infinity, in other words, that there
are more real numbers than there are positive integers, infinitely more. This
he did by using Cantor’s well-known diagonal method, explained in Wallace,
Everything and More, which is all about Cantor and his theory.
In fact, it turns out that the infinity of transcendental reals is exactly
as large as the infinity of all reals, and the smaller infinity of algebraic reals
is exactly as large as the infinity of positive integers. Immediate corollary:
most reals are transcendental, not algebraic, infinitely more so.
Well, this is like stealing candy from a baby! It’s much less work than
struggling with individual real numbers and trying to prove that they are
transcendental! Cantor gives us a much more general perspective from which
to view this particular problem. And it’s much easier to see that most reals
are transcendental than to decide if a particular real number happens to be
transcendental!
So that’s the first of what I would call the “philosophical” proofs that
transcendentals exist. Philosophical as opposed to highly-technical, like fly-
ing by helicopter to the top of the Eiger instead of reaching the summit by
climbing up its infamous snow-covered north face.
Is it really that easy? Yes, but this set-theoretic approach created as
many problems as it solved. The most famous is called Cantor’s continuum
problem.
What is Cantor’s continuum problem?
Well, it’s the question of whether or not there happens to be any set
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that has more elements than there are positive integers, and that has fewer
elements than there are real numbers. In other words, is there an infinite
set whose cardinality or power is bigger than ℵ0 and smaller than c? In
other words, is c the next infinite number after ℵ0, which has the name ℵ1
(aleph-one) reserved for it in Cantor’s theory, or are there a lot of other aleph
numbers in between?
Cantor’s Continuum Problem
Is there a set S such that ℵ0 < #S < c?
In other words, is c = ℵ1, which is
the first cardinal number after ℵ0?
A century of work has not sufficed to solve this problem!
An important milestone was the proof by the combined efforts of Go¨del
and Paul Cohen that the usual axioms of axiomatic set theory (as opposed
to the “naive” paradoxical original Cantorian set theory), do not suffice to
decide one way or another. You can add a new axiom asserting there is a set
with intermediate power, or that there is no such set, and the resulting system
of axioms will not lead to a contradiction (unless there was already one there,
without even having to use this new axiom, which everyone fervently hopes
is not the case).
Since then there has been a great deal of work to see if there might be
new axioms that set theorists can agree on that might enable them to settle
Cantor’s continuum problem. And indeed, something called the axiom of
projective determinacy has become quite popular among set theorists, since
it permits them to solve many open problems that interest them. However,
it doesn’t suffice to settle the continuum problem!
So you see, the continuum refuses to be tamed!
And now we’ll see how the real numbers, annoyed at being “defined” by
Cantor and Dedekind, got their revenge in the century after Cantor, the 20th
century.
Chapter V—The Labyrinth of the Continuum 91
Borel’s amazing know-it-all real number
The first intimation that there might be something wrong, something terribly
wrong, with the notion of a real number comes from a small paper published
by E´mile Borel in 1927.
Borel pointed out that if you really believe in the notion of a real number
as an infinite sequence of digits 3.1415926. . . , then you could put all of human
knowledge into a single real number. Well, that’s not too difficult to do, that’s
only a finite amount of information. You just take your favorite encyclopedia,
for example, the Encyclopedia Britannica, which I used to use when I was
in high-school—we had a nice library at the Bronx High School of Science—
and you digitize it, you convert it into binary, and you use that binary as the
base-two expansion of a real number in the unit interval between zero and
one!
So that’s pretty straight-forward, especially now that most information,
including books, is prepared in digital form before being printed.
But what’s more amazing is that there’s nothing to stop us from putting
an infinite amount of information into a real number. In fact, there’s a single
real number, I’ll call it Borel’s number, since he imagined it, in 1927, that
can serve as an oracle and answer any yes/no question that we could ever
pose to it. How? Well, you just number all the possible questions, and then
the Nth digit or Nth bit of Borel’s number tells you whether the answer is
yes or no!
If you could come up with a list of all possible yes/no questions and only
valid yes/no questions, then Borel’s number could give us the answer in its
binary digits. But it’s hard to do that. It’s much easier to simply list all
possible texts in the English language (and Borel did it using the French
language), all possible finite strings of characters that you can form using
the English alphabet, including a blank for use between words. You start
with all the one-character strings, then all the two-character strings, etc.
And you number them all like that. . .
Then you can use the Nth digit of Borel’s number to tell you whether
the Nth string of characters is a valid text in English, then whether it’s a
yes/no question, then whether it has an answer, then whether the answer is
yes or no. For example, “Is the answer to this question ‘No’?” looks like a
valid yes/no question, but in fact has no answer.
So we can use Nth digit 0 to mean bad English, 1 to mean not a yes/no
question, 2 to mean unanswerable, and 3 and 4 to mean “yes” and “no” are
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the answers, respectively. Then 0 will be the most common digit, then 1,
then there’ll be about as many 3’s as 4’s, and, I expect, a smattering of 2’s.
Now Borel raises the extremely troubling question, “Why should we be-
lieve in this real number that answers every possible yes/no question?” And
his answer is that he doesn’t see any reason to believe in it, none at all!
According to Borel, this number is merely a mathematical fantasy, a joke, a
reductio ad absurdum of the concept of a real number!
You see, some mathematicians have what’s called a “constructive” atti-
tude. This means that they only believe in mathematical objects that can be
constructed, that, given enough time, in theory one could actually calculate.
They think that there ought to be some way to calculate a real number,
to calculate it digit by digit, otherwise in what sense can it be said to have
some kind of mathematical existence?
And this is precisely the question discussed by Alan Turing in his fa-
mous 1936 paper that invented the computer as a mathematical concept. He
showed that there were lots and lots of computable real numbers. That’s the
positive part of his paper. The negative part, is that he also showed that
there were lots and lots of uncomputable real numbers. And that gives us
another philosophical proof that there are transcendental numbers, because
it turns out that all algebraic reals are in fact computable.
Turing: Uncomputable reals are transcenden-
tal
Turing’s argument is very simple, very Cantorian in flavor. First he invents
a computer (on paper, as a mathematical idea, a model computer). Then he
points out that the set of all possible computer programs is a countable set,
just like the set of all possible English texts. Therefore the set of all possible
computable real numbers must also be countable. But the set of all reals
is uncountable, it has the power of the continuum. Therefore the set of all
uncomputable reals is also uncountable and has the power of the continuum.
Therefore most reals are uncomputable, infinitely more than are computable.
That’s remarkably simple, if you believe in the idea of a general-purpose
digital computer. Now we are all very familiar with that idea. Turing’s
paper is long precisely because that was not at all the case in 1936. So he
had to work out a simple computer on paper and argue that it could compute
Chapter V—The Labyrinth of the Continuum 93
anything that can ever be computed, before giving the above argument that
most real numbers will then be uncomputable, in the sense that there cannot
be a program for computing them digit by digit forever.
The other difficult thing is to work out in detail precisely why algebraic
reals can be computed digit by digit. Well, it’s sort of intuitively obvious that
this has to be the case; after all, what could possibly go wrong?! In fact, this
is now well-known technology using something called Sturm sequences, that’s
the slickest way to do this; I’m sure that it comes built into Mathematica
and Maple, two symbolic computing software packages. So you can use these
software packages to calculate as many digits as you want. And you need
to be able to calculate hundreds of digits in order to do research the way
described by Jonathan Borwein and David Bailey in their book Mathematics
by Experiment.
But in his 1936 paper Turing mentions a way to calculate algebraic reals
that will work for a lot of them, and since it’s a nice idea, I thought I’d tell
you about it. It’s a technique for root-solving by successive interval halving.
Let’s write the algebraic equation that determines an individual algebraic
real r that we are interested in as φ(x) = 0; φ(x) is a polynomial in x. So
φ(r) = 0, and let’s suppose we know two rational numbers α, β such that
α < r < β and φ(α) < φ(r) < φ(β) and we also know that there is no other
root of the equation φ(x) = 0 in that interval. So the signs of φ(α) and φ(β)
have to be different, neither of them is zero, and precisely one of them is
greater than zero and one of them is less than zero, that’s key. Because if
φ changes from positive to negative it must pass through zero somewhere in
between.
Then you just bisect this interval [α, β]. You look at the midpoint (α +
β)/2 which is also a rational number, and you plug that into φ and you see
whether or not φ((α+ β)/2) is equal to zero, less than zero, or greater than
zero. It’s easy to see which, since you’re only dealing with rational numbers,
not with real numbers, which have an infinite number of digits.
Then if φ of the midpoint gives zero, we have found r and we’re finished.
If not, we choose the left half or the right half of our original interval in
such a way that the sign of φ at both ends is different, and this new interval
replaces our original interval, r must be there, and we keep on going like that
forever. And that gives us better and better approximations to the algebraic
number r, which is what we wanted to show was possible, because at each
stage the interval containing r is half the size it was before.
And this will work if r is what is called a “simple” root of its defining
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equation φ(r) = 0, because in that case the curve for φ(x) will in fact cross
zero at x = r. But if r is what is called a “multiple” root, then the curve
may just graze zero, not cross it, and the Sturm sequence approach is the
slickest way to proceed.
Now let’s stand back and take a look at Turing’s proof that there are
transcendental reals. On the one hand, it’s philosophical like Cantor’s proof;
on the other hand, it is some work to verify in detail that all algebraic reals
are computable, although to me that seems obvious in some sense that I
would be hard-pressed to justify/explain.
At any rate, now I’d like to take another big step, and show you that there
are uncomputable reals in a very different way from the way that Turing did
it, which is very much in the spirit of Cantor. Instead I’d like to use proba-
bilistic ideas, ideas from what’s called measure theory, which was developed
by Lebesgue, Borel, and Hausdorff, among others, and which immediately
shows that there are uncomputable reals in a totally un-Cantorian manner.
Reals are uncomputable with probability one!
I got this idea from reading Courant and Robbins, What is Mathematics?,
where they give a measure-theoretic proof that the reals are non-denumerable
(more numerous than the integers).
Let’s look at all the reals in the unit interval between zero and one. The
total length of that interval is of course exactly one. But it turns out that
all of the computable reals in it can be covered with intervals having total
length exactly ǫ, and we can make ǫ as small as we want. How can we do
that?
Well, remember that Turing points out that all the possible computer
programs can be put in a list and numbered one by one, so there’s a first
program, a second program, and so forth and so on. . . Some of these pro-
grams don’t compute computable reals digit by digit; let’s just forget about
them and focus on the others. So there’s a first computable real, a second
computable real, etc. And you just take the first computable real and cover
it with an interval of size ǫ/2, and you take the second computable real and
you cover it with an interval of size ǫ/4, and you keep going that way, halving
the size of the covering interval each time. So the total size of all the covering
intervals is going to be exactly
ǫ/2 + ǫ/4 + ǫ/8 + ǫ/16 + ǫ/32 + . . . = ǫ
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which can be made as small as you like.
And it doesn’t matter if some of these covering intervals fall partially
outside of the unit interval, that doesn’t change anything.
So all the computable reals can be covered this way, using an arbitrarily
small part ǫ of the unit interval, which has length exactly equal to one.
So if you close your eyes and pick a real number from the unit interval at
random, in such a way that any one of them is equally likely, the probability
is zero that you get a computable real. And that’s also the case if you get
the successive binary digits of your real number using independent tosses of
a fair coin. It’s possible that you get a computable real, but it’s infinitely
unlikely. So with probability one you get an uncomputable real, and that
has also got to be a transcendental number, what do you think of that!
Liouville, Hermite and Lindemann worked so hard to exhibit individual
transcendentals, and now we can do it, almost certainly, by just picking a
real number out of a hat! That’s progress for you!
So let’s suppose that you do that and get a specific uncomputable real
that I’m going to call R∗. What if you try to prove what some of its bits are
when you write R∗ in base-two binary?
Well, we’ve got a problem if we try to do that. . .
A FAS cannot determine infinitely many bits
of an uncomputable real
The problem is that if we are using a Hilbert/Turing/Post FAS, as we saw in
Chapter II there has got to be an algorithm for computably enumerating all
the theorems, and so if we can prove what all the bits are, then we can just
go ahead and calculate R∗ bit by bit, which is impossible. To do that, you
would just go through all the theorems one by one until you find the value
of any particular bit of R∗.
In fact, the FAS has got to fail infinitely many times to determine a bit of
R∗, otherwise we could just keep a little (finite) table on the side telling us
which bits the FAS misses, and what their values are, and again we’d be able
to compute R∗, by combining the table with the FAS, which is impossible.
So our study of transcendentals now has a new ingredient, which is that
we’re using probabilistic methods. This is how I get a specific uncomputable
real R∗, not the way that Turing originally did it, which was using Cantor’s
96 Meta Math!
diagonal method.
And now let’s really start using probabilistic methods, let’s start talk-
ing about algorithmically incompressible, irreducible random real numbers.
What do I mean by that?
Random reals are uncomputable and have
probability one
Well, a random real is a real number with the property that its bits are
irreducible, incompressible information, as much as is possible. Technically,
the way you guarantee that, is to require that the smallest self-delimiting
binary program that calculates the first N bits of the binary expansion of R
is always greater than N − c bits long, for all N , where c is a constant that
depends on R but not on N .
What’s a “Random” Real Number R?
There’s a constant c such that
H(the first N bits of R) > N − c for all N .
The program-size complexity of the first N bits of R
can never drop too far below N .
But I don’t want to get into the details. The general idea is that you just
require that the program-size complexity that we defined in Chapter III of
the first N bits of R has got to be as large as possible, as long as most reals
can satisfy the lower bound that you put on this complexity. That is to say,
you demand that the complexity be as high as possible, as long as the reals
that can satisfy this requirement continue to have probability one, in other
words, as long as the probability that a real fails to have complexity this high
is zero.
So this is just a simple application of the ideas that we discussed in
Chapter III.
So of course this random incompressible real won’t be computable, for
computable reals only have a finite amount of information. But what if
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we try to use a particular FAS to determine particular bits of a particular
random real R∗? Now what?
A FAS can determine only finitely many bits
of a random real!
Well, it turns out that things have gotten worse, much worse than before.
Now we can only determine finitely many bits of that random real R∗.
Why?
Well, because if we could determine infinitely many bits, then those bits
aren’t really there in the binary expansion of R∗, we get them for free, you
see, by generating all the theorems in the FAS. You just see how many bits
there are in the program for generating all the theorems, you see how complex
the FAS is. Then you use the FAS to determine that many bits of R∗, and
a few more (just a little more than the c in the definition of the random real
R∗). And then you fill in the holes up to the last bit that you got using
the FAS. (This can actually be done in a self-delimiting manner, because
we already know exactly how many bits we need, we know that in advance.)
And so that gives you a lot of bits from the beginning of the binary expansion
of R∗, but the program for doing it that I described is just a little bit too
small, its size is substantially smaller than the number of bits of R∗ that it
got us, which contradicts the definition of a random real.
So random reals are bad news from the point of view of what can be
proved. Most of their bits are unknowable; a given FAS can only determine
about as many bits of the random real as the number of bits needed to
generate the set of all its theorems. In other words, the bits of a random
real, any finite set of them, cannot be compressed into a FAS with a smaller
number of bits.
So by using random reals we get a much worse incompleteness result than
by merely using uncomputable reals. You get at most a finite number of bits
using any FAS. In fact, essentially the only way to prove what a bit of a
particular random real is using a FAS is if you put that information directly
into the axioms!
The bits of a random real are maximally unknowable!
So is there any reason to believe in such a random real? Plus I need to pick
out a specific one, otherwise this incompleteness result isn’t very interesting.
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It just says, pick the real R∗ out of a hat, and then any particular FAS can
prove what at most a finite number of bits are. But there is no way to even
refer to that specific real number R∗ within the FAS: it doesn’t have a name!
Well, we’ll solve that problem in the next chapter by picking out one
random real, the halting probability Ω.
Meanwhile, we’ve realised that naming individual real numbers can be a
problem. In fact, most of them can’t even be named.
Reals are un-nameable with probability one!
The proof is just like the one that computable reals have probability zero.
The set of all names for real numbers, if you fix your formal language or FAS,
is just a countable infinity of names: because there’s a first name, a second
name, etc.
So you can cover them all using intervals that get smaller and smaller,
and the total size of all the covering intervals is going to be exactly as before
ǫ/2 + ǫ/4 + ǫ/8 + ǫ/16 + ǫ/32 + . . . = ǫ
which, as before, can be made as small as you like.
So, with probability one, a specific real number chosen at random cannot
even be named uniquely, we can’t specify it somehow, constructively or not,
we can’t define it or even refer to it!
So why should we believe that such an un-nameable real even exists?!
I claim that this makes incompleteness obvious: a FAS cannot
even name all reals!
Instantaneous proof! We did it in three little paragraphs! Of course,
this is a somewhat different kind of incompleteness than the one that Go¨del
originally exhibited.
People were very impressed by the technical difficulty of Go¨del’s proof. It
had to be that difficult, because it involves constructing an assertion about
whole numbers that can’t be proved within a particular, popular FAS (called
Peano arithmetic). But if you change whole numbers to real numbers, and if
you talk about what you can name, rather than about what you can prove,
then incompleteness is, as we’ve just seen, immediate!
So why climb the north face of the Eiger, when you can take a helicopter
and have a picnic lunch on the summit in the noonday sun? Of course, there
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are actually plenty of reasons to climb that north face. I was recently proud
to shake hands with someone who’s tried to do it several times.
But in my opinion, this is the best proof of incompleteness! As Po´lya
says in How to Solve It, after you solve a problem, if you’re a future math-
ematician, that’s just the beginning. You should look back, reflect on what
you did, and how you did it, and what the alternatives were. What other
possibilities are there? How general is the method that you used? What
was the key idea? What else is it good for? And can you do it without any
computation, or can you see it at a glance?
This way, the way we just did it here, yes, you can certainly see incom-
pleteness at a glance!
The only problem is, that most people are not going to be too impressed
by this particular kind of incompleteness, because it seems too darn philo-
sophical. Go¨del made it much more down to earth by talking about the
positive integers, instead of exploiting problematical aspects of the reals.
And in spite of what mathematicians may brag, they have always had a
slightly queasy attitude about reals, it’s only with whole numbers that they
feel really and absolutely confident.
And in the next chapter I’ll solve that, at least for Ω. I’ll take my para-
doxical real, Ω, and dress it up as a diophantine problem, which just talks
about whole numbers. This shows that even though Ω is a real number,
you’ve got to take it seriously!
Chapter summary
Against Real Numbers!
Prob{algebraic reals} = Prob{computable reals} =
Prob{nameable reals} = 0
Prob{transcendental reals} = Prob{uncomputable reals} =
Prob{random reals} = Prob{un-nameable reals} = 1
In summary: Why should I believe in a real number if I can’t
calculate it, if I can’t prove what its bits are, and if I can’t even
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refer to it? And each of these things happens with probability
one!
We started this chapter with
√
2, which the ancient Greeks referred to as
“unutterable”, and we ended it by showing that with probability one there
is no way to even name or to specify or define or refer to, no matter how
non-constructively, individual real numbers. We have come full circle, from
the unutterable to the un-namable! There is no escape, these issues will not
go away!
In the previous chapter we saw physical arguments against real num-
bers. In this chapter we’ve seen that reals are also problematic from amath-
ematical point of view, mainly because they contain an infinite amount
of information, and infinity is something we can imagine but rarely touch.
So I view these two chapters as validating the discrete, digital information
approach of AIT, which does not apply comfortably in a physical or mathe-
matical world made up out of real numbers. And I feel that this gives us the
right to go ahead and see what looking at the size of computer programs can
buy us, now that we feel reasonably comfortable with this new digital, dis-
crete viewpoint, now that we’ve examined the philosophical underpinnings
and the tacit assumptions that allowed us to posit this new concept.
In the next chapter I’ll finally settle my two debts to you,
dear reader, by proving that Turing’s halting problem cannot be
solved—my way, not the way that Turing originally did. And I’ll
pick out an individual random real, my Ω number, which as we saw
in this chapter must have the property that any FAS can determine
at most finitely many bits of its base-two binary expansion. And
we’ll discuss what the heck it all means, what it says about how
we should do mathematics. . .
Chapter VI—Complexity,
Randomness & Incompleteness
In Chapter II I showed you Turing’s approach to incompleteness. Now let
me show you how I do it. . .
I am very proud of my two incompleteness results in this chapter! These
are the jewels in the AIT crown, the best (or worst) incompleteness results,
the most shocking ones, the most devastating ones, the most enlightening
ones, that I’ve been able to come up with! Plus they are a consequence of the
digital philosophy viewpoint that goes back to Leibniz and that I described
in Chapter III. That’s why these results are so astonishingly different from
the classical incompleteness results of Go¨del (1931) and Turing (1936).
Irreducible Truths and the Greek Ideal of Rea-
son
I want to start by telling you about the very dangerous idea of “logical
irreducibility”. . .
Mathematics:
axioms −→ Computer −→ theorems
We’ll see in this chapter that the traditional notion of what math is about
is all wrong: reduce things to axioms, compression. Nope, sometimes this
doesn’t work at all. The irreducible mathematical facts exhibited here in this
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chapter—the bits of Ω—cannot be derived from any principles simpler than
they themselves are.
So the normal notion of the utility of proof fails for them—proof doesn’t
help at all in these cases. Simple axioms with complicated results is where
proof helps. But here the axioms have to be as complicated as the result. So
what’s the point of using reasoning at all?!
Put another way: The normal notion of math is to look for structure and
law in the world of math, for a theory. But theory implies compression, and
here there cannot be any—there is no structure or law at all in this particular
corner of the world of math.
And since there can be no compression, there can be no understanding
of these mathematical facts!
In summary. . .
When is Reasoning Useful?
“Axioms = Theorems” implies reasoning is useless!
“Axioms ≪ Theorems” implies compression & comprehension!
If the axioms are exactly equal in size to the body of interesting theorems,
then reasoning was absolutely useless. But if the axioms are much smaller
than the body of interesting theorems, then we have a substantial amount of
compression, and so a substantial amount of understanding!
Hilbert, taking this tradition to its extreme, believed that a single FAS
of finite complexity, a finite number of bits of information, must suffice to
generate all of mathematical truth. He believed in a final theory of every-
thing, at least for the world of pure math. The rich, infinite, imaginative,
open-ended world of all of math, all of that compressed into a finite number
of bits! What a magnificent compression that would have been! What a
monument to the power of human reason!
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Coin Tosses, Randomness vs. Reason, True for
no Reason, Unconnected Facts
And now, violently opposed to the Greek ideal of pure reason: Independent
tosses of a fair coin, an idea from physics!
A “fair” coin means that it is as likely for heads to turn up as for tails.
“Independent” means that the outcome of one coin toss doesn’t influence the
next outcome.
So each outcome of a coin toss is a unique, atomic fact that has no
connection with any other fact: not with any previous outcome, not with
any future outcome.
And knowing the outcome of the first million coin tosses, if we’re dealing
with independent tosses of a fair coin, gives us absolutely no help in predicting
the very next outcome. Similarly, if we could know all the even outcomes
(2nd coin toss, 4th toss, 6th toss), that would be no help in predicting any
of the odd outcomes (1st toss, 3rd toss, 5th toss).
This idea of an infinite series of independent tosses of a fair coin may
sound like a simple idea, a toy physical model, but it is a serious challenge,
indeed a horrible nightmare, for any attempt to formulate a rational world
view! Because each outcome is a fact that is true for no reason, that’s true
only by accident!
Rationalist World View
In the physical world, everything happens for a reason.
In the world of math, everything is true for a reason.
The universe is comprehensible, logical!
Kurt Go¨del subscribed to this philosophical position.
So rationalists like Leibniz and Wolfram have always rejected physical
randomness, or “contingent events”, as Leibniz called them, because they
cannot be understood using reason, they utterly refute the power of reason.
Leibniz’s solution to the problem is to claim that contingent events are also
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true for a reason, but in such cases there is in fact an infinite series of reasons,
an infinite chain of cause and effect, that while utterly beyond the power of
human comprehension, is not at all beyond the power of comprehension of
the divine mind. Wolfram’s solution to the problem is to say that all of the
apparent randomness that we see in the world is actually only pseudo-
randomness. It looks like randomness, but it is actually the result of simple
laws, in the same way that the digits of π = 3.1415926 . . . seem to be random.
Nevertheless, at this point in time quantum mechanics demands real in-
trinsic randomness in the physical world, real unpredictability, and chaos
theory even shows that a somewhat milder form of randomness is actually
present in classical, deterministic physics, if you believe in infinite precision
real numbers and in the power of acute sensitivity to initial conditions to
quickly amplify random bits in initial conditions into the macroscopic do-
main. . .
The physicist Karl Svozil has the following interesting position on these
questions. Svozil has classical, deterministic leanings and sympathizes with
Einstein’s assertion that “God doesn’t play dice”. Svozil admits that in its
current state quantum theory contains randomness. But he thinks that this
is only temporary, and that some new, deeper, hidden-variable theory will
eventually restore determinacy and law to physics. On the other hand, Svozil
believes that, as he puts it, Ω shows that there is real randomness in the
(unreal) mental mindscape fantasy world of pure math!
A Conversation on Randomness at City Col-
lege, NY, 1965
As background information for this story, I should start by telling you that
a century ago Borel proposed a mathematical definition of a random real
number, in fact, infinitely many variant definitions. He called such reals
“normal” numbers. This is the same Borel who in 1927 invented the know-
it-all-real that we discussed in Chapter V. And in 1909 he was able to show
that most real numbers must satisfy all of his variant definitions of normality.
The probability is zero of failing to satisfy any of them.
What is Borel’s definition of a normal real? Well, it’s a real number with
the property that every possible digit occurs with equal limiting frequency:
in the long run, exactly 10% of the time. That’s called “simple” 10-normal.
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And 10-normal tout court means that for each k, the base-ten expansion
of the real has each of the 10k possible blocks of k successive digits with
exactly the same limiting relative frequency 1/10k. All the possible blocks
of k successive digits are exactly equally likely to appear in the long run,
and this is the case for every k, for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . Finally there is just plain
“normal”, which is a real that has this property when written in any base,
not just base-ten. In other words, normal means that it’s 2-normal, 3-normal,
4-normal, and so forth and so on.
So most reals are normal, with probability one (Borel, 1909). But what
if we want to exhibit a specific normal number? And there seems to be no
reason to doubt that π and e are normal, but no one, to this day, has the
slightest idea how to prove this.
Okay, that’s the background information on Borel normality. Now let’s
fast forward to 1965.
I’m an undergraduate at City College, just starting my second year. I
was writing and revising my very first paper on randomness. My definition
of randomness was not at all like Borel’s. It was the much more demand-
ing definition that I’ve discussed in this book, that’s based on the idea of
algorithmic incompressibility, on the idea of looking at the size of computer
programs. In fact, it’s actually based on a remark that Leibniz made in
1686, though I wasn’t aware of that at the time. This is my paper that was
published in 1966 and 1969 in the ACM Journal.
The Dean had excused me from attending classes so that I could prepare
all this for publication, and the word quickly got around at City College that
I was working on a new definition of randomness. And it turned out that
there was a professor at City College, Richard Stoneham, whom I had never
had in any of my courses, who was very interested in normal numbers.
We met in his office in wonderful old, stone pseudo-gothic Shepard Hall,
and I explained to him that I was working on a definition of randomness,
one that would imply Borel normality, and that it was a definition that most
reals would satisfy, with probability one.
He explained that he was interested in proving that specific numbers like
π or e were normal. He wanted to show that some well-known mathematical
object already contained randomness, Borel normality, not some new kind of
randomness. I countered that no number like π or e could satisfy my much
more demanding definition of randomness, because they were computable
reals and therefore compressible.
He gave me some of his papers. One paper was computational and was on
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the distribution of the different digits in the decimal expansions of π and e.
They seemed to be normal. . . And another paper was theoretical, on digits
in rational numbers, in periodic decimal expansions. Stoneham was able to
show that for some rationals m/n the digits were sort of equi-distributed,
subject to conditions on m and n that I no longer recall.
That was it, that was the only time that we met.
And the years went by, and I came up with the halting probability Ω.
And I never heard of Stoneham again, until I learned in Borwein and Bailey’s
chapter on normal numbers in Mathematics by Experiment that Stoneham
had actually managed to do it! Amazingly enough, we had both achieved
our goals!
Bailey and Crandall, during the course of their own work in 2003 that
produced a much stronger result, had discovered that 30 years before, Stone-
ham, now deceased (that’s information from Wolfram’s book), had succeeded
in finding what as far as I know was the first “natural” example of a normal
number.
Looking like a replay of Liouville, Stoneham had not been able to show
that π or e were normal. But he had been able to show that the sum of a
natural-looking infinite series was 2-normal, that is, normal for blocks of bits
of every possible size in base-2!
He and I both found what we were looking for! How delightful!
And in this chapter I’ll tell you how we did it. But first, as a warm-up
exercise, to get in the right mood, I want to prove that Turing’s halting
problem is unsolvable. We should do that before looking at my halting
probability Ω.
And to do that, I want to show that you can’t prove that a program
is elegant, except finitely often. Believe it or not, the idea for that proof
actually comes from E´mile Borel, the same Borel as before. Although I
wasn’t aware of this when I originally found the proof on my own. . .
So let me start by telling you Borel’s beautiful idea.
Borel’s Undefinability-of-Randomness Para-
dox
I have a very clear and distinct recollection of reading the idea that I’m about
to explain to you, in an English translation of a book by Borel on the basic
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ideas of probability theory. Unfortunately, I have never been able to discover
which book it was, nor to find again the following discussion by Borel, about
a paradox regarding any attempt to give a definitive notion of randomness.
So it is possible that this is a false memory, perhaps a dream that I once
had, which sometimes seem real to me, or a “reprocessed” memory that I
have somehow fabricated over the years.
However, Borel was quite prolific, and was very interested in these issues,
so this is probably somewhere in his oeuvre! If you find it, please let me
know!
That caution aside, let me share with you my recollection of Borel’s dis-
cussion of a problem that must inevitably arise with any attempt to define
the notion of randomness.
Let’s say that somehow you can distinguish between whole numbers whose
decimal digits form a particularly random sequence of digits, and those that
don’t.
Now think about the first N -digit number that satisfies your definition of
randomness. But this particular number is rather atypical, because it hap-
pens to be precisely the first N -digit number that has a particular property!
The problem is that random means “typical, doesn’t stand out from the
crowd, no distinguishing features”. But if you can define randomness, then
the property of being random becomes just one more feature that you can
use to show that certain numbers are atypical and stand out from the crowd!
So in this way you get a hierarchy of notions of randomness, the one you
started out with, then the next one, then one derived from that, and so forth
and so on. . . And each of these is derived using the previous definition of
randomness as one more characteristic just like any other that can be used
to classify numbers!
Borel’s conclusion is that there can be no one definitive definition of
randomness. You can’t define an all-inclusive notion of randomness. Ran-
domness is a slippery concept, there’s something paradoxical about it, it’s
hard to grasp. It’s all a matter of deciding how much we want to demand.
You have to decide on a cut-off, you have to say “enough”, let’s take that
to be random.
Let me try to explain this by using some images that are definitely not
in my possibly false Borel recollection.
The moment that you fix in your mind a notion of randomness, that
very mental act invalidates that notion and creates a new more demanding
notion of randomness. . . So fixing randomness in your mind is like trying to
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stare at something without blinking and without moving your eyes. If you
do that, the scene starts to disappear in pieces from your visual field. To
see something, you have to keep moving your eyes, changing your focus of
attention. . .
The harder you stare at randomness, the less you see it! It’s sort of
like trying to see faint objects in a telescope at night, which you do by not
staring directly at them, but instead looking aside, where the resolution of
the retina is lower and the color sensitivity is lower, but you can see much
fainter objects. . .
This discussion that I shall attribute to Borel in fact contains the germ of
the idea of my proof that I’ll now give that you can’t prove that a computer
program is “elegant”, that is to say, that it’s the smallest program that
produces the output that it does. More precisely, a program is elegant if no
program smaller than it produces the same output. You see, there may be
a tie, there may be several different programs that have exactly the same
minimum-possible size and produce the same output.
Viewed as a theory, as discussed in Chapter III, an elegant program is
the optimal compression of its output, it’s the simplest scientific theory for
that output, considered as experimental data.
So if the output of this computer program is the entire universe, then
an elegant program for it would be the optimal TOE, the optimal Theory
of Everything, the one with no redundant elements, the best TOE, the one,
Leibniz would say, that a perfect God would use to produce that particular
universe.
Why Can’t You Prove that a Program is “El-
egant”?
So let’s consider a Hilbert/Turing/Post formal axiomatic system FAS, which
(as discussed in Chapter II) for us is just a program for generating all the
theorems. And we’ll assume that this program is the smallest possible one
that produces that particular set of theorems. So the size of this program is
precisely the program-size complexity of that theory. There’s absolutely no
redundancy!
Okay, so that’s how we can measure the power of FAS by how many bits
of information it contains. As you’ll see now this really works, it really gives
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us new insight.
Building on Borel’s paradox discussed in the previous section, consider
this computer program. . .
Paradoxical Program P :
The output of P is the same as the output of
the first provably elegant program Q that you encounter
(as you generate all the theorems of your chosen FAS)
that is larger than P .
Why are we building on Borel’s paradox? Because the idea is,
that if we could prove that a program is elegant, then that would
enable us to find a smaller program that produces the same output,
contradiction! Borel’s paradox, is that if we could define random-
ness, then that would enable us to pick out a random number that
isn’t at all random, contradiction. So I view these two proofs,
Borel’s informal paradox, and this actual theorem, or, more pre-
cisely, meta-theorem, as being in the same spirit.
In other words, P generates all the theorems of the FAS until it finds a
proof that a particular program Q is elegant, and what’s more the size of Q
has got to be larger than the size of P . If P can find such a Q, then it runs
Q and produces Q’s output as its own output.
Contradiction, because P is too small to produce the same output as Q,
since P is smaller than Q and Q is supposed to be elegant (assuming that all
theorems proved in the FAS are correct, are true)! The only way to avoid this
contradiction is that P never finds Q, because no program Q that’s larger
than P is ever shown to be elegant in this FAS.
So using this FAS, you can’t prove that a program Q is elegant if it’s
larger than P is. So in this FAS, you can’t prove that more than finitely
many specific programs are elegant. (So the halting problem is unsolvable,
as we’ll see in the next section.)
And P is just a fixed number of bits larger than the FAS that we’re using.
Mostly P contains the instructions for generating all the theorems, that’s the
variable part, plus a little more, a fixed part, to filter them and carry out
our proof as above.
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So the basic idea is that you can’t prove that a program is elegant if
it’s larger than the size of the program for generating all the theorems in
your FAS. In other words, if the program is larger than the program-size
complexity of your FAS, then you can’t prove that that program is elegant!
No way!
You see how useful it is to be able to measure the complexity of a FAS,
to be able to measure how many bits of information it contains?
Tacit assumption: In this discussion we’ve assumed the soundness of
the FAS, which is to say, we’ve assumed that all the theorems that it proves
are true.
Caution: We don’t really have complete irreducibility yet, because the
different cases “P is elegant”, “Q is elegant”, “R is elegant” are not inde-
pendent of one another. In fact, you can determine all elegant programs less
than N bits in size from the same N -bit axiom, one that tells you which
program with less than N bits takes longest to halt. Can you see how to do
this?
But before we solve this problem and achieve total irreducibility with the
bits of the halting probability Ω, let’s pause and deduce a useful corollary.
Back to Turing’s Halting Problem
Here’s an immediate consequence, it’s a corollary, of the fact that we’ve just
established that you can’t mechanically find more than finitely many elegant
programs:
There is no algorithm to solve the halting problem, to decide whether or
not a given program ever halts. Proof by reductio ad absurdum: Because
if there were such an algorithm, we could use it to find all the elegant
programs. You’d do this by checking in turn every program to see if it halts,
and then running the ones that halt to see what they produce, and then
keeping only the first program you find that produces a given output. If
you look at all the programs in size order, this will give you precisely all
the elegant programs (barring ties, which are unimportant and we can forget
about).
In fact, we’ve actually just shown that if our halting problem algorithm is
N bits in size, then there’s got to be a program that never halts, and that’s
at most just a few bits larger than N bits in size, but we can’t decide that
this program never halts using our N -bit halting problem algorithm. (This
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assumes that the halting problem algorithm prefers never to give an answer
rather than to give the wrong answer. Such an algorithm can be reinterpreted
as a FAS.)
So we’ve just proved Turing’s famous 1936 result completely differently
from the way that he originally proved it, using the idea of program size, of
algorithmic information, of software complexity. Of all the proofs that I’ve
found of Turing’s result, this one is my favorite.
And now I must confess something else. Which is that I don’t think that
you can really understand a mathematical result until you find your own
proof. Reading somebody else’s proof is not as good as finding your own
proof. In fact, one fine mathematician that I know, Robert Solovay, never
let me explain a proof to him. He would always insist on just being told the
statement of the result, and then he would think it through on his own! I
was very impressed!
This is the most straight-forward, the most direct, the most basic proof
of Turing’s result that I’ve been able to find. I’ve tried to get to the heart
of the matter, to remove all the clutter, all the peripheral details that get in
the way of understanding.
And this also means that this missing piece in our Chapter II discussion
of Hilbert’s 10th problem has now been filled in.
Why is the halting problem interesting? Well, because in Chapter II we
showed that if the halting problem is unsolvable, then Hilbert’s 10th problem
cannot be solved, and there is no algorithm to decide whether a diophantine
equation has a solution or not. In fact, Turing’s halting problem is equivalent
to Hilbert’s 10th problem, in the sense that a solution to either problem would
automatically provide/entail a solution for the other one.
The Halting Probability Ω and Self-Delimiting
Programs
Now we’re really going to get irreducible mathematical facts, mathematical
facts that “are true for no reason”, and which simulate in pure math, as much
as is possible, independent tosses of a fair coin: It’s the bits of the base-two
expansion of the halting probability Ω. The beautiful, illuminating fact that
you can’t prove that a program is elegant was just a warm-up exercise!
Instead of looking at one program, like Turing does, and asking whether
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or not it halts, let’s put all possible programs in a bag, shake it up, close
our eyes, and pick out a program. What’s the probability that this program
that we’ve just chosen at random will eventually halt? Let’s express that
probability as an infinite precision binary real between zero and one. And
voila!, its bits are our independent mathematical facts.
The Halting Probability Ω
You run a program chosen by chance on a fixed computer.
Each time the computer requests the next bit of the program,
flip a coin to generate it, using independent tosses of a fair coin.
The computer must decide by itself when to stop reading the program.
This forces the program to be self-delimiting binary information.
You sum for each program that halts
the probability of getting precisely
that program by chance:
Ω =
∑
program p halts 1/2
(size in bits of p)
Each k-bit self-delimiting program p that halts
contributes 1/2k to the value of Ω.
The self-delimiting program proviso is crucial: Otherwise the halting
probability has to be defined for programs of each particular size, but
it cannot be defined over all programs of arbitrary size.
To make Ω seem more real, let me point out that you can compute it in
the limit from below:
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Nth Approximation to Ω
Run each program up to N bits in size for N seconds.
Then each k-bit program you discover that halts
contributes 1/2k to this approximate value for Ω.
These approximate values get bigger and bigger (slowly!)
and they approach Ω more and more closely, from below.
1st approx. ≤ 2nd approx. ≤ 3rd approx. ≤ . . . ≤ Ω
This process is written in LISP in my book The Limits of Mathematics.
The LISP function that gives this approximate value for Ω as a function of
N is about half a page of code using the special LISP dialect that I present
in that book.
However, this process converges very, very slowly to Ω. In fact, you
can never know how close you are, which makes this a rather weak kind of
convergence.
Normally, for approximate values of a real number to be useful, you have
to know how close they are to what they’re approximating, you have to know
what’s called “the rate of convergence”, or have what’s called “a computable
regulator of convergence”. But here we don’t have any of that, just a sequence
of rational numbers that very slowly creeps closer and closer to Ω, but without
enabling us to ever know precisely how close we are to Ω at a given point in
this unending computation.
In spite of all of this, these approximations are extremely useful: In the
next section, we’ll use them in order to show that Ω is an algorithmically
“random” or “irreducible” real number. And later in this chapter, we’ll use
them to construct diophantine equations for the bits of Ω.
Ω as an Oracle for the Halting Problem
Why are the bits of Ω irreducible mathematical facts? Well, it’s because we
can use the first N bits of Ω to settle the halting problem for all programs
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up to N bits in size. That’s N bits of information, and the first N bits of Ω
are therefore an irredundant representation of this information.
How much information is there
in the first N bits of Ω?
Given the first N bits of Ω, get better and better
approximations for Ω as indicated in the previous section,
until the first N bits of the approximate value are correct.
At that point you’ve seen every program up to N bits long
that ever halts. Output something not included in any of the
output produced by all these programs that halt. It cannot have been
produced using any program having less than or equal to N bits.
Therefore the first N bits of Ω cannot be produced with
any program having substantially less than N bits, and Ω
satisfies the definition of a “random” or “irreducible” real
number given in Chapter V:
H(the first N bits of Ω) > N − c
This process is written in LISP in my book The Limits of Mathematics.
The LISP function that produces something with complexity greater than N
bits if it is given any program that calculates the first N bits of Ω, is about
a page of code using the special LISP dialect that I present in that book.
The size in bits of this one-page LISP function is precisely the value of that
constant c with the property that H(the first N bits of Ω) is greater than
N − c for all N . So, the program-size complexity of the first N bits of Ω
never drops too far below N .
Now that we know that Ω is an algorithmically “random” or “irreducible”
real number, the argument that a FAS can determine only finitely many bits
of such a number given in Chapter V immediately applies to Ω. The basic
idea is that if K bits of Ω could be “compressed” into a substantially less
than K-bit FAS, then Ω wouldn’t really be irreducible. In fact, using the
argument given in Chapter V, we can say exactly how many bits of Ω a given
FAS can determine. Here’s the final result. . .
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An FAS can only determine
as many bits of Ω as its complexity
As we showed in Chapter V, there is (another) constant c such that
a formal axiomatic system FAS with program-size complexity H(FAS)
can never determine more than H(FAS) + c bits of the value for Ω.
These are theorems of the form “The 39th bit of Ω is 0”
or “The 64th bit of Ω is 1”.
(This assumes that the FAS only enables you to prove such theorems
if they are true.)
This is an extremely strong incompleteness result, it’s the very best
I can do, because it says that essentially the only way to determine bits of Ω
is to put that information directly into the axioms of our FAS, without using
any reasoning at all, only, so to speak, table look-up to determine these finite
sets of bits.
In other words, the bits of Ω are logically irreducible, they cannot be
obtained from axioms simpler than they are. Finally! We’ve found a way to
simulate independent tosses of a fair coin, we’ve found “atomic” mathemat-
ical facts, an infinite series of math facts that have no connection with each
other and that are, so to speak, “true for no reason” (no reason simpler
than they are).
Also, this result can be interpreted informally as saying that math is
random, or more precisely, contains randomness, namely the bits of Ω. What
a dramatic conclusion! But a number of serious caveats are in order!
Math isn’t random in the sense of being arbitrary, not at all—it most
definitely is not the case that 2 + 2 is occasionally equal to 5 instead of 4!
But math does contain irreducible information, of which Ω is the prime
example.
To say that Ω is random may be a little confusing. It’s a specific well-
determined real number, and technically it satisfies the definition of what
I’ve been calling a “random real”. But math often uses familiar words in
unfamiliar ways. Perhaps a better way to put it is to say that Ω is algorith-
mically incompressible. Actually, I much prefer the word “irreducible”; I’m
116 Meta Math!
coming to use it more and more, although for historical reasons the word
“random” is unavoidable.
So perhaps it’s best to avoid misunderstandings and to say that Ω is
irreducible, which is true both algorithmically or computationally, and logi-
cally, by means of proofs. And which happens to imply that Ω has many of
the characteristics of the typical outcome of a random process, in the physical
sense of an unpredictable process amenable to statistical treatment.
For example, as we’ll discuss in the next section, in base two, in Ω’s
infinite binary expansion, each of the 2k possible k-bit blocks will appear with
limiting relative frequency exactly 1/2k, and this is provably the case for the
specific real number Ω, even though it’s only true with probability one, but
not with certainty, for the outcome of an infinite series of independent tosses
of a fair coin. So perhaps, in retrospect, the choice of the word “random”
wasn’t so bad after all!
Also, a random real may be meaningless, or it may be extremely meaning-
ful; my theory cannot distinguish between these two possibilities, it cannot
say anything about that. If the real was produced using an independent toss
of a fair coin for each bit, it’ll be irreducible and it’ll be meaningless. On
the other hand, Ω is a random real with lots of meaning, since it contains a
lot of information about the halting problem, and this information is stored
in Ω in an irreducible fashion, with no redundancy. You see, once you com-
press out all the redundancy from anything meaningful, the result necessarily
looks meaningless, even though it isn’t, not at all, it’s just jam-packed with
meaning!
Borel Normal Numbers Again
In fact, it’s not difficult to see that Ω is normal, that is to say, b-normal for
any base b, not just 2-normal. And the lovely thing about this, is that the
definition of Ω as the halting probability doesn’t seem to have anything to
do with normality. Ω wasn’t constructed especially with normality in mind;
that just dropped out, for free, so to speak!
So for any base b and any fixed number k of base-b “digits”, the limiting
relative frequency of each of the bk possible k-digit sequences in Ω’s b-ary
expansion will be exactly 1/bk. In the limit, they are all equally likely to
appear. . .
How can you prove that this has got to be the case? Well, if this were not
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the case, then Ω’s bits would be highly compressible, by a fixed multiplicative
factor depending on just how unequal the relative frequencies happen to be.
In other words, the bits of Ω could be compressed by a fixed percentage,
which is a lot of compression. . . These are ideas that go back to a famous
paper published by Claude Shannon in The Bell System Technical Journal in
the 1940’s, although the context in which we are working is rather different
from his. Anyway that’s where I got the idea, by reading Shannon. Shannon
and I both worked for industrial labs: in his case, it was the phone company’s,
in my case, IBM’s.
So that’s how I succeeded in finding a normal number! It was because I
wasn’t interested in normality per se, but in deeper, philosophical issues, and
normality just dropped out as an application of these ideas. Sort of similar
to Turing’s proof that transcendentals exist, because all algebraic numbers
have to be computable. . .
And how did the City College professor Richard Stoneham succeed in
his quest for randomness? Here it is, here is Stoneham’s provably 2-normal
number:
1/(3× 23) + 1/(32 × 232) + 1/(33 × 233) + . . . 1/(3k × 23k) + . . .
This is normal base 2 for blocks of all size.
And what is the more general result obtained by David Bailey and Richard
Crandall in 2003?
1/(c× bc) + 1/(c2 × bc2) + 1/(c3 × bc3) + . . . 1/(ck × bck) + . . .
This is b-normal as long as b is greater than 1 and b and c have no common
factors. For example, b = 5 and c = 7 will do; that gives you a 5-normal
number. For the details, see the chapter on normal numbers, Chapter 4, in
Borwein and Bailey, Mathematics by Experiment. And there’s lots of other
interesting stuff in that book, for example, amazing new ways to calculate
π—which actually happens to be connected with these normality proofs! (See
their Chapter 3).
Getting Bits of Ω using Diophantine Equations
In Chapter V, I expressed mathematical skepticism about real numbers.
And in Chapter IV, I expressed physical skepticism about real numbers. So
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why should we take the real number Ω seriously? Well, it’s not just any real
number, you can get it from a diophantine equation! In fact, you can do this
in two rather different ways.
One approach, that I discovered in 1987, makes the number of solutions
of an equation jump from finite to infinite in a way that mimics the bits of Ω.
The other approach, discovered by Toby Ord and Tien D. Kieu in Australia
2003, makes the number of solutions of the equation jump from even to odd
in a way that mimics the bits of Ω. So take your choice; it can be done either
way. There’s a Northern and there’s a Southern Hemisphere approach to this
problem—and no doubt many other interesting ways to do it!
Remember Kronecker’s credo that “God created the integers; all else is
the work of man”? If you prefer, Ω isn’t a real number at all, it’s a fact
about certain diophantine equations; it has to do only with whole numbers,
with positive integers! So you cannot shrug away the fact that the bits of
the halting probability Ω are irreducible mathematical truths, for this can
be reinterpreted as a statement about diophantine equations.
Chaitin (1987):
Exponential Diophantine Equation #1
In this equation n is a parameter,
and k, x, y, z, . . . are the unknowns:
L(n, k, x, y, z, . . .) = R(n, k, x, y, z, . . .).
It has infinitely many positive-integer solutions
if the nth bit of Ω is a 1.
It has only finitely many positive-integer solutions
if the nth bit of Ω is a 0.
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Ord, Kieu (2003):
Exponential Diophantine Equation #2
In this equation n is a parameter,
and k, x, y, z, . . . are the unknowns:
L(n, k, x, y, z, . . .) = R(n, k, x, y, z, . . .).
For any given value of the parameter n,
it only has finitely many positive-integer solutions.
For each particular value of n:
the number of solutions of this equation will be odd
if the nth bit of Ω is a 1, and
the number of solutions of this equation will be even
if the nth bit of Ω is a 0.
How do you construct these two diophantine equations? Well, the details
get a little messy. The boxes below give you the general idea; they sum-
marize what needs to be done. As you’ll see, that computable sequence of
approximate values of Ω that we discussed before plays a key role. It’s also
important, particularly for Ord and Kieu (2003), to recall that these approx-
imate values are a non-decreasing sequence of rational numbers that get
closer and closer to Ω but that always remain less than the value of Ω.
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Chaitin (1987):
Exponential Diophantine Equation #1
Program(n, k) calculates the kth approximation to Ω,
in the manner explained in a previous section.
Then Program(n, k) looks at the nth bit of this approximate value for Ω.
If this bit is a 1, then Program(n, k) immediately halts; otherwise it loops forever.
So Program(n, k) halts if and only if
(the nth bit in the kth approximation to Ω) is a 1.
As k gets larger and larger, the nth bit of the kth approximation to Ω
will eventually settle down to the correct value. Therefore for all sufficiently large k:
Program(n, k) will halt if the nth bit of Ω is a 1,
and Program(n, k) will fail to halt if the nth bit of Ω is a 0.
Using all the work on Hilbert’s 10th problem that we explained in Chapter II,
we immediately get an exponential diophantine equation
L(n, k, x, y, z, . . .) = R(n, k, x, y, z, . . .)
that has exactly one positive-integer solution if Program(n, k) eventually halts,
and that has no positive-integer solution if Program(n, k) never halts.
Therefore, fixing n and considering k to be an unknown, this exact same equation
L(n, k, x, y, z, . . .) = R(n, k, x, y, z, . . .)
has infinitely many solutions if the nth bit of Ω is a 1,
and it has only finitely many solutions if the nth bit of Ω is a 0.
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Ord, Kieu (2003):
Exponential Diophantine Equation #2
Program(n, k) halts if and only if k > 0 and
2n × (jth approximation to Ω) > k
for some j = 1, 2, 3, . . .
So Program(n, k) halts if and only if 2n × Ω > k > 0.
Using all the work on Hilbert’s 10th problem that we explained in Chapter II,
we immediately get an exponential diophantine equation
L(n, k, x, y, z, . . .) = R(n, k, x, y, z, . . .)
that has exactly one positive-integer solution if Program(n, k) eventually halts,
and that has no positive-integer solution if Program(n, k) never halts.
Let’s fix n and ask for which k does this equation have a solution.
Answer: L(n, k) = R(n, k) is solvable precisely for
k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., up to the integer part of 2n × Ω.
Therefore, L(n) = R(n) has exactly integer part of 2n × Ω solutions,
which is the integer you get by shifting the binary expansion for Ω left n bits.
And the right-most bit of the integer part of 2n × Ω will be the nth bit of Ω.
Therefore, fixing n and considering k to be an unknown, this exact same equation
L(n, k, x, y, z, . . .) = R(n, k, x, y, z, . . .)
has an odd number of solutions if the nth bit of Ω is a 1,
and it has an even number of solutions if the nth bit of Ω is a 0.
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Why is the Particular Random Real Ω Inter-
esting?
This is a good place to discuss a significant issue. In the previous chapter
we pointed out that with probability one a real number is algorithmically
irreducible. Algorithmically compressible reals have probability zero. So
why is the particular random real Ω of any interest?! There are certainly
plenty of them!
Well, for a number of reasons.
First of all, Ω links us to Turing’s famous result; the halting problem is
unsolvable and the halting probability is random! Algorithmic unsolvability
in one case, algorithmic randomness or incompressibility in the other. Also,
the first N bits of Ω give us a lot of information about particular, individual
cases of the halting problem.
But the main reason that Ω is interesting is this: We have reached into
the infinitely dark blackness of random reals and picked out a single random
real! I wouldn’t say that we can touch it, but we can certainly point straight
at it. And it is important to make this obscurity tangible by exhibiting a
specific example. After all, why should we believe that most things have a
certain property if we can’t exhibit a specific thing that has this property?
(Please note, however, that in the case of the un-nameable reals, which
also have probability one, we’re never ever going to be able to pick out an
individual un-namable real!)
Here’s another way to put it: Ω is violently, maximally uncomputable,
but it almost looks computable. It’s just across the border between what
we can deal with and things that transcend our abilities as mathematicians.
So it serves to establish a sharp boundary, it draws a thin line in the sand
that we dare not cross, that we can not cross!
And that’s also connected with the fact that we can compute better and
better lower bounds on Ω, we just can’t ever know how close we’ve gotten.
In other words, for an incompleteness result to be really shocking, the
situation has got to be that just as we were about to reach out and touch
something, we get our fingers slapped. We can never ever have it, even
though it’s attractively laid out on the dining room table, next to a lot of
other inviting food! That’s much more frustrating and much more interesting
than being told that we can’t have something or do something that never
seemed concrete enough or down to earth enough that this ever looked like
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a legitimate possibility in the first place!
What is the Moral of the Story?
So the world of mathematical truth has infinite complexity, even though any
given FAS only has finite complexity. In fact, even the world of diophantine
problems has infinite complexity, no finite FAS will do.
I therefore believe that we cannot stick with a single FAS, as Hilbert
wanted, we’ve got to keep adding new axioms, new rules of inference, or some
other kind of new mathematical information to the foundations of our theory.
And where can we get new stuff that cannot be deduced from what we already
know? Well, I’m not sure, but I think that it may come from the same place
that physicists get their new equations: based on inspiration, imagination
and on—in the case of math, computer, not laboratory—experiments.
So this is a “quasi-empirical” view of how to do mathematics, which is
a term coined by Lakatos in an article in Thomas Tymoczko’s interesting
collection New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics. And this is
closely connected with the idea of so-called “experimental mathematics”,
which uses computational evidence rather than conventional proof to “es-
tablish” new truths. This research methodology, whose benefits are argued
for in a two-volume work by Borwein, Bailey and Girgensohn, may not only
sometimes be extremely convenient, as they argue, but in fact it may
sometimes even be absolutely necessary in order for mathematics to be
able to progress in spite of the incompleteness phenomenon. . .
Okay, so that’s my approach to incompleteness, and it’s rather different
from Go¨del’s and Turing’s. The main idea is to measure the complexity or
the information content of a FAS by the size in bits of the smallest program
for generating all the theorems. Once you do that, everything else follows.
From that initial insight, it’s more or less straight-forward, the developments
are more or less systematic.
Yes, but as Po´lya pointedly asks, “Can you see it all at a glance?” Yes,
in fact I think that we can:
No mechanical process (rules of the game) can be really cre-
ative, because in a sense anything that ever comes out was already
contained in your starting point. Does this mean that physical
randomness, coin tossing, something non-mechanical, is the only
possible source of creativity?! At least from this (enormously over-
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simplified!) point of view, it is.
Against Egotism
The history of ideas offers many surprises. In this book we’ve seen that:
• Digital philosophy can be traced back to Leibniz, and digital physics
can be traced back to Zeno.
• My definition of randomness via complexity goes back to Leibniz.
• My Ω number can be traced back to Borel’s know-it-all real number.
Borel’s number is also an example of what Turing would later call an
uncomputable real.
• The main idea of my proof that you can’t prove that a program is
elegant—in fact it’s the basic idea of all my incompleteness results—
can be traced back to Borel’s undefinability-of-randomness paradox.
I think that these observations should serve as an antidote to the excessive
egotism, competitiveness and the foolish fights over priority that poison sci-
ence. No scientific idea has only one name on it; they are the joint production
of the best minds in the human race, building on each other’s insights over
the course of history.
And the fact that these ideas can be traced that far back, that the threads
are that long, doesn’t weaken them in any way. On the contrary, it gives them
even greater significance.
As my friend Jacob T. Schwartz once told me, the medieval cathedrals
were the work of many hands, anonymous hands, and took lifetimes to build.
And Schwartz delighted in quoting a celebrated doctor from that period, who
said about a patient, “I treated him and God cured him!” I think that this
is also the right attitude to have in science and mathematics.
Chapter VII—Conclusion
As you have no doubt noticed, this is really a book on philosophy, not just a
math book. And as Leibniz says in the quote at the beginning of the book,
math and philosophy are inseparable.
Among the great philosophers, only Pythagoras and Leibniz were great
mathematicians. Indeed, Pythagoras, though lost in the mists of time, is
credited with inventing philosophy and mathematics and also inventing the
words “philosophy” and “mathematics”. As for Leibniz, he is what the
Germans call a “universalgenie”, a universal genius, interested in everything;
and if he was interested in something, he always came up with an important
new idea, he always made a good suggestion.
Since Leibniz, perhaps only Poincare´ was a little like this. He was enough
of a philosopher to come up with a version of relativity theory before Einstein
did, and his popular books of essays were full of philosophical observations
and are still in print.
And Leibniz used the word “transcendental” as in transcendental curves,
numbers, and methods etc. deliberately, thinking of God’s transcendence of
all things human, which also inspired Cantor to develop his theory of infinite
magnitudes. After all, math deals with the world of ideas, which transcends
the real world. And for “God” you can understand the laws of the universe,
as Einstein did, or the entire world, as Spinoza did, that doesn’t change the
message.
The topic of monotheism and polytheism is also germane here. I love
the complexity and sophistication of South Indian vegetarian cuisine, and
my home is decorated with Indian sculpture and fabrics—and much more. I
admired Peter Brook’s Mahabharata, which clearly brings out the immense
philosophical depth of this epic.
But my intellectual personality is resolutely monotheistic. Why do I say
that my personality is monotheistic? I mean it only in this rather abstract
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sense: that I am always searching for simple, unifying ideas, rather than
glorying intellectually in “polytheistic” subjects like biology, in which there
is a rich tapestry of extremely complicated facts that resists being reduced
to a few simple ideas.
And let’s look at Hilbert’s FAS’s. They failed miserably. Nevertheless
formalism has been a brilliant success this past century, but not in math,
not in philosophy, but as computer technology, as software, as programming
languages. It works for machines, but not for us!8
Just look at Bertrand Russell’s three-volume magnum opus (with White-
head) Principia Mathematica, which I keep in my office at IBM. One entire
formula-filled volume to prove that 1+1 = 2! And by modern standards, the
formal axiomatic system used there is inadequate; it’s not formal enough!
No wonder that Poincare´ decried this as a kind of madness!
But I think that it was an interesting philosophical/intellectual exercise to
refute this madness as convincingly as possible; somehow I ended up spending
my life on that!
Of course, formalism fits the 20th century zeitgeist so well: Everything
is meaningless, technical papers should never discuss ideas, only present the
facts! A rule that I’ve done my best to ignore! As Vladimir Tasic´ says in
his book Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought, a great deal
of 20th century philosophy seems enamored with formalism and then senses
that Go¨del has pulled the rug out from under it, and therefore truth is
relative. — Or, as he puts it, it could have happened this way. — Tasic´
presents 20th century thought as, in effect, a dialogue between Hilbert and
Poincare´. . . But truth is relative is not the correct conclusion. The correct
conclusion is that Hilbert was wrong and that Poincare´ was right: intuition
cannot be eliminated from mathematics, or from human thought in general.
And it’s not all the same, all intuitions are not equally valid. Truth is not
reinvented by each culture or each generation, it’s not merely a question of
fashion.
Let me repeat: formal axiomatic systems are a failure! Theorem proving
algorithms do not work. One can publish papers about them, but they only
prove trivial theorems. And in the case-histories in this book, we’ve seen
that the essence of math resides in its creativity, in imagining new concepts,
8Mathematicians this century have nevertheless made the fatal mistake of gradually
eliminating all words from their papers. That’s another story, which I prefer not to discuss
here, the Bourbakisation of 20th century mathematics.
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in changing viewpoints, not in mindlessly and mechanically grinding away
deducing all the possible consequences of a fixed set of rules and ideas.
Similarly, proving correctness of software using formal methods is hope-
less. Debugging is done experimentally, by trial and error. And cautious
managers insist on running a new system in parallel with the old one until
they believe that the new system works.
Except—what we did in a marvelous project at IBM—for constantly eat-
ing your own cooking. We were constantly running the latest version of our
software, constantly compiling our optimizing compiler through itself. By
constantly using it ourselves, we got instantaneous feedback on the perfor-
mance and on the design, which was constantly evolving. In my opinion
that’s the only way to develop a large piece of software: a totalitarian top-
down approach cannot work. You have to design it as you go, not at the
very beginning, before you write a single line of code.
And I feel that my experience in the real world debugging software, yields
a valuable philosophical lesson: Experimentation is the only way to “prove”
that software is correct. Traditional mathematical proofs are only possible
in toy worlds, not in the real world. The real world is too complicated. A
physicist would say it like this: Pure math can only deal with the hydrogen
atom. One proton, one electron, that’s it! The quasi-empirical view of math
may be controversial in the math community, but it is old hat in the software
business. Programmers already have a quasi-empirical attitude to proof.
Even though software is pure mind-stuff, not physical, programmers behave
like physicists, not mathematicians, when it comes to debugging.
On the other hand, a way to minimize the debugging problem is to try
at all costs to keep software intellectually manageable, as illustrated by my
discussion of LISP. In our IBM project, I did this by re-writing all my code
from scratch each time that I advanced in my understanding of the problem.
I refused to use ad hoc code and tried instead to base everything as much as
possible on clean, systematic mathematical algorithms. My goal was crys-
talline clarity. In my opinion, what counts most in a design is conceptual
integrity, being faithful to an idea, not confusing the issue!
The previous paragraph is very pro-math. However, my design evolved,
as I said, based on computer experiments, and the experimental method is
used by physicists, not by mathematicians. It’s too bad that mathematicians
feel that way about experimentation!
Remember, I think that math is not that different from physics, for we
must be willing to add new axioms:
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Physics: laws → Computer → universe
Math: axioms → Computer → theorems
To get more out, put more in!
Another lesson I’d like you to take from this book is that everything
is connected, all important ideas are—and that fundamental questions go
back millennia and are never resolved. For example, the tension between
the continuous and the discrete, or the tension between the world of ideas
(math!) and the real world (physics, biology). You can find all this discussed
in ancient Greece. And I suspect we could even trace it back to ancient
Sumer, if more remained of Sumerian math than the scrap paper jottings on
the clay tablets that are all we have, jottings that give hints of surprisingly
sophisticated methods and of a love for calculation that seems to far outstrip
any possible practical application.9
On Creativity
Having emphasized and re-emphasized the importance of creativity, it would
be nice if I had a theory about it. Nope, but I do have some experience
being creative. So let me try to share that with you.
The message of Go¨del incompleteness, as I’ve said again and again in
this book, is that a static fixed FAS cannot work. You have to add new
information, new axioms, new concepts. Math is constantly evolving. The
problem with current metamath is that it deals only with—it refutes—static
FAS’s. So where do new math ideas come from? Can we have a theory about
that? A dynamic rather than static view of math, a dynamic rather than a
static metamath, a kind of dynamic FAS perhaps?
Since I don’t have that theory, I think an anecdotal approach might be
best. This book is full of amazing case studies of new, unexpected math
ideas that reduced the complicated to the obvious. And I’ve come up with a
few of these ideas myself. How does it feel to do that?
9Did Sumer inherit its mathematics from an even older civilization—one more ad-
vanced than the ancient Greeks—that was destroyed by the glaciers, or when the glaciers
suddenly melted, or by some other natural catastrophe? There is no way for such sophis-
ticated computational techniques to appear out of nowhere, without antecedents.
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Well, you can’t find them if you don’t look for them, if you don’t really
believe in them.
Is there some way to train for it, like a sport?! No, I don’t think so! You
have to be seized by a demon, and our society doesn’t want too many people
to be like that!
Let me describe what it feels like right now while I’m writing this book.
First of all, the ideas that I’m discussing seem very concrete, real and
tangible to me. Sometimes they even feel more real than the people around
me. They certainly feel more real than newspapers, shopping malls and TV
programs—those always give me a tremendous feeling of unreality! In fact,
I only really feel alive when I’m working on a new idea, when I’m making
love to a woman (which is also working on a new idea, the child we might
conceive), or when I’m going up a mountain! It’s intense, very intense.
When I’m working on a new idea I push everything else away. I stop
swimming in the morning, I don’t pay the bills, I cancel my doctor appoint-
ments. As I said, everything else becomes unreal! And I don’t have to force
myself to do this.
On the contrary, it’s pure sensuality, pure pleasure. I put beautiful new
ideas in the same category with beautiful women and beautiful art. To me
it’s like an amazing ethnic cuisine I’ve never tasted before.
I’m not depriving myself of anything, I’m not an ascetic. I don’t look like
an ascetic, do I?
And you can’t force yourself to do it, anymore than a man can force
himself to make love to a woman he doesn’t want.
The good moments are very, very good! Sometimes when I’m writing this
I don’t know where the ideas come from. I think that it can’t be me, that
I’m just a channel for ideas that want to be expressed. — But I have been
concentrating on these questions for a long time. — I feel inspired, energized
by the ideas. People may think that something’s wrong with me, but I’m
okay, I’m more than okay. It’s pure enthusiasm! That’s “God within” in
Greek. Intellectual elation—like summiting on a high peak!
And I’m a great believer in the subconscious, in sleeping on it, in going
to bed at 3am or 5am after working all night, and then getting up the next
morning full of new ideas, ideas that come to you in waves while you’re
taking a bath, or having coffee. Or swimming laps. So mornings are very
important to me, and I prefer to spend them at home. Routine typing and
e-mail, I do in my office, not at home. And when I get too tired to stay in
the office, then I print out the final version of the chapter I’m working on,
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bring it home—where there is no computer—and lie in bed for hours reading
it, thinking about it, making corrections, adding stuff.
Sometimes the best time is lying in bed in the dark with my eyes closed,
in a half dreamy, half awake state that seems to make it easier for new ideas,
or new combinations of ideas, to emerge. I think of the subconscious as a
chemical soup that’s constantly making new combinations, and interesting
combinations of ideas stick together, and eventually percolate up into full
consciousness. — That’s not too different from a biological population in
which individuals fall in love and combine to produce new individuals. —
My guess is that all this activity takes place at a molecular level—like DNA
and information storage in the immune system—not at the cellular level.
That’s why the brain is so powerful, because that’s where the real information
processing is, at a molecular level. The cellular level, that’s just the front
end. . .
Yes, I believe in ideas, in the power of imagination and new ideas. And
I don’t believe in money or in majority views or the consensus. Even if all
you are interested in is money, I think that new ideas are vital in the long
run, which is why a commercial enterprise like IBM has a Research Division
and has supported my work for so long. Thank you, IBM!
And I think that this also applies to human society.
I think that the current zeitgeist is very dangerous, because people are
really desperate for their lives to be meaningful. They need to be creative,
they need to help other people, they need to be part of a community, they
need to be adventurous explorers, all things that tribal life provided. That’s
why much of the art in my home is from so-called “primitive” cultures like
Africa.
So you’re not going to be surprised to hear that I think that we desperately
need new ideas about how human society should be organized, about what
it’s all for and how to live.
When I was a child, I read a science fiction story by Chad Oliver. He was
an anthropologist (from Greek “anthropos” = human being), not someone
interested in hardware, or in spaceships, but in what was going on inside, in
the human soul.
The story was called Election Day, and it was about a typical Ameri-
can family consisting of a working father, a stay-at-home mother, and two
children, a boy and a girl.—That was the 1950’s, remember!—Everything
seemed normal, until you learned that the father, who was running for of-
fice, actually wasn’t himself a candidate, no, he had created a social system.
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And the election wasn’t electing people, it was voting on the choice of the
next social system. And this wasn’t really 1950’s America, they had voted
to live that way for a while, and then they were going to change and try a
completely different system, right away, soon after election day!
What a remarkable idea!
And that’s what I think we desperately need: Remarkable new ideas!
Paradigm shifts! Meaning, intuition, creativity! We need to reinvent our-
selves!
Thank you for reading this book and for taking this journey with me!
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Reading a Note in the Journal
Nature I Learn
by Robert M. Chute
Omega, Omega-like, and Computably Enumerable
Random Real Numbers all may be
a single class.
Should I be concerned? Is this the sign
of a fatal fault line
in the logic of our world?
You shouldn’t worry, I’m told,
about such things, but how to be indifferent
if you don’t understand?
Standing here, we do not sense
any tectonic rearrangement
beneath our feet.
Despite such reassurance I feel
increasing dis-ease. Randomness is rising
around my knees.
Remember how we felt when we learned
that one infinity
could contain another?
Somewhere between the unreachable
and the invisible
I had hoped for an answer.10
10From Beloit Poetry Journal, Spring 2000 (Vol. 50, No. 3, p. 8). The note in Nature in
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question is C. S. Calude, G. J. Chaitin, “Randomness everywhere,” Nature, 22 July 1999
(Vol. 400, pp. 319–320).
Math Poem
Someone wrote a book called The Joy of Math.
Maybe I’ll write a book called The Pathos of Math.
For through the night I wander
between intuition and calculation
between examples and counter-examples
between the problem itself and what it has led to.
I find special cases with no determining vertices.
I find special cases with only determining vertices.
I weave in and out.
I rock to and fro.
I am the wanderer
with a lemma in every port.
—Marion D. Cohen11
11From her collection of math poetry Crossing the Equal Sign at
http://mathwoman.com. Originally published in the April 1999 American Mathe-
matical Monthly.
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Further Reading — Books /
Plays / Musicals on Related
Topics
Instead of providing an infinitely long bibliography, I decided to concentrate
mostly on recent books that caught my eye.
• Stephen Wolfram, A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media, 2002. [A
book concerned with many of the topics discussed here, but with quite
a different point of view.]
• Joshua Rosenbloom and Joanne Sydney Lesser, Fermat’s Last Tango.
A New Musical, York Theatre Company, New York City, 2000. CD:
Original Cast Records OC-6010, 2001. DVD: Clay Mathematics Insti-
tute, 2001. [A humorous and playful presentation of one mathemati-
cian’s obsession with math.]
• David Foster Wallace, Everything and More: A Compact History of
Infinity, Norton, 2003. [An American writer’s take on mathematics.]
• Dietmar Dath, Ho¨henrausch. Die Mathematik des XX. Jahrhunderts
in zwanzig Gehirnen, Eichborn, 2003. [A German writer’s reaction to
modern math and modern mathematicians.]
• John L. Casti, The One True Platonic Heaven. A Scientific Fiction on
the Limits of Knowledge, Joseph Henry Press, 2003. [Go¨del, Einstein
and von Neumann at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study.]
• Apostolos Doxiadis, Incompleteness, A Play and a Theorem,
http://www.apostolosdoxiadis.com. [A play about Go¨del from the au-
thor of Uncle Petros and Goldbach’s Conjecture.]
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• Mary Terall, The Man Who Flattened the Earth. Maupertuis and the
Sciences in the Enlightenment, University of Chicago Press, 2002.
[Newton vs. Leibniz, the generation after; a portrait of an era.]
• Isabelle Stengers, La Guerre des sciences aura-t-elle lieu? Scientific-
tion, Les Empeˆcheurs de penser en rond/Le Seuil, 2001. [A play about
Newton vs. Leibniz.]
• Carl Djerassi, David Pinner, Newton’s Darkness. Two Dramatic Views,
Imperial College Press, 2003. [Two plays, one about Newton vs. Leib-
niz.]
• Neal Stephenson, Quicksilver, Morrow, 2003. [A science fiction novel
about Newton vs. Leibniz. Volume 1 of 3.]
• David Ruelle, Chance and Chaos, Princeton Science Library, Princeton
University Press, 1993. [A physicist’s take on randomness.]
• Cristian S. Calude, Information and Randomness, Springer-Verlag,
2002. [A mathematician’s take on randomness.]
• James D. Watson, Andrew Berry, DNA: The Secret of Life, Knopf,
2003. [The role of information in biology.]
• Tom Siegfried, The Bit and the Pendulum. From Quantum Computing
to M Theory—The New Physics of Information,Wiley, 2000. [The role
of information in physics.]
• Tor Nørretranders, The User Illusion. Cutting Consciousness Down to
Size, Viking, 1998. [Information theory and the mind.]
• Hans Christian von Baeyer, Information: The New Language of Sci-
ence, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003.
• Marcus du Sautoy, The Music of the Primes: Searching to Solve the
Greatest Mystery in Mathematics, HarperCollins, 2003. [Of the recent
crop of books on the Reimann hypothesis, the only one that considers
the possibility that Go¨del incompleteness might apply.]
• Douglas S. Robertson, The New Renaissance: Computers and the Next
Level of Civilization, Oxford University Press, 1998.
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• Douglas S. Robertson, Phase Change: The Computer Revolution in
Science and Mathematics, Oxford University Press, 2003.
[These two books by Robertson discuss the revolutionary social trans-
formations provoked by improvements in information transmission
technology.]
• John Maynard Smith and Eo¨rs Szathma´ry, The Major Transitions in
Evolution, Oxford University Press, 1998.
• John Maynard Smith and Eo¨rs Szathma´ry, The Origins of Life: From
the Birth of Life to the Origin of Language, Oxford University Press,
1999.
[These two books by Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry discuss evolution-
ary progress in terms of radical improvements in the representation of
biological information.]
• John D. Barrow, Paul C. W. Davies, Charles L. Harper, Jr., Science
and Ultimate Reality: Quantum Theory, Cosmology, and Complexity,
Cambridge University Press, 2004. [Essays in honor of John Wheeler.]
• Gregory J. Chaitin, Conversations with a Mathematician, Springer-
Verlag, 2002. [Previous book by the author of this book.]
• Robert Wright, Three Scientists and Their Gods: Looking for Meaning
in an Age of Information, HarperCollins, 1989. [On Fredkin’s thesis
that the universe is a computer.]
• Jonathan M. Borwein, David H. Bailey, Mathematics by Experiment:
Plausible Reasoning in the 21st Century, A. K. Peters, 2004. [How to
discover new mathematics. Volume 1 of 2.]
• Vladimir Tasic´, Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern Thought,
Oxford University Press, 2001. [Where I learnt about Borel’s know-it-
all number.]
• Thomas Tymoczko, New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics,
Princeton University Press, 1998.
• Newton C. A. da Costa, Steven French, Science and Partial Truth,
Oxford University Press, 2003.
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• Eric B. Baum, What is Thought?, MIT Press, 2004.
